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4Abstract
Th is PhD thesis delivers an artistic research practice based on a deconstruction of the 
photographic image. Photography in post-photographic, digital culture has, due to 
changes in technology, become a matter of style while neglecting its own traditional 
process base. Th is thesis claims that similar automated processes can be found within 
information technology, which in the artistic realm has a strong relation to Conceptual 
art. A post-conceptual critique of the notion of ‘information’ in Conceptual practice 
allows for a repositioning of the image. Focusing on visual, transformative reﬂ ection, 
the thesis resists the temptation to present generalising philosophical speculation in 
favour of an artistic research practice that focuses on the inner, transformative workings 
of artworks, or the work’s ‘ﬁ guration’ as I call it, following Jean-François Lyotard and 
Georges Didi-Huberman.
Th is research project oﬀ ers an artistic interrogation into the potential of post-photographic 
practices under post-conceptual conditions. Apart from photography, the practice 
employs drawing, installation art, painting and printmaking to produce work that is often 
conceptually developed on the computer. Much of the work consists of abstract, blob-
like ‘ﬁ gures’ appropriated from digital-image material, while other work is measurement-
based. Figuration is advanced in each of these through constructive processes that remain 
visible.
A developed understanding of process-oriented practices within the digital realm, which 
this PhD oﬀ ers, allows present-day photography to connect to its traditional diversity. 
Th e necessary re-thinking of the image, which is a key result of the research, may aﬀ ect 
artistic practices beyond photography, giving an extended contemporary photographic 
practice increased artistic relevance.
Th e research is supported by art-historical discussions concerning the history of 
photography, the history of Conceptual art, and what Svetlana Alpers calls ‘the northern 
mode’ of painting. Technical discussions of post-photography and the notion of 
‘information’ help clarify underlying processes, while philosophical considerations are 
used to give meaning to a changed concept of the image. Finally, a methodological 
discussion contextualises the research within current notions of practice-led research.
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Chapter 1: Studio Practice
1.1 Th e Research Question
Th e research question that this PhD attempts to answer is a visual one. It ﬁ rst arose in 
relation to my work Remember Me, 2000 (ﬁ gs 1 and 2) and can be paraphrased with the 
query: ‘What does it mean to see like this?’; in other words, it is the event of seeing that 
is under scrutiny. 
Remember Me consists of a set of six Iris Giclee prints, which formally resemble portraits. 
Th e images share, besides the faces they depict, a characteristic blur that evenly covers 
their surface. In eﬀ ect, face and blur are not distinct elements. Th e blur is only visible 
with the aid of the face, because it adds tonal variations to the image; the face, on the 
other hand, seems to be made up of blur rather than simply being visible through it. Th is 
is related to the way in which the images were made. Appropriated, very small digital 
photographs of faces were enlarged in Adobe Photoshop using ‘bicubic interpolation’, 
resulting in an almost entirely calculated and thus blurred image.
Th e research question originates from this blur. Th e blur is distinct from the type of blur 
that one could encounter as an optical side-eﬀ ect in photography. In photography, an 
image is usually blurred when it is out of focus, or when the subject is moving. Th e blur in 
Remember Me, however, is a software-blur that shows the characteristics of this particular 
interpolation algorithm. Images softened with a ‘Gaussian’ blur, which is a diﬀ erent 
type of algorithm, are in comparison more like out-of-focus photographs. Gaussian blur 
is for this reason used to fake a reduced depth of ﬁ eld in the digital manipulation of 
photographs. In both cases, and in a way similar to an out-of-focus photograph, it is 
impossible, however, to tell blur and image apart. Although Gaussian blur is a software 
blur, it mimics an optical blur, while bicubic interpolation does not have an equivalent 
in optics. Th us the perceptions of these diﬀ erent kinds of blurs create very diﬀ erent 
connotations. While we do not step outside of what we will later call the ‘photographic 
style’ in an image that was post-produced using the Gaussian blur, our judgement is 
less straightforward in the case of bicubic interpolation, since there is no equivalent in 
traditional photography. 
Th e research question that is encountered visually in Remember Me takes its origin from 
the particular function of the blur in the work. As it brings the question of photography 
and post-photography into focus, through a blur that has a particular visual appearance, 
the work opens up an interrogation of photography – the status of photography in a 
computerised world and the visual implications of a changed technical way of imaging.
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Bicubic interpolation is not a blurring tool. It is used when images are resized, and as a 
consequence become blurred during the reconstruction of missing information. Bicubic 
interpolation cannot create new information (although new pixels are generated; see 
Chapter 3), but it does not remove existing information either. Blurs of the Gaussian 
type, however, do remove information as image detail is lost. In the case of Remember 
Me, bicubic interpolation has the interesting eﬀ ect of preserving image information that 
is not – so to speak – part of the image, if we think of the portrait as the image. Given the 
fact that the sources for Remember Me are very small and thus pixelated images, bicubic 
interpolation preserves the square layout of the pixel raster as though it were part of the 
face, thus blending face and raster into an interpolated image that is both face and raster 
(ﬁ g. 3).
Although Remember Me puts forward a visual question, it does not go any further. In fact, 
the sexually charged portraits distract from the question by overlaying a second issue: that 
of gender, gaze and sexuality. Th e blur in the work is thus in danger of functioning as a 
post-photographic eﬀ ect used to create a particular type of message rather than pushing 
for the meaning of this eﬀ ect in the realm of visuality. Th e title Remember Me, which was 
originally conceived as a play on the familiarity of the sexual gaze, extends into a deeper 
meaning when the work is seen as a research question. Th e remembrance of photography 
in post-photography opens up a critical interrogation of the blur of post-photography. 
In this PhD, the call for the remembrance of photography produces a degree-zero of 
certain visual aspects of photography, which will later be called ‘process-vision’ as opposed 
to ‘picture-vision’. Picture-vision is our ability to see what something is or represents, 
while process-vision is the ability to perceive how something is done or how it works. 
Photography, it is assumed, has always referred to both types of vision, although it is only 
from the perspective of post-photography that this has become an issue. In Remember 
Me, the female face is a residue of picture-vision embedded in the process-vision of the 
technical and conceptual construction of the work. 
An earlier example, Tottenham Court Road 1, 1999 (ﬁ g. 4), can serve to illustrate this. In 
this work, the halftone dots of a printed photograph are brought back into photography 
by re-photographing the image through the un-corrected lens of a magnifying glass. Th e 
face, with its clearly visible neutral skin tone, is an illusion reconstructed from the blurring 
of the halftone dots that underlie the smooth image. Tottenham Court Road 1 is similar 
to Remember Me in that both use reduced image information as their bases (halftone and 
pixel raster), which the works, regardless of the process, push into picture-vision. Th ey 
diﬀ er, however, in the sense that in Tottenham Court Road 1 the original photograph 
returns to the heightened picture-vision of photography. In Remember Me, 
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this reconciliation is disturbed through the impossibility of resolving the image back into 
a photograph due to the non-optical blur of bicubic interpolation. 
A successive work used the same process as Remember Me, but in removing the face, 
attempted to eliminate the associated picture-vision through an emptying out of the 
image. In White Square, 2001 (ﬁ g. 5), a white area had been placed on top of the face 
in the appropriated source material in order to make the sitter anonymous. Th e same 
result was sought in the appropriated source material for White Rose, 2001 (ﬁ g. 6), only 
here it was done with the help of a large-brimmed hat decorated with a white rose. 
Th e covered-up faces oﬀ ered the ﬁ rst perspective into a reduction of the picture-vision 
without, however, pushing forward process-vision as an alternative.
Th e following sections will give an account of the work that was undertaken in an attempt 
to respond to the research question in practical terms. Th e account deliberately keeps to 
a description of the works and the methods employed, since the context of the studio 
practice that is set up in this ﬁ rst chapter foregrounds the hands-on material development 
of the work. Th e contexts provided by the successive chapters will, by following their 
own logic, both implicitly and explicitly interrelate. All contexts taken together form my 
response to the research question that is Remember Me.
1.2 Grids and Blobs
Although the grid structure of the source image remains comparatively visible in the ﬁ nal 
images that comprise Remember Me, it is the ‘patchy’ or ‘blobby’ appearance of colour 
within the blur of the image that stands out. Th ese blobs are particularly pronounced 
around the eyes, for example, which emerge as dark, blurred dots due to the strong 
contrast in brightness between the eyes and the surrounding skin. Even in low-contrast 
areas, such blobs can be perceived. Th e replacement of the face by the square in White 
Square and by the rose in the White Rose series introduces a high-contrast colour amongst 
the more subdued colours in the rest of the image. It is thus the elements in the portraits 
that are used to hide the faces – the rose and the square – that create the strongest and 
most monochrome patches of colour.
Focusing on these patches of white in the White Rose series, I made the Potato Prints (White 
Rose), 2004 (ﬁ gs 7 and 8). Th e diﬀ erences in brightness of the blurred but pixellated 
images of the roses were mapped onto a scale from 0 to 5, 0 indicating the darkest and 
5 indicating the brightest areas. (Fig. 9 is an example of the numerical data of one of the 
‘roses’.) Th e decision to use a scale of six brightness values was an arbitrary reduction out 
of a maximum of 256 possible brightness values. I employed the numerical image map in 
the actual making of the work when using ﬁ ve diﬀ erent-sized halved potatoes to represent 
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the various brightness values. Th e largest potato was chosen to represent the highest 
number (namely, 5) all the way down to the smallest potato representing the value of 1. 
Points with the value of 0 were not represented. Once the ‘palette’ was established, the 
map was transposed onto paper by printing in black gouache with the cut side of each 
potato. Th e result is a black blob shape on a white ground. Th e grid structure is visible, 
but it appears chaotic at times, where imperfections in the printing have left white areas 
that rival the white gaps in the grid (ﬁ g. 10). Th e grid, although clearly an element of 
structure, is visually less important than, or even challenged by, the overall compact blob 
shape that seems to ‘hold’ the dots together.
In Th e Premier Rose, 2007 (ﬁ g. 11), a comparable process was used, except that here the 
source image was the appropriated photograph of a large diamond – the Premier Rose. 
Th is work diﬀ ers in a number of ways from the Potato Prints: Th e Premier Rose is made 
with black acrylic paint on primed, white canvas. A selection of lids served as the ‘palette’. 
Th ese were: Size 1: Volvic Mineral Water, Size 2: Yoghurt Drink, Size 3: Spray Glue, Size 
4: Sulfur 8 Anti-Dandruﬀ  Conditioner, Size 5: Hair Gel (Wet Look), Size 6: Zinc and 
Castor Oil Cream, Size 7: White Gouache (ﬁ g. 12). Th e ‘palette’ for Th e Premier Rose 
shows greater diﬀ erences in size than that used for the Potato Prints: the smallest size is 
less than 3 cm, while the largest is more than 12 cm in diameter. Th is wider range in size, 
and the strong local contrast in the image of the reﬂ ective crystal, have resulted in a quite 
diﬀ erent work: while the Potato Prints are very compact and voluminous, similar to some 
scientiﬁ c illustrations of molecules (ﬁ g. 13), the loose arrangement of dots in Th e Premier 
Rose is more akin to the halftone dots used in printmaking. Th is gives rise to the overall 
cleaner appearance with less volume.
In the case of Negative Light, 2004 (ﬁ g. 14), a patch of light from a source image (ﬁ g. 15) 
was represented in diﬀ erent sized ripped-out square pieces of black paper that were stuck 
onto a white gallery wall. Th e uneven borders of the ripped paper and the curling up of 
the paper on the wall produced a grid that was only unevenly visible across the work, 
again destabilising the organisational function of the grid. Th e large, black middle section 
created a coherent blob shape that once more stood out against the grid.
Th e photogram Catwalk, 2006 (ﬁ g. 16) utilises a similar quantiﬁ cation of image data. For 
this work, holes were punched into a piece of cardboard, mapping the brightness values 
of an appropriated photograph of a model on a catwalk (ﬁ gs 17 and 18). Th e cardboard 
was used to mask-oﬀ  light that was projected onto photographic paper, whereby each 
hole functioned as a small aperture through which the shape of the light source was 
projected onto the photographic paper. As the light source was square, so are the elements 
from which the ﬁ gure on the photogram is composed.
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All of these works use image data that is organised into grids. By focusing on blobs, 
the grid that usually addresses the whole of an image has been transformed into a local 
phenomenon. Such a localised grid is secondary to the blob. It appears as if the grid only 
emerges in those areas of the ground that were intersected by the outlines of the blobs. 
Th e blob changes the function of the grid, which moves from being a universal structure 
in which elements are organised, to a local structure constituting these image elements. 
Th e ground usually equally addressed by the grid is allowed to remain empty. 
Although the pixel matrix is essential to digital photographs, it is possible to foreground 
the blobs further and not represent the grid within the blob. Th e digital image makes 
it easy to address areas of similar brightness or colour. It allows the quick creation of a 
subset of the grid, whose particular shape, the blob, is a quality in its own right. In the 
small works Coﬀ ee Stain and Madagascar, both 2004 (ﬁ g. 19), I transposed the shape of a 
stain and that of the map of Madagascar into gold acrylic paint behind A5 sheets of clear 
Perspex. Th e size of the golden shapes was optimised by placing them diagonally on the 
ground in a fashion similar to the selection of irregular shapes on the computer. Th ese 
are usually framed by the smallest possible rectangle, which is a rudimentary reminder of 
the grid. Using a literal map in the work creates an explicit relation between blobs and 
the representations of topographies that we know from geography (ﬁ g. 20) and aerial 
photography (ﬁ g. 21). 
In London Eye, 2005 (ﬁ g. 22), the idea of a two-dimensional image representing a three-
dimensional map is further alluded to. An image of the central axel of the London Eye 
was digitalised from a found photograph (ﬁ g. 23) and broken down into regions of 
similar brightness. Th ese were represented by diﬀ erent shades of grey as the image-map 
was transferred onto a white gallery wall using conventional household paint. Th e angle 
at which the axel points to the sky was carefully copied from the source photograph and 
could be seen as indicating the direction of the map. Th e accessing and the representation 
of the numerical data of the image does, in fact, treat the image as if it were a map. Focusing 
on the blob interrupts the representational function of, and foreground’s informational 
relations within, the image. Th e stripping bare of such representational functions turns 
the blobs into abstract images.
In various works with photo-murals and posters, such as Grand Canyon and Indian 
Summer, 2005 (ﬁ g. 24) and later smaller versions (ﬁ g. 25), I ripped the blob-shape out of 
the same image material from which it was conceived. Th e blob-shape was transformed 
in the process, and stretched across the whole of the image. Th is transformation resulted 
in a visible displacement between the source and the consequent shape, in places showing 
both elements next to each other (ﬁ g. 26). Th e borders of the blobs are irregular, but prove 
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to be speciﬁ c despite their irregularity: the outline can, for example, be rounder or more 
edgy dependent on the source image and the coloured area that was selected. Instead of 
layering a blob onto an image or a wall, this body of work shows the blob in its absence, 
and as such, as a negative space. Th e area of the blob (the resultant) and the wall (the 
support) meet on the edges where the image frame is perforated by the blob, producing a 
visual reversal: the corners, the image residues, disintegrate and become shapes that ﬂ oat 
between the wall inside and around the work (ﬁ g. 27). In a proposal, I planned to install 
such artworks on public billboards (ﬁ g. 28). According to this proposal, the central blob 
would be ﬁ nished in black paint or sugar paper, making a tangible rip in the image space 
that advertising provides in the urban landscape. Such billboards would give the abstract 
image an appearance that stands in contrast to our everyday way of seeing. Th ey would 
open up imaginative spaces derived from the images themselves. A similar approach could 
be used for custom-made newspapers (ﬁ g. 29).
In many of these works, a triplet of layers is at play. First, the works use a support material 
that is often the gallery wall. Second, an image material is utilised that stands oﬀ  the 
support and provides information that is, third, derived from the image to produce a 
sometimes transformed blob that intersects both support and image. Th e photograph of 
New Cross Gate, 2006 (ﬁ g. 30), showing graﬃ  ti on a fence in New Cross Gate station 
in London, is structurally composed of the same elements. Here, the background is the 
support on which the grid-like image-fence sits, which holds a white blob-shape that is 
spray-painted onto the fence. Th is blob appears as if it is visually erasing the image layer 
(the fence), pushing it back into the support as if it were invisible or had never existed. 
Th us the blob becomes a shape through which we see, rather than a shape that we see. In 
its limited ﬁ eld, a visual opening can be created that allows the information on the image 
to be seen diﬀ erently. Th e present research focuses upon this diﬀ erent visual appearance.
All of these works create a relation between image materials that are supported by the grid 
structure of the pixel matrix. In terms of imaging, the blob is the most ‘natural’ shape 
on which these works focus, since it is the way in which light or, rather, the reﬂ ection 
of light, appears in a photograph. By putting the abstract blob into the spotlight, the 
function of the grid can be understood but also broken down and re-negotiated in the 
material experience of the artworks. Th e grid is, however, not the only structure that can 
be used.
1.3 Drawings and Constructions
Digital photographs have formed the image material for all the works that have up to 
this point been discussed. Th e camera, extended into the conceptual post-production 
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work of the studio, has been used as a mapping device rather than an imaging device, 
making the representational function of the image comparatively less important. From 
the point of view of information, the camera is a possible but not a necessary device; 
other processes that deliver information for its mapping are feasible. In the works that 
will be discussed in this section, I substituted the camera with alternative ways of arriving 
at image information, most notably, measuring. It is crucial for the understanding of the 
work to focus on the visual function of the blob and not to be distracted by its diﬀ erent 
appearance beyond the pixel grid.
Without taking an image, the camera can be used as a mapping device. In the Distance 
Circles, all 2006 (ﬁ gs 31 and 32), I mounted a standard SLR camera onto a tripod 
carefully positioned in an interior space (domestic, studio or gallery). By rotating the 
camera around a full 360 degrees in 15 degrees steps and by focusing the lens on whatever 
was central in the viewﬁ nder, I could read-oﬀ  the distances from the lens, and thus 
map the space as ‘seen’ by the camera. Th e distances were plotted onto the ﬂ oor and 
connected, resulting in a shape similar to the blobs discussed above. Th e square, uniform 
grid, however, is replaced in these circles by a structure radiating from a central point. 
Dividing the full circle into 15-degree steps is comparable to the resolution of the pixel 
matrix: a higher resolution would, in theory, create a smoother blob, although reading-oﬀ  
the distances from the lens is so inaccurate that it would be diﬃ  cult to obtain diﬀ erent 
readings from points very close to each other. Th e circle was constructed around the 
shape as a substitute for the invisible horizon to which vision in the enclosed space could 
not stretch. Th e circle is an ideal device comparable to the orthogonal frame or grid in 
the previous works. A planned piece, the GPS Circle, will use latitude and longitude 
data received from the Global Positioning System (GPS) for the drawing of a circle that 
will represent a circular walk around a central point (a gallery, for example). Th e street 
layout of the urban architecture, however, will make it impossible to create a perfect circle 
through such a walk.
Th e Distance Circles, with their central viewpoint and their use of a camera, are still 
closely related to photography. It is, however, possible to create maps without assuming 
a point from which a perspective is constructed. Th e series Reconstructions (City Trees), 
2006 (ﬁ gs 33 – 35; ﬁ g. 36 shows a set of pictures of an actual space) utilises the principle 
of triangulation to reconstruct a shape in a given space. For this work, I measured the 
distances between groups of trees in the city of Paris. Simply put, if I know the position of 
three trees, A, B and C, I can construct the position of tree D if I also know the distances 
between D and A, B and C. In principle, the position of all trees in the group can be 
reconstructed from those initial three trees. For Reconstructions, however, I did not use 
the same three trees for the measurement of the group. Instead, I used a rule whereby I 
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measured from any given tree to the three trees closest to that tree, provided a distance 
had not been measured before. Following this rule, the shape in which a group of trees 
was planted could be developed and reconstructed. For the reconstruction, a Computer 
Aided Design (CAD) programme was used. Th e resulting shape was transferred in pencil 
to paper. 
Th e usage of a CAD-programme was not necessary, but it made it easier to reconstruct 
large groups of trees. For Reconstruction (Road), 2006 (ﬁ g. 37), I used nothing but a large 
compass and chalk to create the drawing of Place Roger Prijou-Valjean in a parking space 
near the actual square. Th e circles, which could be omitted for the pencil drawings, have 
the same weight as the constructed lines, creating a shape that is the almost disappearing 
centre of the construction as a whole. In the early drafts of Argelès Plage, 2007 (ﬁ g. 38), 
I used a plotter to transfer the CAD drawings onto paper (ﬁ g. 39). Th e piece itself was 
done with a large compass and a pencil.
Th e idea of the ‘blob’ is present in all of these examples. It is a shape or a ﬁ gure that is drawn 
on a ground that contains its construction within it. Th is construction is comparatively 
even when a grid is imposed, but uneven and dynamic when the construction is internal 
and does not hold on to an outside structure. Such constructions may be called ‘organic’, 
since they carry a principle within themselves that is repeated as the construction is 
developed. Leonardo da Vinci’s Levels of Equal Cross-sectional Area in the Branching of a 
Tree, c. 1500 (ﬁ g. 40) is not unrelated. Th e branching of a tree follows a principle that 
is present in each branch. In the upper drawing, this is seen from a central point at the 
trunk of the tree; the bifurcations, however, could also be drawn as circles around each 
node with diminishing radiuses, thus using circles with multiple centres to represent the 
development and growth of a tree. Th e lower drawing shows the ideal circle into which 
that growth is developing, which looks surprisingly similar to my Distance Circles. Th e 
point I want to make here is that the work described in this section has done away with an 
external grid structure in exchange for an internal principle of construction, development 
or growth. If the blob, as speculated in the previous section, is the area that constitutes 
the visibility of the preconceived grid, the blob now makes visible a construction not 
dependent on a structure outside of it.
I have carried this idea into three-dimensional space in Treetops Remodelled, 2007 (for 
example, ﬁ gs 41 and 42), where I used multiple photographs of pollarded trees (ﬁ g. 
43) to re-construct a three-dimensional model of the tree (ﬁ g. 44) in order to inscribe 
a construction similar in kind to the drawings for Reconstructions. Th e models were 
developed in a CAD application (ﬁ g. 45), but this time three-dimensionally printed 
using a stereolithograph rapid-prototyping machine. A sketch done with string and a 
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branch shows how such a structure ‘sits’ around the branch (ﬁ g. 46). In a later piece, 
Treetops (Elastic), 2007 (ﬁ g. 47), I re-created one of the models in a gallery space using 
string and elastic.
Th e three-dimensional work engages the viewer diﬀ erently from the drawings. Th e shapes 
in the drawings are contained by their outline and look to a certain degree like drawings 
of specimens (ﬁ g. 48). In Treetops Remodelled, the outline is interrupted and thus, opened 
up, which makes them appear spatially more active. In this respect, the models stretch the 
idea of ‘blobs’: the openness contradicts the outline to a certain degree, which is necessary 
to conceive something as a blob. If, however, the idea that relates the models to the blobs 
is followed through, it should become apparent that on a more abstract level the blobs 
might be seen as simpler instances of dynamic, open and abstract ﬁ gures in general.
1.4 Conceptual Transformations
Th e relations that I claim exist between the works demand the imagination of a less 
tangible principle, which the research has sought to foreground. So far this has been 
done by looking at images of blobs of various shapes. In the current section, it should 
become clear that the abstract ‘ﬁ gure’ under scrutiny may have additional aspects, which 
are addressed by a diﬀ erent type of work.
Painting (USB) (ﬁ g. 49) is a work that is very slow to execute and which has, as a result, 
been in progress since 2004. It consists of a painting that, in eﬀ ect, copies an image 
frame that was captured when I connected my USB web camera for the ﬁ rst time to the 
computer (ﬁ g. 15). In Negative Light (ﬁ g. 14), I also made use of this image by focusing 
on the patch of light on the background wall. For Painting (USB), however, I wanted to 
represent the whole image as if it were a blob, i.e. as if it had an internal constitutive logic 
only spatially limited by the picture frame. Th e re-doing of the image in acrylic paint thus 
had to establish such logic.
In Mona Lisa, 2005 (ﬁ g. 50), I introduced colour into the work by painting each piece of 
a jigsaw puzzle in a monochrome colour that matched the average colour on that piece. 
Th e matching of the colour was done by eye from a scan of the puzzle. For Painting 
(USB), however, I wanted to arrive at a colour for each pixel that resulted from the 
mixing of diﬀ erent proportions of the primary colours (red, blue and yellow) and white, a 
mixing that was made following a rule rather than an approximation by eye. Such mixing 
is standard on a traditional computer screen, for example, where three cathode ray tubes 
(CRT), one each for red, green and blue, are ﬁ red according to the RGB, the red, green 
and blue value of that pixel, which is possible because light mixes lineally. Physical paint, 
on the other hand, does not mix lineally. Professional paint-mixing systems, such as those 
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used by Dulux, therefore employ a database of possible colours against which a colour 
sample is compared and for which the mixing instructions are known. For Painting 
(USB), I devised a system that mixes the three primary colours plus white as if they mixed 
lineally, comparable to light. Th is was done by scanning swatches of primary colour and 
determining their RGB values (ﬁ g. 51) and by constructing a colour space spanned out 
between these colours (ﬁ g. 52). Th e colour of pixels of the source image can be mixed by 
mapping the RBG value of that pixel onto the hypothetical colour space created from 
the scanned pigments. Fig. 53 shows the position of all colour values of the source image 
in relation to the hypothetical colour space. For colours that lie within this hypothetical 
colour space, a mixing instruction can be achieved directly by combining the pigments 
in proportion to the distances of the colour from the corners of the hypothetical colour 
space; colours that are outside of this space have to be projected onto that colour space 
before a mixing instruction can be derived.
Th e 55,000 individual pixels of Painting (USB) can thus be mixed and applied to the canvas 
(ﬁ g. 54) with a square piece of wood (4 x 4 mm) using lists of colours and their position 
in the grid (ﬁ g. 55). No visual comparison between the painting and the source image is 
necessary. Only in comparison to the source image does the painting look ‘wrong’. (Th e 
shadows, for example, are all blue, since all dark colours have a quantity of blue in them, 
due to the fact that pure blue is by far the darkest pigment of the primary colours.) Th e 
painting looks ‘right’, however, from the point of view of the colour-mapping programme, 
since all colours are represented correctly according to their measured values. Th e image 
maps that for the blobs have so far been discussed only in relation to the location of image 
points can also be applied abstractly. Painting (USB) maps the colours of all pixels instead 
of their locations: what have been discussed as ‘dynamic, open and abstract ﬁ gures’ can 
be conceptual transformations and need not be restricted to spatial mappings, although 
diagrams that look surprisingly similar to some of the drawings for the Reconstruction 
series, for instance, can be used for their visualisation. One could thus generalise that 
with the blobs, ﬁ gures of transformation have been isolated that are not only spatial but 
also conceptual in nature.
Talking about the transformational aspect of the blobs allows one to focus on temporal 
implications. It was one of the initial ideas for this research project to look at Remember 
Me as something that is moving or has to be moved. Some tests were made in which I 
shifted the resolution that underlies Remember Me, creating an animation of the image 
(ﬁ g. 56). An installation was proposed that consisted of two projections showing the 
same animated footage out of sync. Th e dissatisfaction with the overburdening question 
of the face and the gaze that was alluded to above made me radically re-think and re-
address the function that this installation was supposed to have in relation to the research 
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question. Instead of putting forward an animation that would have expanded the research 
question, a diﬀ erent type of installation was made that answered the concerns, according 
to which an animation of Remember Me appeared appropriate. 
Th e chief reason for looking at an animation was that a sense of vibrancy was already at 
play in the still images of Remember Me: somehow, the blur made the images ‘hover’ over 
the wall, while focusing on the blurred image seemed to be diﬃ  cult for the eye. Th us, 
additional to the blob shapes, a particular type of instability also seemed to be important 
for the blur from which the blobs were derived. Chokes, 2003 (ﬁ g. 57) is an installation 
that utilises the principle of a feedback loop. Fluorescent tubes of the traditional kind 
usually produce a ﬂ icker when switched on before the tube is fully alight. I used this 
ﬂ icker as input data for the switching on or oﬀ  of a second ﬂ uorescent tube, whose ﬂ icker 
was used to switch on or oﬀ  the ﬁ rst tube in return. In this way, both light systems (each 
consisting of a tube and a light switch) were interconnected in a feedback loop: Flicker 
Light A –> Switch Light B –> Flicker Light B –> Switch Light A –> Flicker Light A –> 
Switch Light B … Th e feedback loop was maintained using custom-made electronics 
consisting of light-dependent resistors (LDRs) to measure the light levels at the tubes (ﬁ g. 
58), solenoids to do the actual switching of conventional household switches (ﬁ g. 59), 
and a circuit board with a micro-controller holding the programme (ﬁ g. 60).
Initially, the programme tells both sets of solenoids to switch both lights on. Th e ﬂ icker, 
being a random event that is very speciﬁ c to the tube and the associated electronics, 
happens unevenly across the two tubes. Whichever tube ﬂ ickers ﬁ rst will start the 
feedback loop. Th e work is active for a few loops (with a maximum duration of about 5 
seconds) until both lights are either on or oﬀ  and the installation has resulted in a stable 
state. Th e stable state (on or oﬀ ) is maintained for about ten seconds. Both lights are then 
automatically switched oﬀ  for half a minute before the process is re-started. Fig. 61 shows 
a graph of the light levels and the resultant switching commands.
Th e experience of Chokes is physical. Th e ﬂ icker is very intense in a darkened space; the 
hammering of the solenoids against the switches is extremely loud. Th in wires hang from 
each tube across the space to connect these to the switches they are operating. Th is is 
technically not important, but it was done in order to emphasise the necessary crossing at 
one point between the two light systems A and B. Th is could be imagined as a horizontal 
ﬁ gure 8 (∞), the symbol for inﬁ nity (ﬁ g. 62). Th e loose, hanging wires, paired with the 
loud sound and the intense ﬂ icker and the knowledge that electricity is involved create a 
highly physical experience of active instability. 
States of instability were the main concern of Ilya Prigogine, 1977 Nobel Laureate in 
chemistry, in his book Th e End of Certainty. According to him, they are related on a very 
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material basis to the act of seeing: ‘[W]e can say that matter at equilibrium is “blind”, 
but far from equilibrium it begins to “see”.’ (Prigogine, 1997: 67) Without wanting 
to speculate too much on a ﬁ eld that is beyond the limits of this PhD, it is, however, 
interesting to notice that instabilities, as they may be experienced in Chokes and on a more 
visual level in Remember Me, and in subsequent work, may be seen as material processes 
of reﬂ ection and ultimately vision. (Th is topic will be of importance in Chapters 4 and 
5.)
1.5 Inventory
I have been using diagrams as another way to foreground the dynamics of reﬂ ection. Th e 
blob that above was seen as related more closely to a map than to the representational 
function of images could also be conceptualised as a diagram. Diagrams are visualisations 
of data that can be very diﬀ erent in kind, while maps visualise a space and the locations 
of data points within that space. From the moment the space becomes a conceptual 
space, as it does in Chokes, for example, and not an image space comparable to the Potato 
Prints and other related works, the notion of the ‘map’ may be too limited to express the 
particular type of a not necessarily spatial order, which internally regulates the appearance 
of a blob or any other kind of shape or drawn ﬁ gure. Inventory, 2006 (ﬁ gs 63 – 71) is 
a collection of diagrams relevant to the philosophical background of this research. Th e 
work consists of a set of stretched canvases primed with green blackboard paint. Th e 
diagrams are made with white chalk. It is important for the panels to be paintings rather 
than blackboards because this fact emphasises the diagrams as ﬁ gural propositions. On an 
actual blackboard, as with so many of Joseph Beuys’s blackboards (ﬁ g. 72), the diagrams 
are seen more as vehicles for teaching than as works in their own right. At Tate Modern, 
for example, where some of Beuys’s blackboards are housed and exhibited, they look like 
mementoes of his teaching and thus like residual objects. Some of the visual functions of 
the diagrams may be overlooked.
Inventory thus brings together the works that map image information, which so often 
use diagrams (see ﬁ gs 44, 45, 52, 53 and 55), with systematic and philosophical thinking 
about the research. Diagram details also share their appearance with some of the other 
works, like Reconstructions (City Trees) (ﬁ g. 34), for example, where the lines organise the 
space. Th e abstract ﬁ gures that I have introduced through my discussion of blobs – and 
this is crucial for artistic research practice – are also ‘ﬁ gures of thought’, i.e., visualisations 
of the abstract movements necessary for a thought to occur. It is no coincidence that the 
visuals through which this research has progressed are, in the end, compatible with, if not 
identical to, the visualisation of thoughts as they are formed in research. Lines, arrows, 
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shapes and even words form a constellation in movement, which ﬂ oats on a ground 
comparable to the blobs in the Potato Prints or the line drawings. 
Th e materially visible blobs have served not only as an introduction to these more abstract 
transformations, but may to diﬀ erent degrees be seen as active themselves. A relation that 
can be drawn across the range of work executed for this PhD shows that at the heart of it, 
the research addresses transformative functions that appear diﬀ erently depending on the 
type of engagement the work creates. Th is can also apply to processes of thinking, which 
form the backbone of any PhD research. Th e ‘conceptual transformations’ that have been 
described on various levels can thus be extended into the fabric of the research itself and 
into the way it develops ‘knowledge and understanding’, which in the present case must 
also be the knowledge and understanding of development.
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Chapter 2: Post-Photography
2.1 Th e Documentary Style
Just over a decade ago, Martin Lister’s introduction to Th e Photographic Image in Digital 
Culture solemnly declared that ‘there is no clean break’ between old and new media (Lister, 
2001: 20, his italics). Today, it has become apparent that his statement has to be seen 
within its historical context. In 1995, ‘new media’ were still new. Th e concern was to 
assess just how new the proclaimed new media actually were, and how possible it was 
to approach them using traditional categories. Today, after the hype of the new appears 
to have worn oﬀ , it is not so much that we might reorganise the cultural territory of the 
‘digital’ as another artistic practice, but that the territory itself has changed. For example, 
the title Th e Photographic Image in Digital Culture implies that the ‘photographic image’ 
remained addressable as a viable entity and that it was merely its place within digital 
culture that needed to be negotiated. In contrast to this, the 2002 Brighton conference 
Photography, Philosophy, Technology produced a reader entitled Where is the Photograph? 
(Green, 2003), which seemed to imply that the shifting cultural grounds had by then 
destabilised traditional media.
Current approaches to photography have to respond to this shifting ground, and appear 
to require a re-deﬁ nition of photography in order to preserve its integrity. For example, 
the exhibition Cruel and Tender: Th e Real in the Twentieth-Century Photograph (5 June 
– 7 September 2003) was Tate Modern’s ‘ﬁ rst major exhibition dedicated purely to the 
medium [of photography]’ (Burton and Bolitho, 2003) and can serve as a telling example 
of such activity that modiﬁ es our understanding of the history of photography in order 
to accommodate an – albeit limited – contemporary digital practice.
Tate’s dedication of the exhibition to the ‘medium of photography’ was not just expressed 
in the sheer amount of photographs on show, but also in the focus on a central practice 
of photography, namely a realist or documentary style. Th e term ‘documentary style’ was 
used by Walker Evans, the photographer to whose work the words ‘cruel and tender’ were 
originally applied, to make a sharp distinction between the photograph as a document 
and the photograph as an artwork. Evans made this clear in an interview with Karl Katz 
in 1971 when he said: 
‘When you say “documentary”, you have to have a sophisticated ear to receive 
that word. It should be documentary style, because documentary is police 
photography of a scene and a murder … Th at’s a real document. You see art is 
really useless, and a document has use. And therefore art is never a document, but 
it can adopt that style. I do it. I’m called a documentary photographer. But that 
presupposes a quite subtle knowledge of this distinction.’ (Evans, 1983: 216)
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As a ‘documentary style’ photographer, Evans created images that looked like documents 
and appeared to have a use, when in fact, according to Evans’s own deﬁ nition, they were 
not documents since they had no practical use. Documentary style, then, is a mode that 
gives the impression that an image is a document when it is not. With the shift from 
the photograph as a document to the photograph as an artwork, the point of reference 
has also shifted. Th e police photographer references the murder that has taken place, 
while the artist references the image’s appearance as document. Th is appearance might 
in turn reference a reality, but this is not the primary concern of a documentary-style 
photographer. Th us what guarantees the reality of a documentary-style photograph is the 
fact that it looks like a document, not the authenticity of the depiction.
Evans characterised the documentary style in various ways. He linked it to Gustave 
Flaubert’s literary style, which is at once realist and objective, permitting no space for 
subjectivity to appear. (Evans, 1983: 70) It is also lyrical, in so far as the non-lyrical 
documentary photograph was likely to fail in its documentary function. (Evans, 1983: 
238) Evans himself has, in a posthumously published introduction of 1961, compared his 
way of working to that of a historian: ‘Evans was, and is, interested in what any present 
time will look like as the past.’ (Evans, 1983: 151) Th e historian’s or archaeologist’s view 
allows for a disinterested distance as ‘an aesthetic ambition’, as Peter Galassi has pointed 
out (Galassi, 2000: 87, my italics). 
Another aspect of the documentary style is the choice of motif. It does not require 
painterly subjects, but can accommodate the ordinary, and if the style is ‘literary’, as 
Clement Greenberg remarked (Greenberg, 1992: 63), without producing minor works 
of art. According to Galassi, this is, indirectly, Alfred Stieglitz’s merit: 
‘By explicitly deﬁ ning photographic art in opposition to the sprawling mass 
of ordinary, practical photography, Alfred Stieglitz paradoxically endowed the 
latter with an embryonic identity it had not possessed. Evans and his successors 
completed the process by recognizing a coherent aesthetic in the pile of mundane 
photographs that everyone knew and used, ﬁ led, or discarded as the daily occasion 
required.’ (Galassi, 2000: 39) 
Stieglitz’s work, in particular, served as a basis against which Evans could create his style. 
(Eklund, 2000: 31f.) Ironically, Evans appears to have fulﬁ lled Stieglitz’s demand that 
‘unless photography has its own possibilities of expression, separate from those of the 
other arts, it is merely a process, not an art’ (quoted in: Caﬃ  n, 1972: 36), a demand that 
Stieglitz himself never quite met.
2.2 Th e Photographic Style
Because the documentary style is uniquely photographic, it becomes the blueprint for a 
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‘photographic style’ in general. In the same way as the documentary style produces an 
image that looks like a document, the photographic style produces images that look like 
photographs. Th e term ‘photographic style’ does not designate a style from a particular 
artist’s hand, but work that appears to be photography. (Cf. Batchen, 1999: 213) Th e 
diﬀ erence between photographic and documentary style lies in the fact that the former, 
apart from being a more general term, does not rely on the photograph’s appearance as 
document. It is in this way that a photograph, even when its appearance as photograph is 
convincing, can be imagined to be only loosely related to the photographed reality. Such 
a process can be seen to generate a new ‘photographic reality’ that is detached from the 
reality photographed. Olivier Richon has recently argued in reference to Jacques Derrida 
that any original reality may, in fact, be dependant on its image. (Richon, 2007: 11) 
Such a re-deﬁ nition of reality in relation to photography is at the heart of the notion of a 
‘photographic style’ that is used to indicate an alternative deﬁ nition of the photographic 
away from the traditional and more restrictive notion of photography as medium.1
When Tate Modern dedicated Cruel and Tender to the medium of photography, and 
placed Walker Evans’s documentary-style photographs at the heart of the exhibition, it 
implicitly emphasised style over medium. Th e work of Andreas Gursky, also exhibited, 
can be used to illustrate this distinction further. His work shows how digital manipulation 
can be used to ‘enhance’ an image’s photographic reality. It can also be used to deduce 
where the curators of Cruel and Tender, Emma Dexter and Th omas Weski, may have set 
today’s limits on the deﬁ nition of the photograph. Weski, for instance, appears to have 
included Gursky’s work only to the extent that it ‘mimic[s] the language of documentary 
photography’ by blocking a ‘direct engagement with the world’ (Dexter and Weski, 2003: 
27). Gursky’s images are, for the most part, not digital photomontages, but digitally 
post-produced photographs. Th is point is stressed in the exhibition leaﬂ et: ‘Gursky has 
made subtle digital alterations to some of his photographs, adjusting the composition, 
eliminating details and enhancing colour’ (Burton and Bolitho, 2003: , my italics). Th is 
ambivalence between Weski’s questioning of Gursky in terms of documentary style at 
the same time as the exhibition insists on Gursky’s photographic basis against the digital, 
indicates the current striving for a redeﬁ nition of photography as style.
Th e photographic style, then, relies on a visual understanding of reality as produced by 
the documentary style. Th e cultural knowledge of how a photograph should look is used 
and referred to. Both photographer and spectator rely on this mutual understanding, 
which, on a second plane, can be challenged by the photographer. Th e photographic style 
1 Photography’s ‘indexicality’, i.e. its physical relation to an event, is of no importance when it comes to 
the ‘photographic style’ since the photographic style is all about an image’s appearance as photograph inde-
pendent of its production. A discussion can thus be omitted.
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produces photographic reality, and oﬀ ers a system of beliefs that, if prescribed as reality, 
can be seen to function as ideology.
Cruel and Tender develops such an ideology. Some of the work of Robert Adams (e.g. ﬁ g. 
73), for instance, can be seen as closely related to Evans’s documentary style (e.g. ﬁ g. 74), 
while the photographs of Lewis Baltz, also on show, appear to stand for a transition into a 
pictorial reality, ﬁ rst in the images of dehumanised American industrial architecture (ﬁ g. 
75) (that in Robert Adams’s approach is still populated) and later in his Sites of Technology 
(ﬁ g. 76), where he is well on the way to an aesthetic model comparable to Gursky’s (e.g. 
ﬁ g. 77). Th e photographic style, as much as it creates a photographic reality, allows the 
image to be made less realistic in its pictorial appearance as photograph. Photographic 
reality and documentary-style realism are two separate categories, a fact that is even 
further underlined when photographs are digitally manipulated. 
Digitally manipulated photographs are also re-negotiating photography’s relationship to 
painting, in so far as the ‘hand’ of the artist appears in the photographic image. Th e 
photographic style in general is an image’s ability to reference a reality, as it would look in 
a photograph. Before the advent of image computation, photographic reality could only 
be represented in photographs, whereas in our digital age, photography is no longer a 
prerequisite for the achievement of photographic reality. Gursky’s images, according to 
the Tate leaﬂ et, ‘could be compared to paintings in their sensuous visual impact’. (Burton 
and Bolitho, 2003) Th e idea of painting does not only come to mind because of the 
image’s impact. Rather, the production of the images employs a painter’s methods of 
composition, thus demonstrating that digital photography has narrowed the gulf between 
photography and painting. (Dexter and Weski, 2003: 27)
An artist who consciously explores photography’s relationship to painting, yet whose 
work was not included in Cruel and Tender, is Jeﬀ  Wall. Because of his art-historical 
background and the careful composition of his images, Wall is often understood in relation 
to painting (e.g. Lauter, 2001: 18ﬀ ). It is, however, his relationship to the photographic 
style, while using a painter’s approach to composition, that makes his work relevant in 
this context. (Tietjen, 2003) Wall, who uses the computer as a tool to create montages 
from individual shots, explained in an interview with Jan Tumlir in 2001: ‘Th e montage 
is composed of acts of photography, even if there is no simple photographed moment. I 
don’t think that any photographic qualities are eliminated, except the single moment in 
which the entire image was made.’ (Tumlir, 2001: 154) What Wall discovered is that the 
single decisive moment of ‘taking’ the image was not necessary for the image to appear as 
a photograph. Although he decisively does away with the idea that a photograph has to 
be made in a single moment, he does not contest photography’s perspectival construction 
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from a single viewpoint, and nor does he challenge the integrity of the ambient light. To 
photograph the individual images, he carefully arranges the camera in a way that keeps 
lighting and perspective congruent. As he says: 
‘Th e picture would be a failure if it permitted any doubt that the two worlds 
were as one … You could use the same digital montage techniques to question … 
the idea of spatial continuity I’ve just described. But I’m not interested in that.’ 
(Tumlir, 2001: 153)
A style might be called ‘photographic’, then, when the reference to a photographic reality 
is left intact. Th e images can challenge that reality (as Wall’s ‘surrealist’ images do), but 
from the moment they break it, they cease to be photographic. From the point of view 
of the deﬁ nition of photography as a medium, images like Wall’s do not sit well in the 
history of photography (and might for this reason have been excluded from Cruel and 
Tender), because they focus on digital montage techniques rather than the camera itself. 
In terms of the perfection of photography as style, however, they seem to be an almost 
logical conclusion. By bringing the reality of the photographic style into the image as the 
product of a montage (as he most famously did on site in Th e Destroyed Room of 1978, 
ﬁ g. 78) and not as a naive belief in photography’s built-in realism, Wall is able to propose 
contemporary photographic realism from outside the conﬁ nes of the medium. With this, 
the opposite is also true: in a situation where the photographic style dominates our cultural 
reality, its use without its explicit acknowledgement removes the photograph from this 
reality and with it from reality as such. Although ultimately stopping short, Cruel and 
Tender manifests a general tendency in recent photographic practice to detach the idea of 
the photographic from the notion of ‘medium’, allowing a deﬁ nition of photography as 
style to claim validity.
2.3 Th e Paintbox
Photorealistic paintings (for example those of Robert Bechtle, ﬁ g. 79) have to be 
understood against the backdrop of a ‘photographic style’: that such paintings look like 
photographs cannot be directly due to the medium of either painting or photography. 
Th ere are many paintings that do not resemble photographs, which can be taken as 
proof that looking-like-a-photograph is not a general property of painting, while as 
paintings they are done with a brush and paint of some sort and not with a camera 
(although a camera image might have been employed at some stage). Without the notion 
of a ‘photographic style’, it would be impossible to tell when something that is not a 
photograph looks like a photograph: that which is not a photograph needs to resemble 
the particular way in which that which is a photograph appears. Naturally, photorealistic 
painting, unlike digitally manipulated photography, is very conscious of staying within 
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the parameters of painting whilst playing on or with the photographic style. Th e use of 
material paint makes certain that a painting, as photographic as it may appear, will not 
be mistaken for a photograph. Using non-material paint to digitally retouch or even 
compose a photograph, on the other hand, allows for the act of painting to stay invisible 
within the image. Th is is due to the development of image computation, which through 
its use of technology may be related more to photography than to the manual process of 
painting.
Although digital computers were operational from the 1940s (Konrad Zuse’s Z3 being 
the ﬁ rst, in 1941), making them suitable for photography has been a slow process, 
since digital computers are essentially calculators and not machines for image capture 
or manipulation. Th e ﬁ rst scanner was introduced in 1957, while in 1963, the ﬁ rst 
interactive drawing programme, Sketchpad, allowed the user to draw directly on the 
screen using a light pen. Th e invention of Random Access Memory (RAM) in 1970 
allowed the storage of more data and with it the use of two-dimensional shapes rather 
than lines or text. Following the design of the ‘frame-buﬀ er’ in the early 1970s (that is, 
memory space corresponding to the image on the screen), bitmapped images became 
possible, and with them the development of paint applications. Only the development of 
paint applications could prepare the ground for digital photography, as one is even today 
metaphorically reminded in applications such as Adobe’s Photoshop, where the ‘canvas’, 
a term borrowed from painting, forms the conceptual basis onto which a photographic 
image is layered.
Mike King, looking historically at the development of computer art, calls the period in 
which paint applications were developed and predominantly used the ‘Paintbox era’, 
which he sees as stretching from 1986 to 1994, when multimedia applications started to 
dominate (King, n.d.). According to him, 1986 was the key year for a number of reasons: 
ﬁ rstly, it was the year in which the BBC created a television broadcast called ‘Painting 
with Light’ that used the Quantel Paintbox application, ‘a pioneering television graphics 
paint system’ that has lent the whole era its name. Secondly, it was in 1986 that Adobe’s 
Photoshop was written, albeit not yet released. And ﬁ nally, it was the year in which 
key ﬁ ne artists like Andy Warhol, working on a Commodore Amiga, started to use the 
computer in the production of their art.
Paint programmes utilise the concept of bitmapped image representation, allowing for 
the manipulation of individual pixels by ‘painting’ onto the memory space that holds 
the image. Although algorithms are used to perform this manipulation of the pixels, the 
change in colour values is due to the operator’s choice of how each individual pixel should 
look. To give an example, the operator can ‘draw’ a blue line onto the memory space. 
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Each colour value in the memory space that is covered by the blue line is replaced by a 
colour value representing blue. At no point, however, does the software construct a line. 
Th at is, the knowledge that the string of blue pixels represents a line is solely on the side 
of the operator. It is an important aspect of the Paintbox era that the digital artwork was 
put under the control of an artist, who needed no extended technical understanding to 
change an image instantly. Th e shift to bitmapped images paired with the development 
of easy-to-use imaging software has thus liberated the production of images on the 
computer. 
Paint programmes were a good option for artists who were not interested in the materiality 
of paint on canvas – something that the computer naturally could not provide. In 1984, 
Keith Haring even criticised other artists in an interview in Flash Magazine, when he 
said: 
‘Living in 1984, the role of the artist has to be diﬀ erent from what it was ﬁ fty 
or even twenty years ago. I am continually amazed at the number of artists who 
continue to work as if the camera were never invented, as if Andy Warhol never 
existed, as if airplanes, and computers, and videotape were never heard of.’ 
(quoted in: Goodman, 1987: 71) 
Here, the computer’s potential is almost experienced as normative, since it already deﬁ nes 
reality, in much the same way as modern air travel does. Like King, Haring references 
Warhol, whose work stands for a paradigmatic shift in the history of ﬁ ne art.
Always experimenting with the artistic possibilities of mass media, Warhol produced in 
1986 a remarkable image of Deborah Harry (ﬁ g. 80), which can serve as a good example 
of the various elements that come together and can be activated in a Paintbox-type digital 
image. Images like these, which look ‘astonishingly like those it normally took him weeks 
to produce’ (Goodman, 1987: 86), could be done in minutes. Th e image of Harry makes 
four levels of technology visible: (1) the original photographic image of the subject (2) the 
substitution of colour within that photographic image (3) the drawing of a line around 
the face, the painting red of the lips and Warhol’s signature, and (4) the name of the 
software package (‘GraphiCraft V27 Release 06’) that enabled this type of image.
With a Paintbox-type application, the environment in which the photograph is processed 
has been conﬂ ated with an environment in which one can digitally paint. In eﬀ ect, 
there is no technical diﬀ erence between a photograph and a painting in the Paintbox 
application. When Warhol foregrounds drawn elements within the photographic image, 
this is a choice as much as it is Wall’s choice to maintain a photographic appearance while 
composing images made up of separate parts. If photography is essentially the technology 
that captures images, it is Paintbox-type applications that eﬀ ectively enables their 
manipulation. Digital photography paired with paint applications makes the photograph 
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available for manipulation that has become invisible and thus, indistinguishable from 
photography. 
2.4 Post-Photography I
Although the manipulation of photographs is as old as photography itself – see Oscar 
Rejlander’s Th e Two Ways of Life, 1858 (ﬁ g. 81), for example – it has always been treated as 
the exception rather than the rule. Henry Fox Talbot, one of the inventors of photography, 
stresses in his Th e Pencil of Nature of 1844 that photography is done ‘naturally’ when he 
writes: 
‘It may suﬃ  ce, then, to say that the plates of this work have been obtained by the 
mere action of Light upon sensitive paper. Th ey have been formed or depicted 
by optical and chemical means alone, and without the aid of any one acquainted 
with the art of drawing … Th ey are impressed by Nature’s hand.’ (Talbot, 1977: 
2) 
Th e fact, however, that the technical process of photography is natural, in so far as it 
happens in accordance with natural laws embedded in the optical and chemical apparatus, 
does not by itself give the image a diﬀ erent status. Arguments like the one quoted from 
Th e Pencil of Nature try to set up the photograph as a diﬀ erent type of image from 
painting, for example, by making the artist and his choices disappear from the image. But 
Olivier Richon has remarked that the bookcase Talbot photographed in 1840 (ﬁ g. 82), 
for example, had been placed in an ‘unnatural’ setting, outside in the courtyard, to create 
more light for the photograph. (Richon, 2007: 9) As Geoﬀ rey Batchen has wryly asked: 
‘After all, what else is photography other than the manipulation of light levels, exposure 
times, chemical concentrations, tonal ranges, and so on?’ (Batchen, 1999: 212)
A photograph that looks like a painting is no more or less natural than a photograph that 
does not look like a painting. It would, however, be less convincing to the viewer, since, 
following Talbot’s deﬁ nition, a painting introduces the suggestion of an artist’s hand and 
an artist’s choice within the image. Th e struggle for photographers to be seen as artists, as 
mentioned above in relation to Stieglitz, is possibly due to the fact that the photographer 
could not appear in an image that was made to make him disappear in the ﬁ rst place. It 
was only when the documentary style became accepted, and with it, photography as a 
practice, that an audience could ‘see’ the photographer in his very disappearance behind 
a process that assured the reality of that depicted.
Traditionally, such a ‘natural’ process has safeguarded the photographic image against its 
manipulation. Th is is due to the fact that on a microscopic level, once the silver haloid 
was developed and the image ﬁ xed, the physical binding of the silver grain onto the carrier 
material meant that it was very diﬃ  cult to remove, change or even address. Recently, 
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Peter Weibel, in his contribution to Tate Modern’s lecture series When New Media Was 
New (Weibel, 2003), reminded us that the manipulability of digital media is one of 
their most basic properties. (See also: Manovich, 2001: ; Mitchell, 2001). In comparison 
to chemical processes like photography and ﬁ lm, electrical processes (as they were ﬁ rst 
employed in analogue video and later in digital media), because of the separation of 
information and carrier, allow for the erasure and re-writing of the image. In the case of 
digital media, this not only amounts to the possible manipulation of a complete image or 
frame, but also technically sets free the manipulation of the smallest elements by which 
the image is composed, the pixel.
Th e manipulation of traditional photographs, being a secondary and intrusive activity, has 
often been synonymous with the degrading of the original photograph, suggesting that 
the manipulation is a foreign and thus non-photographic element. As Edward Weston 
remarked: 
‘Th e extreme ﬁ neness of these particles [the silver grains] gives a special tension 
to the image, and when that tension is destroyed – by the intrusion of handwork, 
by too great enlargement, by printing on a rough surface, etc. – the integrity of 
the photograph is destroyed.’ (Weston, 1980: 172) 
Such destruction, however, might nevertheless enhance the image idea that has guided 
the artist. An untitled and undated print by Yva (Else Neuländer-Simon) in my collection 
(ﬁ g. 83), for example, shows clear scratch-marks on the upper right arm and the neck of 
the model (ﬁ g. 84), which thin and lighten these areas of the body on the photograph. 
By today’s standards (and possibly even by those of the 1930s), the marks show the clear 
will of the artist to enhance the image, even if this meant at the same time admitting 
that the photograph was imperfect and in need of improvement. Any interference with 
the traditional photograph, because of the degrading that comes with it, can at best be 
an enhancement of the image idea but cannot be an enhancement of the photographic 
appearance of this idea. With digital-image manipulation, however, this has changed: 
now an image idea can be enhanced along with its photographic appearance. Th is is 
possible only if it is the photographic style that makes the photograph and not the use of 
the medium of photography. Th e image idea in Yva’s case is painterly whilst being realised 
on a photograph, but the image ideas of Wall, for example, are photographic despite his 
use of painterly elements. Both focus on the pictorial appearance of the image rather 
than the process by which it is made and reality is disclosed. (For the case of Jeﬀ  Wall see: 
Newman, 2007)
Focusing on the appearance of the image as opposed to the process of photography 
appears to be the dominant discourse in both photography and new media studies. 
In Snap to Grid: A User’s Guide to Digital Arts, Media, and Cultures, Peter Lunenfeld 
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proposes that photography’s new digital place lies in its subsumption within computer 
graphics, in so far as core qualities of the photograph are, in the digital realm, replaced 
by those of graphics and painting. For Lunenfeld, the technical reality of photographs 
is being ‘blend[ed] even further into the computer’s digital soup of letters, numbers, 
motion graphics and sound ﬁ les’ (Lunenfeld, 2001: 59), essentially prohibiting the 
meaningful separation of computer graphics from digital photographs. In terms of media 
that produce particular types of images, such an argument might be consistent. However, 
it promotes the fusion of the diﬀ erent practices bracketed under the digital image, instead 
of looking at the particularities that those practices might carry. It is thus no surprise that 
according to such a position, it is only a matter of time before photography’s particular 
relationship with reality will wear out (Lunenfeld, 2001: 60f.), since, seen as image alone, 
the photographic real may, indeed, be doubted. Th e process by which the image has come 
into being is covered up, however, if the image is seen as appearance only.
Th us, one meaning of ‘post-photography’ (Mitchell, 2001: 225) is the development of 
an un-photographic photograph, of a photograph beyond its condition as a photograph. 
It has become part of photographic practice, and perhaps even essential to contemporary 
photography, to work with the photographic image as style. Th is fact can be more or less 
fore-grounded in the work of any photographer, but it has become an aspect of a general 
visual culture aided by the development of image computation that cannot be ignored by 
anybody working photographically.
2.5 Post-Photography II
If an un-photographic photograph is possible – that is, a photograph produced in an un-
photographic manner – one may also be permitted to speculate about a photographic un-
photograph. Such a notion could become an alternative deﬁ nition of post-photography 
that takes, not the image’s photographic appearance, but photographic practice as central 
to photography. It also produces an interesting alternative take on photography’s relation 
to image computation.
William J. Mitchell’s inﬂ uential Th e Reconﬁ gured Eye: Visual Truth in the Post-Photographic 
Era mentions ‘automation’, that is, the creation of images under the control of an 
apparatus, as being central to photography. He does so almost in passing, on his way to 
a discussion of the photographic and later digital image, the latter of which he uses for 
his argument concerning post-photography. He diﬀ erentiates between ‘algorithmic’ and 
‘nonalgorithmic’ images, while stressing that they are on a sliding scale, with partially 
algorithmic images being possible. Algorithmic images are principally images that are 
‘automatically constructed’, ‘involve fewer or even no intentional acts’ and ‘provide more 
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trustworthy evidence of what was out there in front of the imaging system’. (Mitchell, 
2001: 30) Algorithms are sets of instructions that can be processed by a computer. Th e 
notion can, more generally, be used for any rule-bound process such as those employed in 
photography, as most famously expressed by Kodak’s advertisement: ‘You press the button, 
we do the rest’, implying that the ‘rest’ – that is, the exposure and the development – is 
not worth mentioning since it merely follows the rules demanded by the photographic 
process and ‘programmed’ by Kodak. Vilèm Flusser uses similar ideas when he talks about 
the ‘camera program’ or ‘well-programmed cameras’ (Flusser, 1984: 19) and focuses on 
the relationship that the photographer has with the programme as he plays within and 
against the ‘game’ of photography.
Early visual computer art can be described as essentially algorithmic, while work of the 
Paintbox-type, although utilising algorithms, foregrounds the intentional act of painting. 
Algorithmic art is the earliest and most fundamental artistic practice on the computer. 
Th e ﬁ rst practitioners of computer art were the programmers themselves, who at that time 
were predominantly mathematicians. Algorithmic art is a visualisation of mathematical 
and often randomised functions expressed in terms of computer algorithms. In theory, 
it is possible to deduce the algorithm from its visualisation. Visualisations of algorithms 
have since served mathematicians as a means to gain insight into algorithmic patterns. 
Whereas in early computer graphics, mathematics were employed to produce an optical 
eﬀ ect or an artful decoration, they have increasingly become accepted as tools for 
mathematical research, a ﬁ eld that has, according to Michele Emmer, been termed ‘Visual 
Mathematics’. (Emmer, 1993) Th e birth of fractal geometry is a good example of how 
important visualisation in mathematics has become. According to Benoit Mandelbrot: 
‘Fractal art … is indissolubly based on the use of computers. It could not possibly have 
arisen before the hardware was ready and the software was being developed.’ (Mandelbrot, 
1993: 11) However, even here, a ‘photographic’ way of working as described above in 
relation to Talbot forms an important element of the aesthetics that are sought. For 
Mandelbrot, ‘To “ﬁ x” an unsatisfactory corner of a piece by a local patch [i.e. inserting 
something by hand] is not permitted.’ (Mandelbrot, 1993: 15)
Th e elimination of human interference with the image is crucial to the German artist 
Manfred Mohr (for example, ﬁ g. 85), active since 1969, who co-founded the Algorists 
Group in 1996 in order to promote the idea of algorithmic art. In a 1975 text, he 
explicitly refers to Marshall McLuhan’s concept of technology as an extension of the 
human nervous system (McLuhan, 1995), when he writes: 
‘Breakthroughs in human development are always accompanied by radical 
changes of attitude towards the so-called human values … It is evident that one 
should not create single forms and judge them by a traditional and subjective 
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aesthetic, but build sets of form where the basic parameters are relationships 
between forms with no aesthetical value associated to any particular form in the 
set. It is possible within this context to ignore the former “good” and “bad”, now 
allowing aesthetical decisions to be based on statistical and “wertfreie” [value-
free] procedures where the totality represents a quality of a quantity.’ (Mohr, 
1976: 94ﬀ .) 
Th is demand can be seen as critiquing the work of other artists working with algorithms 
at the time, like Frieder Nake (ﬁ g. 86), Georg Nees (ﬁ g. 87), or A. Michael Noll (ﬁ g. 
88), who appeared to choose particular images over others. Such a choice, not being part 
of the algorithm employed, inscribes a foreign, i.e. human, aspect into the work, which 
according to Mohr hampers the aesthetic understanding of the algorithm.
Algorithmic artworks do not look like photographs, which might make it diﬃ  cult 
to maintain the idea of a ‘photographic practice’ given that no camera is used and 
no photograph is produced. On the other hand, for a photographer, algorithmic 
computer practice appears surprisingly close to his own practice, except that the 
apparatuses employed are diﬀ erent. Göran Sonesson thus suggests that the notion of the 
‘technographic’ should be used in order to extend our understanding of ‘photographic’ 
practice. A second deﬁ nition of post-photography can, as a result, be developed from a 
focus on the technographic aspects of photography, which can be seen as photographic 
practice beyond the production of photographic images. (Sonesson, 1999)
Algorithmic art has predominately focused on the creation of images with little or no 
relation to ‘what was out there in front of the imaging system’. (Mitchell, 2001: 30) 
Although algorithmic art is technographic, it shares with painting the possibility of 
working from nothing, an option that is not essentially photographic. Photograms  may 
be seen as exceptions, in so far as they are considered ‘photographic’, while the image is 
created without reference to anything ‘in front of the imaging system’. Th e ﬁ rst examples 
that are usually given of algorithmic art are oscillograms, like those produced by Ben F. 
Laposky and Herbert Franke in the 1950s. Franke’s Lichtformen 1953–5 (ﬁ g. 89), for 
example, look very much like some of the photograms by László Moholy-Nagy (ﬁ g. 
90, for example) and could be seen as related to his late Plexiglas sculptures, which he 
also photographed in motion (ﬁ g. 91). In fact, his Light-Space-Modulator of the 1920s 
(ﬁ g. 92) can be seen as photographic apparatus projecting photograms. According to 
Moholy-Nagy, ‘this piece of lighting equipment can be used to arrive at countless optical 
conclusions’ (Moholy-Nagy, n.d.), and functions as such in a way that is not dissimilar to 
the computer algorithms employed by Mohr and others.
In contrast to the technographic forms of algorithmic art and photograms, photography 
has a relation to the world from which the image is taken. (Mitchell, 2001: 56) It 
foregrounds the act of seeing (or learning to see) with the aid of an apparatus. Under the 
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heading of Photographing the Invisible, Fred Ritchin speculated in 1990 about what post-
photography, or rather, ‘hyper-photography’ as he calls it, might be. His account, like so 
many of the time, has a utopian ring to it (cf. Coyne, 1999), but it has the advantage of 
thinking about post-photography from a position before the now predominant Paintbox. 
According to him, hyper-photography ‘takes as its world anything that did, does, will or 
might exist, visible or not – anything, in short, that can be sensed or conceived’. (Ritchin, 
1999: 116) To be sure, his deﬁ nition does not diﬀ erentiate between images taken and 
images created. It would thus allow for the algorithm to be the invisible world conceived 
by the artist. In his examples, however, he focuses exclusively on ‘hyper-photography’ 
in relation to some sort of input, making sure that the ‘hyper-photograph’ still tells us 
something about the world as it is. Nancy Burson’s Warhead I (ﬁ g. 93), for example, can 
be included on the grounds that the percentages by which the portraits of Reagan (55%), 
Brezhnev (45%), Deng, Mitterand and Th atcher (less than 1%) are mixed represent ‘the 
number of nuclear warheads deployable by each country’. (Ritchin, 1999: 121) Th e 
‘hyper-photograph’ can also be an X-ray image or the visualisation of a sound.
Post-photography understood in these terms is a technographic practice based on a visible 
or invisible input, where the image has a diagrammatic relation to its source in so far as it 
visualises the source’s data. Th e resulting image need not be a photograph; light, a camera, 
etc. need not be involved. Such a deﬁ nition of post-photography is distinctly diﬀ erent 
from a post-photography designed to simulate an image’s appearance as photograph. 
Focusing on Paintbox-type photographs ignores a certain process-based way of working 
that has been as central to photography as has the photographic image. Post-photography, 
as introduced through the computer, has, in eﬀ ect, raised the question not only of where 
we see photography’s past and future, but also what we take to be essential in its practice. 
With the move to the computer and the necessary re-formulation of photographic 
processes as algorithms, ‘Photography, for 150 years basically a perceptual medium, can 
now become a largely conceptual one as well.’ (Ritchin, 1999: 124) 
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Chapter 3: Post-Conceptual Art
3.1 Th e Universal Machine
Post-photography that does not appropriate the photographic medium as style is essentially 
photographic practice mediated through an apparatus. It is able to engage conceptually 
with this apparatus since the algorithms or rules that are employed are conceptual in 
nature: they can be expressed through sets of instructions – the programme – that the 
apparatus follows during their execution. Th e photographic camera is, in comparison to 
the computer, a limited apparatus because it allows only certain types of executions, all 
involved with the taking of a photograph. It has, however, been noted that photography, 
limited as it may be, can be seen as a predecessor of the computer. (Stocker, 2001: 35)
Th e computer, most importantly, has no limited purpose: it is designed to become any 
possible machine as long as that machine has been conceptualised in a succession of 
discrete instructions. Th e machine that the computer becomes when executing these 
instructions has a particular function, while the computer’s only function is to become 
this machine, or any machine, in fact. Th e computer is thus an ‘all-purpose’ or ‘universal 
machine’. (Davis, 2001)
Algorithmic art is the art of designing ‘machines’ that can be run on a computer for the 
production of art. Th is is the reason why in algorithmic art a single, concrete artwork that 
is produced by the computer is a mere possible outcome through which the ‘real’ artwork, 
the algorithm, can only be incompletely understood. A particular artwork can in fact be 
generated by a number of diﬀ erent algorithms; only if we know and can compare all 
possible artworks that an algorithm can generate can we understand the potential inherent 
in that algorithm. Algorists like Manfred Mohr, who was mentioned above in Chapter 2, 
insist for this reason that the artworks produced must be a complete representation of the 
algorithm for meaning to emerge. Th e material artwork in algorithmic art is secondary to 
the conceptual artwork of the programme, while the programme can only be the primary 
artwork through the conceptual framework oﬀ ered by the computer.
According to Flusser in Towards a Philosophy of Photography, it is the ability of the 
photograph to surprise us – that is, to extend photography’s possibilities – that makes 
the art of the photographer. (Flusser, 1984: 58) When John Hilliard made a Camera 
Recording its Own Condition in 1971 (ﬁ g. 94), he showed the possible space within which 
a photograph can operate: the photograph must lie somewhere between black (no light 
and therefore no detail) and white (too much light and therefore no detail). Th at this image 
looks similar to those that one would ﬁ nd in an instruction booklet describing exposure 
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settings is no surprise because the work foregrounds the apparatus over the photographic 
image. It can thus be considered conceptual. Another more recent algorithmic example 
is John F. Simon’s Every Icon (1997) (ﬁ g. 95), where a web-based computer programme 
produces all the possible ‘icons’, i.e. images that can be represented on a 32 by 32 matrix 
of pixels. In theory – and time – the programme will produce all possible images, and 
those images that appear to represent something will in his opinion be nothing but a very 
small subset of the totality of all possible images. Simon estimates that the programme 
would need several trillion years to display all the possible icons.
Almost twenty-ﬁ ve ﬁ ve years earlier, Frieder Nake, one of the early German computer 
artists, referred to a similar, albeit hypothetical, programme in his book Ästhetik als 
Informations verarbeitung, which would be a 
‘simple algorithm … that could create all objects in a class by going through all 
possible combinations. Such an algorithm would be as simple as it was useless, 
because, in the face of the gigantic size of these classes, it would take thousands 
of years before the ﬁ rst interesting object was created.’ (Nake, 1974: 104, my 
translation) 
Th e reason why Nake calls such algorithms ‘useless’ lies in the absence of any judgement 
concerning the aesthetic qualities of the images that could produce a surplus of meaning 
and, thus, ‘use’ for an audience. Every Icon, however, is as simple as the programme 
envisioned by Nake: it is nothing but the visualisation in binary format of a counter 
counting up to 21024. In ﬁ g. 95, for example, Every Icon has counted to 9868694593, the 
decimal value of the binary term 1001001100001110000101010001000001, as which 
ﬁ g. 95 can be read when every black pixel is expressed as 1 and every white pixel as 0. Th e 
upper-left corner of the grid, which is the start ﬁ eld, is the last digit of the binary term. 
Once the end of the ﬁ rst line is reached, Every Icon starts the second line from the pixel 
furthest left. Instead of having a 32 by 32 matrix, Every Icon actually creates a string that 
is 1,024 spaces long, and which for the purpose of forming an icon, has been split into 
32 lines.
Counting is an activity that does not make a meaningful diﬀ erence between numbers; 
numbers (if one excludes numerology) represent diﬀ erent values, but they do not have a 
meaning beyond this diﬀ erence. Th us, the icons in Every Icon are assembled not in terms 
of their meaning, but as pure calculational possibilities. In Matthew Mirapaul’s review 
of the work for the New York Times’s website Arts@Large in 1997, Simon is quoted as 
saying: ‘Th ere was a lot of talk at the end of the 80s when post-modernism was emerging 
about how we’ve reached the end of imaging, and I wanted to show that even in a simple 
32 by 32 space, the possibilities for imaging were vast.’ Mirapaul adds: ‘Most of the 
images will have no value, a realization which in turn deepens one’s appreciation for 
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the range of choices that artists must confront and discard daily.’ (Mirapaul, 1997) Th e 
artist’s ‘hand’, it would seem, which had vanished from the technographic image, has 
somehow survived in the sense of the artist’s choice, which in the age of the computer 
can be made from a set of options delivered to the artist. Th e conceptual implications for 
the art, however, described in the previous chapter, that result from an engagement with 
processes of automation, are nulliﬁ ed when these processes deliver images only, without 
impacting on the processes by which the artist chooses. 
Although writing his own algorithms, Joshua Davis, for example, makes a point of calling 
them his ‘brushes’, ‘paints’, or ‘strokes’, in order to maintain a position according to which 
the computer is a tool comparable to a brush and where he is an artist comparable to a 
painter. He also writes that he is ‘in a constant state of surprise and discovery’ (Davies, 
2004: 142), which recalls Flusser’s conception of the photographer. Flusser, however, 
stresses that a new discovery (of a new image, for example) is only really new if it ‘discover[s] 
hidden virtualities in the programme’. (Flusser, 1984: 19) It is, according to Flusser, not 
the creation of a new image within existing possibilities that makes the art; it is the creation 
of new possibilities that are introduced through new images. When, however, a work like 
Every Icon demonstrates the huge but limited possibilities given in a pixel-matrix, it is 
clear that the realisation of one of these possibilities might be surprising, but will not 
question the parameters of the apparatus. On the contrary, such practice uses conceptual 
skills to programme the computer, while artistic practice is a-conceptually graphic. Th is 
is a common problem, which if not clearly addressed can create meaningless categories 
that ignore artistic merit, as in Information Arts, Stephen Wilson’s 2002 encyclopaedic 
survey of anything artistic that has to do with the ‘information society’ (Wilson, 2002: 
3) in which we live.
3.2 Information and Meaning
In a later text, Simon remarks: ‘One thing that I have learned is that there are more 
possible images than we will ever be able to see or that the computer will ever be able to 
display, so we will continue to need creative human image-makers to pick the meaningful 
signal from the noise.’ (Simon, 2004: 46) Th is implies that some images created by his 
software are more meaningful than others. However, it also implies that the diﬀ erence 
cannot be identiﬁ ed by the computer programme, and that a human operator is required 
for this task.
So-called ‘generative aesthetics’, which held sway from the beginning of the 1960s to the 
early 1970s, but is almost forgotten today, took a diﬀ erent position. In this principle, 
the diﬀ erence in meaning to which Simon refers was explicable within a theory of 
41
information, according to which all images where formally equal but diﬀ ered in the 
amount of information they contained. Understanding the notion of ‘information’ that 
is used to make this distinction will help us understand not only the historical but also 
the systematic context that has inﬂ uenced artistic practice.
It is not diﬃ  cult for a computer programmer to create a programme that executes a 
command like: ‘Return the sum of 2 and 5’. A command like ‘Return a number between 
1 and 6’, however, poses more complicated problems. Th e diﬃ  culty lies in the fact that 
the return value of the ﬁ rst command is unequivocal (namely 7), whereas the second 
is not (it could be any number from 1 to 6). To create random numbers, programmers 
have designed a special type of algorithm called a ‘random generator’. Th ese can produce 
random numbers only when fed with a ‘seed’. A seed is a number taken from somewhere 
outside of the algorithm (usually the time, the temperature of the processor, or other 
accessible sources). However, this makes random numbers diﬃ  cult to obtain. To work 
around this problem, so-called ‘pseudo-random’ numbers are introduced. Th ese are 
calculated on the basis of irrational numbers (numbers that cannot be expressed as a 
fraction, thus having an inﬁ nite number of decimal places without ordering themselves 
into periodic sequences), which make them appear to be random, although pseudo-
random sequences eventually start repeating themselves. It is, however, by no means 
always certain that random sequences created using a seed will not exhibit similar 
problems, making randomness on the computer a diﬃ  cult issue.
Saying that ‘sequences start repeating themselves’ implies that a speciﬁ c rule becomes 
apparent that can be used to construct, and thus, predict future sequences, making the 
sequence not random at all. Th e rule thus provides a shortcut to the sequence; that 
is, a shorter way to construct the sequence than following one number after the other. 
Th e informational content of that rule is shorter (and thus requires less memory space) 
than the actual sequence itself. Th e relationship of the sequence to its shortest expression 
is, according to Kolmogorov, a measure for the randomness of the sequence. (Bennett, 
1999: 163) If the quotient is 1, it means that the shortest way to express a sequence is the 
sequence itself. Such a sequence can be considered to be absolutely random.
Claude Shannon has argued in A Mathematical Th eory of Communication, 1948, that it 
is exactly such a random series that contains a maximum of information. Th is counter-
intuitive argument becomes more understandable if one accepts the hypothesis that a 
message not only consists of information but also of redundant elements. Something is 
redundant if it does not add any further information to a message. Shannon claims, for 
instance, that approximately 50 percent of letters are redundant in the ordinary English 
language; that is, a text only containing (the right) 50 percent could still be understood. 
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(Shannon, 1948) Redundancy thus reduces the informational content of messages, of 
which artworks are considered to be a sub-class. Redundancy, however, increases the 
comprehensibility to humans of a message, due to the fact that the information a human 
can register in a given time span is, according to Abraham Moles, limited to about 16 
bits per second. (Moles, 1973: 18) An artwork, for example, that requires an information 
intake above this value contains too much information and is considered too complex; 
if it requires signiﬁ cantly less, it is considered banal, because it gives hardly any new 
information (the image’s content is mainly redundant). (See ﬁ g. 96 for a graph by 
Moles illustrating the distribution of the capacity to process given information across a 
population.)
‘Entropy’ is the measure that Shannon introduces for the quantity of informational 
content. Redundancy plus entropy equals 1. Th at is, all that is not information in an 
artwork or a message in general is redundant, in the same way that all that is not redundant 
is information. However, this equation also states that everything in an artwork can be 
seen as either entropy or redundancy and nothing else. An absolutely random artwork, 
which Nake classiﬁ ed as ‘useless’, would most likely be some kind of ‘white noise’, 
comparable to the left-hand image in ﬁ g. 97. For information-theorists like Moles, such 
artworks do not contain no information but rather, too much information. ‘Th e lack 
of any spontaneous interpretation is from a theoretical point of view linked with too 
much informational content, whereas following the common psycho-aesthetic view, it 
is linked to a lack of structure, or inner organisation.’ (Moles, 1971: 93, my translation) 
For this reason, entropy has been linked to disorder: the higher the entropy, the more 
evenly information is spread out and the less obstructed by a structure this spreading of 
information is (the house in ﬁ g. 97, right).
In summary, the informational approach to artworks locates two contradictory and 
supplementary properties in any work: redundancy and entropy. Information is identiﬁ ed 
with entropy and thus with randomness and disorder. Order, on the other hand, is a 
structure that is represented by an artwork’s redundant elements. For humans, redundancy 
is necessary for the understanding of information.
Th e claim that the informational elements of an artwork would be located in its disorder 
provoked a response by Rudolf Arnheim in his essay Entropy and Art of 1971. (Arnheim, 
1971) According to him, information has to be located in the structures of images. Th e 
example in Chapter 2 of the blue line that was drawn ‘into’ the memory space and whose 
structure is not known to the computer but only to the operator, is a good example of 
Arnheim’s point that in the process of registering information, meaning is changed. As 
he says: 
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‘A straight line reduced to a sequence of dots for the purpose of piecemeal analysis 
or transmission can be highly redundant; in the drawing of a geometrician, 
engineer, or artist it is not … In dealing with structure, as is constantly done in 
the arts, regularity of form is not redundancy.’ (Arnheim, 1971) 
Still, according to Arnheim, both the artist and the information theorist follow the 
same economic principle of ﬁ nding the simplest solution to a problem. ‘Any predictable 
regularity is termed redundant by the information theorist because he is committed to 
economy: every statement must be limited to what is needed. He shares this commitment 
with scientists and artists.’ (Arnheim, 1971) Both, however, follow diﬀ erent economies. 
By rejecting information theory’s approaches to art, Arnheim nevertheless accepts the 
validity of information theory, albeit in a diﬀ erent context. For Arnheim, the meaning of 
a work of art is what the work has to give in terms of information. Such information is 
bound to an inner structure and not a random meeting of separate pieces. Th e image on 
the right in ﬁ g. 96 could have been produced by intentionally drawing a house. It could 
also have happened as an unlikely chance event. For Arnheim, the grid-like structure of 
the image would already symbolise parts that are stuck together to form a house rather 
then elements that belong together. Using an informational approach to art implicitly 
claims that reality is equally composed of unrelated elements and chance encounters. 
‘Only in a world based exclusively on the chance combination of independent elements 
is an orderly pattern a most improbable thing to turn up.’ (Arnheim, 1971)
Concerning the arts, Arnheim does not wish to separate information from meaning. 
Information theorists like Warren Weaver, on the other hand, radically distinguish 
information from meaning and are only concerned with the informational elements of 
things. For Weaver, the term ‘information’ must be kept distinct from the term ‘meaning’: 
‘In fact, two messages, one of which is heavily loaded with meaning and the other of 
which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent, from the present viewpoint, as regards 
information.’ (Warren Weaver’s preface to: Shannon, 1948) For Arnheim’s understanding 
of art, on the other hand, each message is clearly diﬀ erent. Th e two ‘economies’ (to use 
Arnheim’s term) that can be identiﬁ ed are the economy of meaning and the economy 
of information. Arnheim’s essay can be seen as a response to the socio-cultural shift 
towards an understanding of art as message, which can be split into its informational 
components.
It is notable, however, that Arnheim, who discusses the relation of structure and 
creativity in the second part of Entropy and Art, references Gustav Th eodor Fechner for 
an explanation of creativity. 
‘Fechner conceived of the original state of all being as that of a comprehensive 
primordial creature, anticipating all existing things in intricate relations and 
movements, held together only by the force of gravity, and comparable in its 
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chaotic fertility to “a Brazilian forest” … What he describes is most clearly the 
initial stage of human creativity, when the mind is a disorderly storehouse of many 
possibilities – a state of aﬀ airs that has its external counterpart in the picturesquely 
overcrowded studios and studies of many creative persons.’ (Arnheim, 1971) 
Arnheim does not say so, but the state before structure appears and which he describes so 
colourfully is exactly how the ‘economy of information’ has to be thought about – not 
as structural reality, but as an active state of movement and possibility. Th e ‘economy of 
information’ is thus related to artistic creation and the avant garde in general, since it 
is this that best describes a state where the human imprint on any structure appears as 
nothing but possibility. Arnheim, too, needs this state – ‘the overcrowded studios’ – but 
he is interested only in the structures that leave the studio, not in the entropy by which 
avant-garde art maintains its own possibility. It is clear, however, that both conceptions 
are based on a Romantic understanding of a genius that creates and innovates.
Reﬂ ecting on the notion of ‘information’, Max Bense, German mathematician and 
philosopher at the centre of information theory in relation to art in the 1960s, crucially 
stresses that only innovative things have informational value, and that these things are 
the result of automated processes. Automation seen in relation to information produces 
innovation, which is the reason why Bense stresses that in relation to information, art 
and technology are identical, that art is an apparatus that uses creativity to expand and 
reproduce itself. What would in a diﬀ erent context be called ‘the modern world’, he calls 
‘civilisation’ when he says: 
‘Each innovation equals an increase in civilisation in the form of information, 
although each automation is based on information that it consumes. Automation 
is thus arrested information and describes precisely in this manner a perfect state 
understood as precision. Automation and innovation, intelligibilité and originalité, 
technology and information … prove to be in this regard equally exclusive and 
inclusive partial processes of civilisation, and it seems that science on the one side 
and art on the other represent the perfect states of exclusion as well as inclusion.’ 
(quoted in: Von Herrmann, 2004: 156) 
Art is understood as a rule-based, that is, institutionally automated, process, which 
maintains itself as it innovates and includes, and thus learns and transforms civilisation 
into its body. It is thus not surprising that some commentators have even identiﬁ ed the 
function of computer software with that of the avant-garde, in the sense that: ‘software 
codiﬁ es and naturalizes the techniques of the old avant-garde’. (Manovich, 2002) Th is is, 
however, not a question of a particular style shared by the avant-garde and software, but 
of the relationship that both have to information.
Such explication of a perceived historical process, that of modernism, and the active 
function of art, coincided with art’s own realisation of its institutional role in the form 
of Conceptual art. While Conceptual art was able to create a momentum beyond the 
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paradigm of information, late modern informational theories of art got stuck in their own 
deﬁ nitions and quickly became outdated in the ﬁ rst half of the 1970s. Th ey can be used, 
however, to interrogate the notions of information and meaning around Conceptual art, 
as well as process and practice.
3.3 Conceptual Art
‘Information’, which occupies the ﬁ eld of the possible and the new, is according to such 
information theory separate from ‘meaning’. Duchamp’s ready-mades, often taken as 
examples of the ﬁ rst Conceptual artworks (e.g. Wood, 2002), demonstrate the possible 
withdrawal of meaning in an object that is allowed to be indiﬀ erent through its status 
as information. Th e snow shovel or the urinal are propositions of possibility that resist 
meaning. (McEvilley, 2005: 88) Although any object can become a ready-made, not all 
objects deliver themselves as information, since some could, in fact, mean something. 
What makes the ready-made successful is its possibility as art and not its reality as object. 
Th at success, however, is threatened by the ready-made becoming meaningful as art 
object, disallowing it as a proposition of possibility. Sherrie Levine’s bronze Fountain 
(1989) (ﬁ g. 98), for example, may be seen as critiquing this transformation by fulﬁ lling 
it, while Maureen Connor’s Untitled (1989) (ﬁ g. 99), which consists of ‘Duchamp’s’ 
bottle rack with underwear attached, does not. Although it references the ready-made 
turned sexualised consumer object, it also makes one think about the status of sexuality 
in Duchamp’s work; it questions the bottle rack’s status as ready-made by making it 
consequential to Duchamp’s thinking. Although the historic relation between Duchamp’s 
work and what was later called ‘Conceptual art’ is questionable (Colpitt, 2004: 41), his 
ready-mades nevertheless indicate a shifting deﬁ nition of art against individual practices 
(such as painting), which may be seen repeated in the later generation of Conceptual 
artists.
Before moving on to a discussion of Conceptual art, it might help to follow the lead 
of Th ierry de Duve and stay for a moment longer with Duchamp’s contribution, for 
de Duve, too, uses Fountain in his description of the closure of modernism. By calling 
Fountain ‘art’, one repeats, according to de Duve, modernism’s pattern of adding the 
new to the collection of what one has already chosen to be art. Th is addition is always 
a rupture, since the new is only new – and, therefore, informative – if it has not been 
predicted by what was already counted as art. ‘Each time the sentiment of your dis-
sentiment makes you add a new, unexpected, and overwhelming thing to your critical 
collection, you shake up the set of references to which you have been referring this or 
that work until then.’ (De Duve, 1996: 69) Th is motion is identical to the idea expressed 
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above about art that consumes with its institutional structures the innovation provided 
by a ‘creative’ avant-garde, which as it unsettles and informs also stabilises ‘the economy 
of information’ that is rooted in entropy and disorder. By oﬀ ering a ready-made object as 
a token of art’s future as radical possibility, Duchamp wagered on art changing beyond 
recognition. By accepting Fountain as art, any shielding criteria that had protected art 
against the notion of ‘information’ (taste, for example) had to be left behind, rendering 
the institution of ‘art’ questionable.
Innovative and avant-garde artists challenge art. However, as they do so, they are at the 
same time stabilising it; modern art needs the avant-garde to do exactly that. Modern art 
is already constituted in relation to its future as possibility, a process that, according to 
Rosalind Krauss, ‘involved tying back one’s perceptions of art in the present [the avant-
garde’s delivery of the future] to what one knew about art in the past’. (Cited in: Colpitt, 
2004: 34) All innovations and all provocations have to be something possible that can 
deliver ‘information’ to the institution of art. Seen from art’s perspective, that realm of 
information is indeed surprising when it breaks into the institution, and therefore must 
be in extremis unstructured by a reality guaranteed by the institution. Fountain delivered 
maximum information, and once the work was accepted as art (and thus made reality), 
it completely changed art: nothing could be excluded anymore, since everything had 
become potentially art. As a result, art, as Duchamp wagered, has become a game of the 
possible, which it had originally asked the avant-garde to supply; or, more simply put, 
it has become a game played with the possible: information. Having become a game, 
art has also turned instrumental, since now only the understanding of the game is what 
matters. Such ‘guided thinking’ has replaced the ‘creative artist’.
As de Duve has written, Alfred Stieglitz’s photograph of Fountain was at least as important 
to the reception of the work as the original material object (ﬁ g. 100). (De Duve, 1996: 
89ﬀ ) It was the photographer, accused of the naivety of modernism, who ‘signed-oﬀ ’ 
Fountain as art by photographing it. But he had misunderstood how much of his own 
ground was being challenged. Th e artwork as necessarily dormant possibility, which is key 
to de Duve’s argument, was thus made only by the photograph. Without the photograph, 
the censored Fountain would not have been seen; with the photograph, it became an 
event, but only as a suggestion of possibility. Th e function of photography, one could 
speculate, again with reference to Flusser, has always been its ability to suggest a world 
of possibilities, ‘the world of information’, rather than to depict a world of realities. 
In a letter to Stieglitz dated 22 May 1922, Duchamp expressed his inclination for 
photography over painting, which runs against Stieglitz’s own desire for photography to 
become like painting: ‘I would like to see it [photography] make people despise painting 
until something else will make photography unbearable.’ (Quoted in: De Duve, 1996: 
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140) Getting Stieglitz to create a painterly photograph of the urinal in dramatic shadow, 
placed in front of a painting as background, only to expose painting and with it art to 
what photography meant to Duchamp – namely, the realisation of art as possibility – is 
one of Duchamp’s greatest ironic achievements. With Fountain, art was exposed to the 
‘world of information’ that it had already joined by demanding originality from artists. 
(Krauss, 1986b: 157) 
Conceptual art of the 1960s as envisaged by Joseph Kosuth in Art after Philosophy, for 
example, follows Duchamp’s lead, except that now art is explicitly anchored within the 
informational paradigm. Th e history of art, including its ‘masterworks’, is considered 
irrelevant if it cannot be activated and thus become informational in any given present: ‘Art 
“lives” through inﬂ uencing other art, not by existing as the physical residue of an artist’s 
ideas.’ (Kosuth, 1999: 165) Only as information does art function as art. Art is a concept, 
in need of execution, in order to ‘live’; that is, to form a ‘proposition presented within the 
context of art as a comment on art’. (Kosuth, 1999: 165) Art is active speculation about 
its own potential. According to Kosuth, this speculation is necessarily conceptual because 
it functions only in regard to the concept of art. Th e form that such speculation takes 
should, therefore, be of no importance, but Kosuth prefers language as a form because 
he believes that language protects against ‘appearance’ and ‘morphology’. (Kosuth, 1999: 
164) Language, however, has subsequently proved not to be pure enough, since it too, 
‘appears’. John Baldessari has stated: 
‘Unless you can prove me wrong, any artist who has ever used language has had 
to get more and more visual to say the same thing, to the point where it becomes 
all about the visual spectacle and the meaning is lost. Th ey have to keep upping 
the ante. Th at’s why I stopped using words in the work.’ (Quoted in: Godfrey, 
1998: 351)
Language, it seems, can describe the process necessary for art to function, but it is not 
identical to that process. It should, however, be noted that the concept of language in 
analytical philosophy, to which Kosuth is sympathetic, has had a great inﬂ uence on the 
development of programming languages. (Drucker, 2004: 256)
3.4 Information and Software, 1970
Two key exhibitions, both held in 1970, can be cited to describe the notion of ‘information’ 
in Conceptual art. Th e ﬁ rst, curated by Kynaston McShine, is tellingly called Information 
and opened in July at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Th e second, curated 
by Jack Burnham, opened in September at the Jewish Museum in Brooklyn under the 
heading Software – Information Technology: Its New Meaning for Art. Some artists, like 
Hans Haacke or Robert Berry, were represented in both exhibitions, while the later 
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Software show made a point of including technological projects in order to illustrate the 
cross-over between Conceptual art and information technology. (For a discussion of this 
see: Shanken, 2002)
Th ere are many works in Information that can illustrate the artists’ coming to terms with 
‘the world of information’ as a lived fact. For Service Area (ﬁ g. 101), for example, Vito 
Acconci had his mail forwarded to the museum for a period of three months, where it 
was deposited in a clear Plexiglas box and collected by the artist at varying intervals. 
Information, here in the form of letters, was something that was delivered and had to be 
actively received. Hans Haacke’s MoMA Poll (ﬁ g. 102) asked each visitor the question: 
‘Would the fact that Governor Rockefeller has not denounced President Nixon’s Indo-
China policy be a reason for you not voting for him in November?’, presented as a 
questionnaire through which he both collected statistical information on the visitor’s 
opinions and informed those who might not have been aware of Rockefeller’s position. 
Th e information polled was represented visually by presenting the ballots for and against 
in two transparent ballot boxes. Haacke also demanded in the proposal printed in the 
catalogue that the ballots should be ‘counted photo-electrically [so that] the state of the 
poll at any given time during the exhibition is available in absolute ﬁ gures’. (McShine, 
1970: 57) Th e poll was regulated bureaucratically, to meet Haacke’s request that the 
tickets should be marked, ballots counted, and irregularities reported ‘immediately’. In 
this way, he ensured that the activity of ‘polling’ was as real to the museum as it was to the 
visitors. Mel Bochner’s contribution to Information, his Measurement Series: By Formula 
(Circle) (ﬁ g. 103), created a diagrammatic experience of the exhibition space, blending 
the formulas that accompanied his construction with the architecture of the space. 
Science, both as application and appearance, was central to the exhibition, making art’s 
propositional speculations about itself that Kosuth had demanded more scientiﬁ c than 
artistic in nature. Adrian Piper’s Th ree Models of Art Production Systems (ﬁ g. 104), for 
example, claims to be art at the same time as it speculates on its own conditions in a 
formulised scientiﬁ c manner. ‘System I’ describes the transformation of an information 
input through the artist’s consciousness into a separate art product. ‘System II’ describes a 
similar process, except that the art product stays within the artist’s consciousness and has 
to be ‘conveyed through external communication forms’. (McShine, 1970: 111) ‘System 
III’, which appears to be the most advanced system, does not diﬀ erentiate in terms of a 
system between art products and input material; the active consciousness does not create 
but only ‘recognize[s] and distinguish[es]’. According to this (ideal) system, there is no 
diﬀ erence between information and art; all that happens is a mutual transformation of 
‘the world of information’ and the ‘active consciousness’. Crucially, though, the artwork-
cum-scientiﬁ c system has no interest in setting up a general taxonomy of ‘art production 
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systems’: it tells the reader that ‘other models may be constructed’, making what might 
have been taken for science an artwork. 
Ira Joel Haber’s Information Wall Work (ﬁ g. 105) uses the grid layout as an ordered 
information structure that can present arbitrary information, such as the ‘Presidents of 
the United States’, taken from a 10-cent booklet published by the government, as an 
‘example of information the public can obtain inexpensively’. (McShine, 1970: 58) Th e 
grid, i.e. the informational structure, which was designed in four rows of nine presidents, 
is not ﬁ xed: ‘If this work is to be repeated after Richard Nixon leaves oﬃ  ce, then the only 
possible arrangement would be one row of thirty-seven pages.’ Th e system by which the 
presidents are organised and ultimately understood is thus nothing but a number game.
It is diﬃ  cult to ascertain the opinions of each of the artists represented in the exhibition 
regarding the function of information in their work. As much as the show embraces 
the paradigm of information, the irony with which the individual artists approached 
the idea seems to demonstrate that the ‘new’ place of art in terms of information also 
threw up the question: ‘[W]hat does it mean to formulate the question of art’s urgency 
and utility under the sign of information?’ (Meltzer, 2006: 124) It would, however, be 
wrong, as Johanna Drucker suggests, to see the swing to information in Conceptual 
art as ‘mark[ing] the end of Modernism’. (Drucker, 2004: 254) What she rightly sees 
as the paradigmatic shift from production to conception is still rooted in production: 
conception, it must be made clear, produces information. A certain hesitation towards the 
meaning of information that can be seen in a show like Information is not necessarily due 
to the question of information, but to the question of the continuation of production 
within information.
Th e second exhibition, Software, has been key in the bringing together of Conceptual art 
and information technology. In the show, information technology was employed mainly 
to create an experience ‘without the mental cues of art history’. (Burnham, 1970: 12) 
Computer technology was presented as an alternative basis from which to experience that 
which would in a diﬀ erent context have been called ‘art’. Burnham saw the space in which 
art operates as conﬂ ated with the space of technology, and believed it was valid to show 
the work of the artists who had just exhibited in the Museum of Modern Art, where the 
‘cues of art history’ were given, in this diﬀ erent technological context. Th e Conceptual 
art in question was made to function as a hinge around which these contexts could be 
substituted. Software, like Information, demonstrates the relation of Conceptual art to the 
theory of information. Burnham’s premise is that information must be experienced in order 
to inform; that is, ‘to change someone’s mind about something’. (Burnham, 1970: 12) 
Crucially, he stresses that art history gets it wrong if it believes that the site of information 
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lies in the already institutionalised past. (Th is argument is similar to the positions of Bense 
and Krauss cited above.) ‘Th e objective of art history and most retrospective disciplines 
is to counteract the natural eﬀ ect of time on information by turning the past into a form 
of information which remains relevant in the future.’ (Burnham, 1970: 12f.) Art and 
technology, rather, are the primary models for information, a belief that the exhibition 
sets out to demonstrate.
Burnham’s position in relation to the history of art is repeated symbolically in John 
Baldessari’s Cremation Piece (ﬁ g. 106), where he burned his ‘accumulated paintings’ made 
between 1953 and 1966 and displayed the ashes behind a commemorative plaque. In so 
doing, he left the history of his work, and with it, previous forms of practice, resolutely 
behind. A second work, Painting for Kubler, 1969, reads: 
‘Th is painting owes its existence to prior paintings. By liking this solution, you 
should not be blocked in your continued acceptance of prior inventions. To 
attain this position, ideas of former paintings had to be rethought in order to 
transcend former work. To like this painting, you will have to understand prior 
work. Ultimately this work will amalgamate with the existing body of knowledge.’ 
(Burnham, 1970: 33)
In this work, Baldessari critiques the very mechanisms that he employed in Cremation 
Piece: a rethinking of existing work and its transcendence through new work, which 
needs to relate to the ‘ideas of former paintings’. Th e burning of the paintings disallows 
material engagement and therefore allows only their idea to be accessed. 
If Baldessari burns the work retrospectively, Les Levine sees the ‘burning’ of the work as 
the actual site. In his Systems Burn-oﬀ  X Residual Software (ﬁ gs 107 and 108) he showed 
1,000 ‘randomly distributed’ copies of each of the thirty-one photographs he had taken at 
the Earth Works exhibition at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, in 1969. According 
to his text in the catalogue, the reality of an art event is unimportant in comparison to the 
material ‘burn-oﬀ ’ it creates. Th e subsequent re-construction of a possible event through 
its residues is the new site from which he operates. In a comment that recalls Baldessari 
he states: ‘[M]ost of the art that is produced today ends up as information about art.’ 
(Burnham, 1970: 61) Th e works of Baldessari and Levine adopt a process of stripping 
themselves from a traditional ‘real’ encounter with art, which they nevertheless repeat to 
a certain extent in the gestures they employ.
Th e more technical examples in the exhibition were not concerned with such mourning 
for the history of art. Th rough them, the exhibition was turned into a laboratory where 
the audience could experience information systems as if they were art. One could, for 
example, sit in a chair and sense an image through vibrators attached to its back rest. 
(Smith-Kettlewell Institute of Visual Sciences, Vision Substitution System, ﬁ g. 109) One 
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could also hear the sound of various radio stations quietly played back through the glass 
panels at the front of the museum. Th e installation was arranged in such a way as to play 
only those stations whose receivers on the roof of the building were in sunlight. Th is 
turned the façade of the Jewish Museum into a space in which the constellation of the 
work could be experienced. (Th eodosius Victoria, Solar Audio Window Transmission, ﬁ g. 
110) 
Th e most spectacular and elaborate display, however, must have been Seek (ﬁ g. 111) by 
Nicholas Negroponte and MIT’s Architecture Machine Group. Seek consisted of a glass 
cage on a table, in which 2 x 2 inch building blocks were arranged, but were constantly 
disturbed by live gerbils let loose in the cage. A computer-operated arm above the cage 
attempted to maintain an order that was constantly under threat by the living system, 
the gerbils. Unaﬀ ected by considerations relating to the history of art, these installations 
played games and created experiences that demonstrated the productive forces hidden in 
life that can only be brought to the fore through designed processes. As Shanken says, the 
works exhibited in Software ‘demand that the viewer examine the process of processing 
information, while in the process of doing so’. (Shanken, 2002: 435, his italics)
A Conceptual practice as exempliﬁ ed by these two exhibitions is a practice that creates 
concepts with which to interrogate a given context, turning occurrences in that context into 
possible rather than real events. Technology, one could generally speculate, is the ability 
to make a reality possible. Being able to think of a reality as information is an indicator by 
which we know there is a possible world at hand. In relation to art, Conceptual art, like 
Dada and Fluxus is by necessity also anti-art; that is, it disrupts the worlds of reality in an 
attempt to free art for information and to make art possible. (McEvilley, 2005)
3.5 Post-Conceptual Art
Conceptual art delivers a world of possibility. It might question the institutions that are 
necessary to achieve this, in particular, the museum, but it does still operate, as illustrated 
by Baldessari and Levine, in relation to art as reality. Post-conceptual art, on the other 
hand, operates from within the world of information. It can take for granted the world 
of information that was achieved by Conceptual art. Its practice, therefore, need not 
negatively focus on an art it works against, but can focus on information as its material. 
Comparable to Lyotard’s use of the preﬁ x ‘post’ in ‘post-modernism’ (Lyotard, 2001: 
79), Post-conceptual art is not necessarily what comes after Conceptual art, but rather, 
an element in Conceptual art that can be more or less pronounced: namely, the working 
with or against information rather than its production.
Th e work of Robert Smithson may be seen to represent such a Post-conceptual practice. 
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Some of the notions introduced above overlap with the concepts that Smithson puts 
forward, while in other cases he pursues distinctly diﬀ erent ideas. What was introduced as 
‘meaning’ in the above discussion in relation to Arnheim, and which has successively also 
been termed ‘redundancy’, ‘automation’ and ‘institution’, is called ‘action’ by Smithson. 
‘Action’ is for him an ‘anthropomorphic measure’, as he says in a diﬀ erent context, which, 
being modelled on a human idea of history, produces ‘progress’. (Smithson, 1996: 37) 
As much as Smithson is indebted to Duchamp, Conceptual art and the function of 
technology, which is the production of information, he nevertheless sees this production 
as an action. Technology, for example, is for Smithson akin to biology (Smithson, 1996: 
35) in that it performs actions of life. In Entropy and the New Monuments, 1966, he quotes 
Sol LeWitt’s comment: ‘I am not interested in idealizing technology’ (Smithson, 1996: 
12), since technology, through producing information, is nothing but an extension of 
biological and human actions. (Th is is, by the way, the same Sol LeWitt who equates the 
concept with the machine in his Paragraphs on Conceptual Art. Th e machine is necessary 
but not central.) (Lewitt, 1999: 12) As long as Conceptual art is productive, one might 
say, it shares with technology the human dependency on progress. In Information and 
especially in Software, one can see art hesitating between the production of, albeit often 
useless, information or its display and the usage of information as material for the work.
Smithson thus insists on thinking about information physically. His use of the notion 
of ‘entropy’ is much closer to the second law of thermodynamics, which states that the 
entropy of a closed system increases over time, than to its usage in relation to information 
technology through which the term was introduced here. He acknowledges this relation 
when he states that the truth or falseness of a message has no implication in informational 
terms; i.e., ‘falseness is devoid of moral implications’. (Smithson, 1996: 18) Th e ‘world of 
information’, one can thus say, with its
‘nulliﬁ cation [of action, for example] has re-created Kasimir Malevich’s “non-
objective world”, where there are no more “likenesses of reality, no idealistic 
images, nothing but a desert!” But for many of today’s artists this “desert” is a 
“City of the Future” made of null structures and surfaces. Th is “City” performs 
no natural function, it simply exists between mind and matter, detached from 
both, representing neither. It is, in fact, devoid of all classical ideals of space and 
process. It is brought into focus by a strict condition of perception, rather than 
by any expressive or emotive means.’(Smithson, 1996: 14) 
Th e ‘City of the Future’ is no modernist city. Rather, it is the ‘Martian landscape’ 
(Smithson, 1996: 45) that Smithson photographed in his Monuments of Passaic, 1967 
(ﬁ g. 112). 
Th e ﬁ rst stage for a Post-conceptual practice is the upholding of human detachment from 
the work, while at the same time becoming free in order to develop a practice within such 
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detachment. Naturally, the danger is to re-inscribe ‘natural action’ through a practice 
that either foregrounds technology or backgrounds the artist’s human actions. Smithson’s 
work evades this danger by ‘mak[ing] some kind of point right away [that] stops any kind 
of possibility’. (Smithson, 1996: 51) Th is ‘making some kind of point’ is a practice that 
engages with the world as possibility (that of information) by making real points ‘right 
away’, without repeating reality as humanised meaning. Smithson’s reality is on the scale 
of the universe as it happens at a concrete and speciﬁ c point as the material reality of the 
artwork. 
Th e best examples for this are his Non-Sites from 1968 (ﬁ gs 113 and 114), installations 
that consist of (1) maps, photographs and documents (2) collected mineral samples, and 
(3) containers, in which these samples are held. All of these elements are set up as a real, 
albeit fragmented, point referencing a site in its absence. As Smithson remarks: ‘Th e bins 
or containers of my Non-Sites gather in the fragments that are experienced in the physical 
abyss of raw matter.’ (Smithson, 1996: 104) Th e ‘abyss’ is a direct reference to Michael 
Fried, who in a 1967 article on Morris Louis had compared the untouched canvas with 
an ‘inﬁ nite abyss’ in front of the artist. (Smithson says: ‘[T]he quality of Fried’s fear 
(dread) is high, but his experience of the abyss is low.’) (Smithson, 1996: 104) Th e Non-
Sites, on the other hand, are much greater in scope, since they are reactors ‘gathering in’ 
not a picture, but raw, that is, physically real, matter. 
In one instance, in Bangor-Pen Angyl, Pennsylvania, Smithson reports how 
‘Banks of suspended slate hung over a greenish-blue pond at the bottom of a 
deep quarry. All boundaries and distinctions lost their meaning in this ocean 
of slate and collapsed all notions of gestalt-unity. Th e present fell forward and 
backward into a tumult of “de-diﬀ erentiation”, to use Anton Ehrenzweig’s word 
for entropy… I collected a canvas bag full of slate chips for a small Non-Site. 
Yet, if art is art, it must have limits. How can one contain this ‘oceanic’ site?’ 
(Smithson, 1996: 110f ) 
Th e Non-Sites, with their containers and references, are attempts to make art right at the 
limit of a human action by giving an experience of the very speciﬁ c reality of the site, 
which is also the site as limit. As he says in Fragments of a Conversation: ‘Th at’s why my 
things don’t oﬀ er any kind of freedom in terms of endless vistas or inﬁ nite possibilities 
… I see it as inevitability; of going towards the fringes, towards the broken, the entropic. 
But even that has limits.’ (Smithson, 1996: 190f )
It is not enough to contemplate information as theoretical possibility and to disregard the 
possible in the face of the made or chosen object. Post-conceptual art must develop speciﬁ c 
solutions for containing information as information, which is reality in formation, as 
opposed to the redundancy of a reality already formed. Information theory and generative 
aesthetics extended into Conceptual art can be used to project an art that is not indebted 
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to art’s history; however, only post-conceptually can a practice be developed that truly 
engages with what the ‘world of information’ actually means. Un-photographic post-
photography is an opening into this world, which can only post-conceptually be seen not 
as a conceptual and thus informational but as a visual question.
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Chapter 4: Figure
4.1 Th e Outside Way of Seeing
Michelangelo is quoted as saying: 
‘In Flanders they paint with a view to external exactness … Th ey paint stuﬀ s and 
masonry, the green grass of the ﬁ elds, the shadow of trees, and rivers and bridges, 
which they call landscapes, with many ﬁ gures on this side and many ﬁ gures on 
that. All of this, though it pleases some persons, is done without reason or art, 
without symmetry or proportion, without skilful choice or boldness and, ﬁ nally, 
without substance or vigour.’ (Quoted in Alpers, 1983: xxiii) 
In her inﬂ uential Th e Art of Describing, Svetlana Alpers cites this passage as the starting 
point for her discussion of what she calls the ‘northern mode’ of painting. According 
to her, Michelangelo was not wrong in his observations about northern art, but misses 
the point through failing to understand that this particular type of painting has an aim 
diﬀ erent from that of the ‘southern mode’, which is ‘the art of describing’. Alpers lists 
some of the characteristics of the ‘northern mode of painting’: ‘the frequent absence of a 
positioned viewer … a play with great contrasts in scale … the absence of a prior frame … 
a formidable sense of the picture as surface … an insistence on the craft of representation’ 
and the diﬃ  culty of tracing any stylistic development within this mode. (Alpers, 1983: 
xxv) She describes these characteristics as dependent on the development of a new type 
of picturing, which she identiﬁ es with Kepler’s conceptualisation of vision. 
Jonathan Friday also bases his theory of photography on such Keplerian pictures; he 
follows Alpers in contrasting these with Alberti’s idea of the picture as window. (Alpers, 
1983: 42ﬀ .; Friday, 2001: 352f.) According to him, a Keplerian picture is best described 
by imagining Alberti’s window, through which the image-world can be seen as having 
moved so close to the eye that the eye becomes part of the image representing what the 
eye sees. (Friday, 2001: 353) In a sketch by Jacques de Gheyn, Old Woman and Vine (ﬁ gs 
115 and 116), such an ‘attentive eye’ (Alpers, 1983: 89) is actually drawn as part of the 
image. However, at the same time as the picture represents what the eye sees, it is emptied 
of all those characteristics that Michelangelo misses, which are considered to be a surplus 
added by the artist: paintings in the northern mode depict the world ‘as it is’, which is, 
normally, ‘without symmetry or proportion’. It is this ‘lack’, Anne Hollander claims, that 
makes the images appear ‘as if the artist has left the meaning to be provided by the viewer’ 
(Hollander, 1991: 17), triggering a direct emotional response similar to the experience in 
the cinema, her main concern.
Alpers’s argument is based on optics. It is the camera obscura, lenses, mirrors and 
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microscopes that have permitted such a way of picturing. Th e eye, as it were, conﬂ ates 
with the image through an optical apparatus, which the image, nevertheless, leaves behind 
in order to appear as a representation of vision. Th e ‘eye’ that is created with the aid of 
the apparatus is a ‘dead eye’ (Alpers, 1983: 36), however, and not real and embodied. 
Jonathan Crary supports this argument, quoting from Descartes’s La dioptrique, 1637, 
where the philosopher proposes the use of the lens from a real eye in the aperture of a 
camera obscura to demonstrate that the image one sees within it is that seen through 
one’s own eyes. (Crary, 1992: 47) 
Th is real or metaphorical removal of the eye from the body, which allows the eye to 
become part of the image, stands for what I would like to call the ‘outside way of seeing’. 
Th e outside way of seeing is not exclusively represented in the northern mode of painting, 
although this mode may, if we are to believe Alpers, be seen to articulate the idea for the 
ﬁ rst time in a coherent history. As Norman Bryson has remarked, it is also important to 
recognise an inner relation between the southern and the northern modes of painting, 
between Albertian and Keplerian pictures, in particular with respect to perspective when 
compared to Baroque art and what he calls ‘the insertion of embodiment into the optical 
ﬁ eld’. (In a discussion recorded in Foster, 1988: 25) Th e outside way of seeing is, however, 
strictly disembodied, but can also be seen extended into modern or even contemporary 
practices as a particular visual mind-set.
Th e notion of ‘information’ that I have developed in the previous chapters from a 
process-based understanding of photography foregrounds the conceptual function of the 
apparatus against the photograph’s appearance as image. Conceptual art, on the surface 
the most radical anti-visual practice, completes the shift from optics to information, 
giving the image a secondary, non-essential status. Th is is true, however, only if one 
assumes at the same time that images do not only fall short in relation to concepts but 
also to information. Yet such a case cannot be made, as a look into the history of the 
outside way of seeing proves. Underlying the northern mode of painting there is already 
a concept of the image as information. Th e concluding chapters of Th e Art of Describing 
are very telling in this respect, since they are concerned with the importance of maps 
(Chapter 4) and text (Chapter 5) for paintings in the northern mode. A drawn map is 
the spatial representation of information, which can, should the need arise, seamlessly 
shift into text. In a painting, text is always on a diﬀ erent register and made to ‘melt’ with 
the image only as tromp l’oeil eﬀ ect, as in Pieter Saenredam’s Interior of the Mariakerk in 
Utrecht , 1641 (ﬁ gs 117 and 118), where the text is written in three diﬀ erent colours by 
three diﬀ erent ‘hands’. On a map, text and image are as one; both are visualisations of 
information. Th e grid, which has become so central to the organisation of maps, and 
more recently, computerised images, should thus be understood less as the mapping of 
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space and more as the spacing out of information. Rosalind Krauss is therefore right to 
reject in her text Grids from 1979 the representational mapping of space through the 
grid, which makes the grid an extreme perspectival device, in favour of the surface itself as 
a map. (Krauss, 1986b: 10) In other words, the grid activates that surface for information 
if not as information already.
Grids, as they appear in modern art (for example, Untitled, 1965, by Agnes Martin, ﬁ g. 
119), may in this respect be seen as pictorial realisations of the principle that underlies 
the outside way of seeing: information. However, even in earlier examples of modern art, 
where one might not necessarily suspect it, the paradigm of information can be traced. 
Norman Bryson’s account of Realism, for example, which he gives in Vision and Painting: 
Th e Logic of the Gaze, is in eﬀ ect an explanation of Realism in terms of information. 
Realism, his argument goes, is convincing not because it is in any way closer to a perceived 
reality, but because it utilises entropy, i.e., a surplus of information. (Bryson, 1983: 56) 
Because it is a surplus that has no apparent necessity with regard to the image’s meaning, 
a Realist painting can obtain a ‘lifelike appearance’ (Bryson, 1983: 60) at the same time 
as this appearance is deeply charged with a false ideology of perception, Bryson’s central 
argument against the ideas put forward by Ernst Gombrich in books such as Art & 
Illusion. (Gombrich, 2002) In perception as conceptualised in the Western tradition, 
says Bryson, the body is removed as vision is re-inscribed as the disembodied, albeit 
seeing, ‘gaze’. Whether Bryson’s ‘gaze’ is comparable to the outside way of seeing as it has 
been introduced here is questionable, since he diﬀ erentiates the gaze from the embodied 
‘glance’, which alone is active and has duration. For Bryson, even the gaze cannot be 
thought beyond the body; the history of the gaze, while suppressing the glance and, 
ultimately, life, is always already the – albeit negative – history of the glance. (Bryson, 
1983: 122) 
It would seem that the question of meaning in relation to information that has concerned 
us in regard to Arnheim’s intervention quoted in the previous chapter re-arises here, with 
Bryson taking Arnheim’s side, since for both thinkers the idea of information is not able 
to penetrate what we think meaning is if it does not actively suppress, as in Bryson’s 
argument, the body as the site for such meaning. On the other hand, Bryson’s rejection 
of perception makes this alliance diﬃ  cult to maintain, since Arnheim’s conception of 
creativity includes perception. (Arnheim, 1971) Bryson’s ‘body’ must thus be sought 
beyond what Crary has called ‘the observer’, which is the nineteenth-century conception 
of an active or even creative human who achieves meaning by processing information, 
a conception to which Arnheim, by basing his idea of creativity on Fechner, had also 
subscribed. (Crary, 1992: 141ﬀ ) Bryson, however, does not oﬀ er any positive deﬁ nition. 
Th e body, it seems, is necessarily not visible, whilst at the same time being the only point 
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of reference for his discussion of both gaze and glance. (Bryson, 1983: 163ﬀ ) A reviewer 
consequently complained: ‘Bryson writes about nobody.’ (Ebitz, 1987: 158)
In Chapters 2 and 3, I remarked that the disappearance of the artist’s hand or, rather, 
its replacement by technological apparatus, is key to the understanding of ‘information’ 
in the artistic realm. A consequence of such a claim could be that the development of 
the notion of ‘information’ is technologically driven by the machines available for its 
production. Th is is, however, a disputed question. Geoﬀ rey Batchen’s Burning with 
Desire, for example, speculates on the reasons for the apparent delay in the invention of 
photography given that key techniques were already in place a number of years before. 
It is not, he argues, the readiness of the apparatus, but the desire towards its usage 
that is important. (Batchen, 1999: 24ﬀ ) His approach, which is explicitly indebted to 
Michel Foucault’s method of ‘archaeology’ (Cf. Foucault, 1989), is shared by Crary, who 
questions Alpers’s foregrounding of the optical instruments available within seventeenth-
century Dutch society. (Crary, 1992: 34ﬀ ) Although I will not be able to answer or even 
contribute to such historical questions, it is nevertheless important to state that what I 
call the ‘outside way of seeing’ may have an optical or technical element, but is conceptual 
in nature. From the point of view of information, it is the concept that is productive and 
not its materialisation in a particular machine or instrument.
Th ere is a certain a-historical aspect to this approach: technology might develop, whilst 
concepts simply change. Technical images conceptual in nature diﬀ er tremendously in 
regard to the technology employed for their production, while in relation to the concepts 
of imaging, which Martin Jay calls ‘scopic regimes’ (Jay, 1988), this may not be the case. 
Photography, for example, which has been the point of reference throughout this text, 
shares its place in relation to the outside way of seeing with current imaging techniques such 
as MRI scanning (ﬁ g. 120), or past inventions like the eighteenth-century physionotrace, 
a device for the drawing of silhouettes (ﬁ gs 121 and 122), or any number of devices for 
the construction and perception of anamorphic images. (Figs 123 and 124) Photography 
can also be extended beyond such narrow technological perspective into the drawings of 
da Vinci (ﬁ g. 40) and even other, less scientiﬁ c, observations like John Ruskin’s study of 
leaves (ﬁ g. 125) or Dutch documentations concerning the images found in an apple tree 
(ﬁ g. 126). Notably, many examples of my own research (see Chapter 1) do not depend 
for their meaning on the usage of technology; precise digital prints (such as ﬁ g. 39) are 
not distinct from hand-made images (like ﬁ g. 7, for example). Rosalind Krauss’s notion 
of the ‘post-medium’ is related to this. Clement Greenberg’s focus on ‘opticality’, says 
Krauss, which he used for a deﬁ nition of modern painting, had become a medium itself, 
making the traditional medium obsolete as a criterion for the criticism of and criticality 
in art. (Krauss, 2000: 29f.)
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Th e research of Martin Kemp in books such as Th e Science of Art: Optical Th emes in 
Western Art from Brunelleschi to Seurat (Kemp, 1990) or Seen/Unseen (Kemp, 2006) 
should be mentioned in this respect, since he primarily approaches images not through 
their context (such as art or science) but through their similarity in respect to the outside 
way of seeing. However, he does not describe it in these terms, and his research does not 
focus on contemporary artistic practice.
4.2 Process-Vision and Picture-Vision
Images that relate to the outside way of seeing are conceptual in nature, and since they 
can potentially be just drawings, may or may not be created with the aid of an apparatus. 
As the discussion concerning post-photography in Chapter 2 has revealed, not all images 
that are made using an apparatus such as those of photography or image computation 
are actually concerned with this apparatus; what has been called ‘photographic style’, for 
example, appropriates an appearance independent of the way in which the image was 
made. Th ose images can be called ‘conceptual’ only within their pictorial appearance – in 
the way Newman proposes in the case of Jeﬀ  Wall, for example (Newman, 2007) – but 
not ‘conceptual’ as understood here: that is, concerned with the process of their creation. 
Th e pictorial element, it must be said, creates conditions that allow for those aspects of 
the image that are not part of the picture to disappear. Th e outside way of seeing thus has 
to be understood as non-pictorial as much as conceptual in nature.
Th e deﬁ nition of the conceptual as productive (Chapter 3) allows for the visualisation 
of diﬀ erences between images made with the aid of apparatus. Since there is no clear 
material distinction between photographs and paintings in post-photography, what they 
are visually is decisive. Th e two types of post-photography that were mentioned, the un-
photographic photograph and the photographic un-photograph, indicate two diﬀ erent 
visual tendencies, where the former foregrounds the image as picture, while the latter 
foregrounds the image as process. Images as pictures allow the visualisation of what 
something is, whereas images as process allow the visualisation of how something works 
or is made. Corresponding to such aspects in terms of the image are what I would propose 
to call ‘process-vision’ and ‘picture-vision’ in terms of vision. On a map, for example, we 
directly see how points in space relate; we can read-oﬀ  distances or compare topographies 
(ﬁ g. 20). In photography, we can very often see how the photograph is made – where the 
camera stood, for example (ﬁ g. 127) – and if we cannot, as when reﬂ ections are used (ﬁ g. 
128), we are stimulated to wonder. In relation to algorithmic art or visual mathematics, 
it is the more or less explicit pattern in an image that shows how particular algorithms 
work. Th e simplest example would be the very ﬁ rst computer image of a bouncing ball on 
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a Whirlwind computer in 1949 (ﬁ g. 129). All of these examples emphasise process-vision 
to various degrees. 
Picture-vision, on the other hand, is perhaps most pronounced in painted portraits, where 
the appearance of a particular person, i.e. what that person looks like, is of importance. 
(Fig. 130, for example.) In post-photography, picture-vision is alluded to when image 
elements are combined in order to achieve a particular composition or mise-en-scène. 
(Fig. 131) Picture-vision is here often cinematic, as in the work of Gregory Crewdson, for 
example, where the compositions seem to present arrested narratives. (Fig. 132)
Th e northern mode of painting, like photography, can in its essence be exclusively identiﬁ ed 
neither with process- nor with picture-vision. Both have a potential for the cinematic, for 
example, which to Hollander is crucial for Dutch art, since ‘the art of describing’ prepares 
for emotive subjectivity (Hollander, 1991: 51); both can also function as maps and the 
visualisation of information highlighting process-vision. What can perhaps be identiﬁ ed 
both in the northern mode of painting and in photography is their ability to combine 
both modes of seeing and not to exclude the one in favour of the other. Process-vision and 
picture-vision are independent; i.e., they can appear together or not, in diﬀ erent or even 
proportions. Certain works of art where both types of vision are pushed to an extreme 
without the one undermining the other may possibly be considered masterpieces. In 
Diego Velásquez’s Las Meñinas, 1656 (ﬁ g. 133), for example, the process of painting is 
made visible to a degree that puts the viewer into the painting at a place that is at the same 
time the centre of the composition. Although, Jeﬀ  Wall’s Picture for Women, 1979 (ﬁ g. 
134), to give another example, does not pull the spectator into the image in exactly the 
same way, the mirror that is used conﬂ ates the viewer with the picture surface, creating 
a perfect composition while indicating all the elements that are necessary to understand 
how the photograph is made.
Las Meñinas has been used by a number of authors, most prominently Michel Foucault 
at the beginning of Th e Order of Th ings (Foucault, 1989), as a case in point for various 
theories of representation. When I mention Las Meñinas in this context, it is, however, 
not to add to such theory, but to indicate that discussions about representation are not 
necessarily satisfactory with regard to process-vision. Craig Owens, who gives a good 
summary of the debate, makes it clear, for example, not only that Alpers’s understanding 
of Las Meñinas in terms of the southern and northern modes of painting stays within a 
pictorial discussion, but also that this discussion is, in eﬀ ect, not a discussion about vision 
but about representational systems as introduced by Foucault. He is, however, satisﬁ ed 
with such an understanding, which produces a subject beyond its own representation 
(Owens, 1992: 106), a move similar to the question of the body as discussed by Bryson 
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and mentioned above.
Owens does, however, talk eloquently about process-vision in a separate context. Th rough 
a discussion of the mirror and its function in terms of representation, he arrives at an 
analysis of photography, and of Walker Evans’s photograph of Cary Ross’s Bedroom (1932) 
(ﬁ g. 135) in particular, as ‘an image of the photographic process’. (Owens, 1992: 26, 
my italics) Further, and most importantly, he stresses that although such an observation 
may be due to the photographic apparatus, this would not ‘account for the photograph’s 
capacity to internally generate and organize meaning’. (Owens, 1992: 26, my italics) His 
short discussion of the photograph as text, Photography en abyme, (Owens, 1992: 20), 
sets out to explain that a photograph uses process-vision, since otherwise the function 
of photography would not be seen. Crucially, this is internal to the photograph and 
as such visible; its understanding is not dependent on making explicit the underlying 
photographic apparatus.
Process-vision is essential in relation to the outside way of seeing. Th e particularity of 
images made according to the outside way of seeing would without such a notion always 
have to fall back on material technology without focusing on the conceptual visual 
implications. It has been very productive for David Hockney, for example, to look at 
Ingres’ drawings in relation to the camera lucida (ﬁ gs 136 and 137), where he identiﬁ ed 
its use due to the size of the head in relation to the body, for example. Being able to 
link process-vision to a possible apparatus may have helped Hockney to investigate 
these works, but it does not visually change our experience of them. In other words, 
the drawings stimulate a particular way of seeing despite the fact that Hockney could 
be wrong or could have failed in his quest for an explanation. When looking at work 
such as that carried out for this PhD, or work quoted in support of it, a particular visual 
attitude is called for that sees the conceptual implications carried by this work as being 
visibly present in the work, which is possible only through process-vision as described. 
Th e process that we see is paramount, and may or may not be compared to the process 
employed in the production of the work. 
4.3 Enantiomorphism
Th e mirror can function as an object that is part of the composition of an image; it 
can also stimulate our understanding by setting up a functional relationship between an 
object and its reﬂ ected image. Th is relationship may be part of the composition – and 
it often is – but it need not be understood exclusively in such terms. Th e mirror, as it 
were, processes images and activates these images as information. When Owens discusses 
Evans’s photograph (ﬁ g. 135) in terms of the mirror – the mirroring within the image 
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between the two beds and the mirroring that the photograph provides of the bedroom – 
he prepares us to accept the fact that we will not be able to make a distinction between 
reality and its image, since the reality that is seen through a mirror is always already an 
image. Th e bedroom, emphasising the function of the mirror in its arrangement, was for 
this reason ‘a photograph even before Evans exposed it’. (Owens, 1992: 26) Taking this 
attitude to an extreme, Owens quotes Smithson’s experience in Passaic, where the 
‘Noonday sunshine cinema-ized the site, turning the bridge and the river into 
an overexposed picture. Photographing it with my Instamatic 400 was like 
photographing a photograph. Th e sun became a monstrous light-bulb that 
projected a detached series of “stills” through my Instamatic into my eye. When I 
walked on the bridge, it was as though I was walking on an enormous photograph.’ 
(Smithson, 1996: 70) 
Reality in this description is taken and accessed by Smithson as already a mirror-image. 
His engagement with such experience of reality may be the reason why mirrors play such 
a central role in his work: in his various Mirror-Displacements (ﬁ gs 138 and 139), in 
some of his Non-Sites (ﬁ g. 140), his Four-Sided Vortex (ﬁ g. 141), or in his Enantiomorphic 
Chambers (ﬁ g. 142), for example.
Smithson’s Enantiomorphic Chambers, which exist today only in the form of a replica, 
consist of two metal-framed chambers that appear similar in style to his Untitled 
sculptures from the mid-1960s (such as ﬁ g. 143). Both chambers are identical, except 
that one of them has been turned through 180 degrees and hung at a distance on the 
same wall. Th e metal frame is painted blue, while some of the openings are covered by 
green glass. ‘Hidden’ inside each is a mirror, ﬁ xed perpendicular to the wall in such a way 
that one mirror is parallel to and reﬂ ects the mirror in the other chamber (see ﬁ g. 144 
for a construction plan). Th e use of the word ‘enantiomorphic’ is confusing in the title, 
because it suggests that one chamber is enantiomorphic to the other, which does not in 
fact appear to be the case. Th e most common example given for ‘enantiomorphism’ is 
that of our hands, where the one hand can be transposed into the other only by turning it 
inside out like a glove, or by mirroring it. A simple rotation through 180 degrees, which 
produces a mirror image for some objects (namely those that have an axis of symmetry 
that is turned into itself through the rotation), does not strictly speaking make the object 
and its image enantiomorphic. Ann Reynolds’s explanation of enantiomorphism, for 
which a simple mirrored image suﬃ  ces, is therefore not convincing and may obscure 
some of the implications of the work mobilised through the title. (Reynolds, 2003: 61) In 
any case, utilising mirrors within the chambers naturally creates enantiomorphic images 
of the spectator who steps into the installation.
Th e use of the term ‘enantiomorphic’ already makes clear that a particular transformation 
happens between object and image, leaving a ‘spatiotemporal gap’, as Jennifer Roberts 
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calls it, due to the fact that an object needs to pass through a dimension higher than 
itself if it is to complete a material enantiomorophic transformation. (Roberts, 2000) 
Enantiomorphic structures, as they are known in the sciences, for example, do exhibit 
diﬀ erent properties and, thus, function diﬀ erently. As Ellen K. Levy remarks: 
‘Smithson’s sculpture features two identical but reversed chambers, whose 
internal mirrors duplicate the symmetry of their side-by-side positioning. Each 
of Smithson’s mirrors reﬂ ects the other half of the sculpture. As a result, the 
mirrors reﬂ ect each other in a manner suggestive of complementarity in DNA 
strands. Using mirrors, Smithson recalls enantiomers (isomers) that are identical 
except that they are positioned in reverse of each other. Th e function of such 
isomers is dependent on their orientation because the mirror-image state can 
exhibit diﬀ erent properties in nature.’ (Levy, 1996) 
Such a reading suggests that the above-mentioned mirror exchange between world and 
image, which Owens introduced with reference to Evans and Smithson, might appear 
to create identical worlds, when in fact those worlds function diﬀ erently. As Smithson 
writes: 
‘Two asymmetrical trails that mirror each other could be called enantiomorphic 
after those two common enantiomorphs – the right and the left hands. Eyes are 
enantiomorphs. Writing the reﬂ ection is supposed to match the physical reality, 
yet somehow the enantiomorphs don’t quite ﬁ t together. Th e right hand is always 
at variance with the left … A mirror looking for its reﬂ ection but never quite 
ﬁ nding it.’ (Smithson, 1996: 131)
Smithson developed the idea for the Enantiomorphic Chambers through his thinking about 
stereoscopic vision. He drew a ﬁ rst draft of his chambers into a diagram of a stereoscope in 
his copy of James P.C. Southall’s Introduction to Physiological Optics (ﬁ g. 145), which seems 
to correspond to the only remaining model that the artist made (ﬁ g. 146). It is important 
to remind the reader that Crary’s explanation of the ‘observer’ as mentioned above points 
to the stereoscope as a key technology for the physiologically understood human of the 
nineteenth century. Here, the human visual apparatus is able to form a single vision from 
the two diﬀ erent images delivered by the eyes. While in the ﬁ rst draft and model the 
mirrors were supposed to throw the gaze outwards, away from the centre, disallowing the 
illusion of a single, fused image, the ﬁ nal chambers oﬀ er a more abstract version, since 
the chambers do not even attempt to mimic the stereoscope functionally. All that remains 
is the ‘metaphoric’ shell of the metal frame (Levy, 1996), while the mirrors are attached 
facing each other so that the only place to stand is right in the middle of the installation. 
Here, however, one cannot see both mirrors at the same time, since one’s own body is 
in the way. If the expected inﬁ nite reﬂ ection between two mirrors happens, therefore, it 
happens without the viewer. Krauss writes: ‘It is not just the viewer’s body that cannot 
occupy this space, then, it is the beholder’s visual logic as well; Chambers explores what 
must be called a kind of “structural blindness”.’ (Krauss and Bois, 1997: 76) Since this 
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process of understanding happens in the viewer, that which ‘sees’ is turned on its head. As 
Smithson writes in an essay entitled Pointless Vanishing Points from 1967: ‘It is as though 
one were being imprisoned by the actual structure of two alien eyes.’ (Smithson, 1996: 
359) What is ‘alien’ is the installation as enantiomorphic to our vision. It is the sculpture 
itself that is like us – but not quite – and is completed through our exclusion. ‘It’s like a 
set of eyes outside my personal set, so it’s a kind of depersonalization’, said Smithson in an 
interview with Dennis Wheeler. (Smithson, 1996: 208) Th e Enantiomorphic Chambers 
are, comparable to Evans’s photograph discussed by Owens, mirrored within (the one 
chamber mirrors the other), but also mirrored outwards (the ‘alien’ eyes mirror our eyes). 
Mirroring is here, however, not understood as perfect reﬂ ection but as enantiomorphic 
transformation.
Smithson records an ‘after thought’ to Enantiomorphic Chambers: he is photographed 
looking down with his hands in his pockets between the chambers. As he says, this 
demonstrates the: ‘Stopping of sight not by brutal opposition, but by lowering the 
“head”.’ (ﬁ g. 147) Th e enantiomorphic relationship between the not-looking subject 
and the reﬂ ecting, ‘seeing’ object corresponds to Smithson’s Sites/Non-Sites, where the 
non-site mirrors a site removed. (Cf. Smithson, 1996: 193) Th e non-site is not an exact 
mirror-image, but an enantiomorph of the site.
To give a brief summary: this chapter started out with a human, albeit, ‘dead’ eye 
as metaphor for an ‘outside way of seeing’. Th e outside way of seeing was primarily 
understood as process-vision, making visually accessible conceptual propositions that are 
internal to the way in which images function. Th e outside way of seeing was described 
as disembodied without being fully able to leave the body behind. Th e discussion made 
clear that process-vision could not be understood within representational systems. Only 
with a move towards completely functional images, such as mirror images, could vision be 
approached beyond such systems. An analysis of Robert Smithson’s understanding of the 
mirror image as enantiomorph made clear that an object and its reﬂ ection are diﬀ erent 
with regard to their inner function. In an ‘after thought’ to his Enantiomorphic Chambers, 
Smithson proposes that process-vision understood as enantiomorphic reﬂ ection does not 
require the human subject to see, which means that the outside way of seeing has been 
located completely beyond the human gaze. Process-vision is captured in a structure 
that we understand, but cannot visually access with our body. Th e exclusion of the body 
is a fait accompli, which can be lamented and possibly traced, but which can also be 
left behind in exactly the gesture demonstrated by Smithson: head lowered, hands in 
pockets. Th is is only ‘anti-vision’ (Krauss, 1986a) as long as vision is still deﬁ ned through 
the body; it is a truly liberated outside way of seeing, however, since vision now has its 
own site in the work independent of the body. For this, an extension of the notion of 
the ‘mirror’ was necessary. Reﬂ ection does not create an exact same image, but rather an 
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enantiomorph, which is the same with a diﬀ erence. One could also call it the work’s inner 
resistance, if one wanted to relate this issue to the discussion of post-conceptual art given 
at the end of Chapter 3. 
What now follows is a discussion of structures that encapsulate what I have called ‘process-
vision’, i.e. conceptual, visual, reﬂ ective and strictly disembodied work shielded from 
perception, but open to an understanding of the processes of the work.
4. 4 Chokes
Chokes (ﬁ g. 57) is formally very diﬀ erent from my other work since it is the only work 
carried out in this research that is time-based. Because of its symmetrical layout, it may 
be seen as similar to Smithson’s Enantiomorphic Chambers, allowing me to introduce, 
however, a diﬀ erence in my work. Everything in Chokes is symmetrical: the arrangement 
of the lights, the switches and even the code that operates the installation. Th ere is not a 
single a-symmetrical element in Chokes, making the installation almost a structural copy 
of the Chambers. Functionally, however, the installations are very diﬀ erent. Th e Chambers 
function, in my opinion, symmetrically even when not engaged by the spectator; I cannot 
really ‘see’ the enantiomorphic element, since all I see, or rather imagine, is mirrored 
reﬂ ections evenly distributed across both sides of the installation. Enantiomorphism is 
visually engaged only when the spectator enters the ﬁ eld; but he or she can experience 
the notion only in relation to his or her presence, and is physically prevented from doing 
so. In Chokes, however, enantiomorphism is exercised by the installation; it functions, 
despite its symmetrical layout, from the outset exactly according to the deﬁ nition 
Smithson has given, and which was quoted above: namely, that the reﬂ ections do not 
quite ﬁ t together. Th e reﬂ ections are the mirroring ﬂ ickers of the ﬂ uorescent tubes, which 
initially fail to synchronise. Despite the conceptual symmetry, then, Chokes produces 
a functional a-symmetry, which is, crucially, independent of the spectator; i.e., the 
installation does not need any experience for its eﬀ ect. Put in relation to the outside way 
of seeing introduced in this chapter, it is clear that the distancing required is not radically 
completed in Smithson’s Enantiomorphic Chambers. One may therefore say that a residue 
of, albeit, negative subjectivity remains with the spectator and thus outside Smithson’s 
installation. 
A central element must without doubt be the use of light as opposed to mirrors. Smithson 
mentions light when he talks of the sunlight exposing the image-world in his Passaic 
text, but he does not really tap into light in his activity. In fact, it has been claimed 
by M.H. Abrams that there was a shift from mirror to light in the nineteenth century 
(Abrams, 1958), for it may be that the mirror is too passive a device to stand for the now 
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active and creative human subject making meaning. Light on its own carries a material 
ability to aﬀ ect light-sensitive surfaces, such as photographic ﬁ lm or the retina of the 
eye. Th e mirror seems to be the wrong metaphor for expressing photography’s essential 
characteristics, in particular, since it remains on the level of the resemblance of the image 
to reality. Light, on the other hand, creates the crucial functional link that goes beyond 
the image as picture.
An idea for a second, not yet realised, installation involves two conventional light bulbs, 
placed next to each other on a board. One bulb will rhythmically and regularly switch 
on and oﬀ  every second or so, while the second will use the same rhythm, but switch 
randomly. Sometimes the lights will be experienced as synchronous, while at other times 
they will appear to be out of sync, despite the fact that the frequency remains constant. 
Th e symmetry here is less radical, since the programme that operates both lights will 
address the lights diﬀ erently: only one will use a random generator. Th e installation, on 
the other hand, will be much simpler and will focus on the essential elements without 
the need to ensure their essentiality by falling back on the technical apparatus. In eﬀ ect, 
what is sought, again, is the conceptual principle and not the material reality of the 
apparatus. 
Th e key element in both of these installations is the autonomy of the work, which is 
achieved, so to speak, after the process that Smithson described in his ‘after-thought’; 
i.e., after the spectator has lowered his head and vision has been relocated to the ‘pair 
of alien eyes’ through which the work now sees. Once the outside way of seeing has 
become a truly outside phenomenon, resident in the work and not in the audience, 
the associated experience of non-vision or blindness on the part of the spectator is of 
no relevance to the meaning of the work. Th e resistance, diﬀ erence or delay that is part 
of process-vision and that was introduced in Smithson’s work is not dependent on the 
spectator, but can be materialised within the work. Process-vision can thus be achieved 
within the art object itself. Each work can as a consequence address particular modes of 
resistance within its concept; that is, elements of diﬀ erence created by the transformative 
function of reﬂ ection, a function that was introduced as an enantiomorphic element in 
Smithson’s work. Th ese resistances are post-conceptual: the conceptual thinking of the 
world as radical possibility cannot address the fact that an image created by a programme, 
for example, does not structurally represent the code. Inherent to the idea of production 
that the last chapter closely linked to Conceptual art, is a belief according to which the 
product is fully dependent on its conceptualisation and, as such, a perfect reﬂ ection of that 
concept. If, however, the reﬂ ection escapes its concept, we cannot consider this escape to 
be part of the conceptual makeup of the work. Post-conceptual work has to be conceptual 
and beyond. Opposed to the conceptual and even space of functional possibility is a real 
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unevenness independent of the spectator’s position or makeup. 
4.5 Figure
In my work, light plays a crucial role. Th e blob-shaped ﬁ gures (many of which were 
introduced in Chapter 1) are responses to the question of light. Th e shapes are often 
developed from photographic source material, although there is a relation between such 
shapes and light even when photography is not involved. When Alpers calls seventeenth-
century Dutch paintings ‘Keplerian’, she does so with reference to Kepler’s conception of 
light necessary for his optics. Details such as the hand of the painter in Jan Vermeer’s Th e 
Art of Painting (ﬁ gs 148 and 149), for example, are according to Alpers, ‘assembled out 
of tone and light’. She quotes Laurence Gowing, who writes: 
‘Vermeer seems almost not to care, or not even to know, what it is that he is 
painting. What do men call this wedge of light? A nose? A ﬁ nger? What do we 
know of its shape? To Vermeer none of this matters, the conceptual world of 
names and knowledge is forgotten, nothing concerns him but what is visible, the 
tone, the wedge of light.’ (Quoted in Alpers, 1983: 37) 
Without wanting to discuss Gowing’s use of the word ‘conceptual’, which is very diﬀ erent 
from my own, it is these shapes, wedges or blobs – which indicate light in an image – that 
are my concern. Even in cases where such shapes are dark, as in Ansel Adams’s Grand 
Canyon from Point Sublime, 1942 (ﬁ g. 150), the shadow is a sign of light. Many of my 
works are ‘negatives’, where blacks represent light. (Negative Light, ﬁ g. 14, for example) 
In terms of shapes on an image, shadow and light are identical. As Goethe says in his 
Farbenlehre: ‘Colour itself is a degree of darkness.’ (Quoted in Crary, 1992: 70) Without 
degrees of darkness, there is nothing to be seen. 
Th e most minimal gesture in the research work is the addressing of a shape and its 
separation from its surroundings. Something coherent must be seen in a shape for this 
to take place. Light, since it can only be seen as degrees of darkness, has a structure. 
Th e outline that holds the shape together singles out such structure, visible as darkness. 
Being the border of the shape, the outline delimits the shape. In the ﬁ nal work, however, 
the outline may or may not be precise. Some works, such as Coﬀ ee Stain (ﬁ g. 19), for 
example, make a fairly clear statement concerning the limits of the shape, while others, 
like Th e Premier Rose (ﬁ g. 11), are less decisive. Th e ﬁ nal outline is, as it were, dependent 
on the inner structure of the work.
Th e work mirrors the shape that was appropriated from a particular image. Because no 
mirror ever leaves an exact copy, the work leaves a non-identical image of the image: 
an image transformed. Th e works are thus transformations and not representations of 
the original light. Th ey do not show what the light actually is – its inner property, for 
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example – but realise a potential that is seen and activated in the transformation. It is 
possible to speculate on what the light might have been before its transformation, but this 
will be nothing but a speculation, since the work reﬂ ects and thus transforms a potential 
and not a reality. Th e work reveals with the information a potential in the image that it 
transforms and changes. Th is inner transformation also means that the work cannot be 
undone, since a second, reverse transformation might simply create another, diﬀ erent 
image.
Th e original shape on the appropriated image is not yet a ﬁ gure. Th e shape becomes a 
ﬁ gure only through its transformation, making the transformation part of the ﬁ gure. 
What I call ‘shape’ is thus a physical property, while the notion of ‘ﬁ gure’ is a shape in 
transformation. Information in photographs can be taken as sheer records of shapes. For 
Gerhard Richter, for example, ‘photographs are almost nature’. (Quoted in: Chevier, 
2000: 45) Reading such a statement, one has to keep in mind the fact that Richter sees 
photography as the delivering of information and not as the natural picturing of nature, 
i.e. its ﬁ guration, as discussed in Chapter 1. Th e shape in a photograph understood as 
information is thus too natural to be a ﬁ gure. Th e photograph, for Richter, is incomplete 
in relation to the ﬁ gure. Th e transformational procedures he employs in paint are meant 
to complete the photograph. As Jean-François Chevrier puts it: ‘Th e painting, in short, 
fulﬁ ls the photographic tableau.’ (Chevier, 2000: 35) Richter’s painterly fulﬁ lment, 
however, is as Guy Tosatto points out, also ‘an abyssal reﬂ ection of pictorial narcissism’. 
(Tosatto, 2002: 7) Th is is not the place to discuss Richter’s paintings in detail. Many 
of them, including his abstract work, however, utilise shapes and with them, light, in a 
fashion reminiscent of Vermeer (see ﬁ gs 151 and 152 for example).
Richter’s ‘patches of light’ may be less easily addressed as ﬁ gures in his more ‘photo-
realistic’ work (although he rejects this term) since here he also engages with the picture’s 
representational aspects. Th e ﬁ gures, however, come to the fore in his abstract works, 
where as Tosatto says: 
‘his experiments really become fascinating [as] he tries to reveal painting’s capacity 
to ﬁ gure – though in a non-illusionist way of course – something of reality: a 
personal, sensible experience of a reality in constant movement, in perpetual 
metamorphosis, which it is only possible to qualify as abstract.’ (Tosatto, 2002: 
13) 
Th e ﬁ gure is for Richter, according to this view, always interwoven with the capacity of 
painting, which is his deﬁ nition of his own personal practice. In order to generalise, we 
could say that it is not only painting’s capacity to ﬁ gure, but any practice’s capacity to 
ﬁ gure that is revealed when information is transformed.
Th e visible structure of a shape, which triggers the outlining of that shape, becomes 
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meaningful only as transformation. Th e outline, having become part of the ﬁ gure, can 
thus address a shape only as the result of a transformation; i.e., as a ﬁ gure. Outlining is, 
however, also part of a practice, which is, when a shape is outlined, outlined just the same. 
In other words, as a practice engages with the making of works, these works also transform 
the practice. It is in this sense that Richter’s paintings address painting as practice at 
the same time as they address light in paint. To generalise again: a reﬂ ective practice of 
ﬁ guration transforms both itself and its material in the work. Th e transformative reﬂ ection 
of a practice in the work is an important aspect that deserves additional discussion. Th is 
will be provided in the following chapters.
As mentioned above, Richter’s notion of ‘photography’ is limited: it is seen only from 
the point of view of what photography is to him. It would be impossible to explain 
why photography as a practice should be excluded from such transformative processes 
on the grounds that it provides information. It has been noted in the case of Smithson’s 
photographs, for example, that they are not just documentations but also active agents in 
their own right. (Owens, 1992: 28) Looking at photographs of his Asphalt Rundown (ﬁ g. 
153), for example, which has also been captured on ﬁ lm, it is evident that the solidiﬁ ed 
movement of the asphalt is re-addressed through photography’s ability to freeze time. Th e 
photographs transﬁ gure a ﬁ guration important to Smithson, who said about the piece in 
an interview with Dennis Wheeler: ‘it sort of stops just before it hits the bottom … [S]o 
there you have the sense of something very deﬁ nitely in time, yet the moment gives you 
that sense of timelessness.’ (Smithson, 1996: 216) A similar phenomenon is present in 
the ﬁ lm of Spiral Jetty (ﬁ g. 154), where the use of the helicopter and its circling above the 
site transﬁ gures the jetty itself. (Cf. Smithson, 1996: 148)
Extending such understanding to Gabriel Orozco’s photographic works, it is important 
to note that he sometimes, but not always, photographs, i.e. documents, an artistic 
intervention, but that the deﬁ nition of ‘artistic intervention’ shifts in the practice and 
extends to his photographs. As he says in an interview with Briony Fer:
‘I didn’t like the way documentation came to look like the leftovers of a party 
… Th is is an important diﬀ erence for the status of the photograph in my work 
from that of Conceptual artists in the 1970s … Th e point is more about making 
something present.’ (Fer, 2007: 57) 
His work is a good example in this context, since the ﬁ gures with which he operates are 
very similar to mine. He often photographs patterns (ﬁ g. 155) or shapes (ﬁ g. 156) in a 
way that isolates and activates the ﬁ gure. However, the many games-related pieces (ﬁ gs 
157 and 158), where the size and the position of the shapes he uses indicate a quantitative 
order, are not brought together with his photographic work, since here the images are not 
quantiﬁ ed into values of brightness or colour as they are in my practice. Photography, as 
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it were, appears to be something to play with, but not something that is already playing 
when light is mapped to colour. Regardless of this, the ﬁ gures in his work often indicate 
the processes he employs, enabling process-vision as introduced above. One of the several 
images of Orozco’s Yielding Stone (1992) (ﬁ g. 159) may be given as an example of his 
take on process-vision activated in photography. In this image, the Yielding Stone lies 
at the end of a gutter, whose iron grid pattern is visibly imprinted into the plasticine of 
the ‘stone’. A chevron above gives the direction in which the stone was rolled across the 
gutter and the direction in which it may continue to travel. Th e outside way of seeing is, 
however, as in Smithson’s Enantiomorphic Chambers, still connected to the concept of the 
human body; Orozco creates a relationship between the Yielding Stone and his own body, 
as if to underline the fact that the presence of the body in the work is still an issue, since 
the amount of plasticine he used was equal to his own body weight. (Fer, 2007: 57) Th e 
issue of the body may also relate to the sense of ‘presentation’ one has in his work; that is, 
the preparation of material for a perceiving audience rather than a reﬂ ective enquiry that 
happens on the side of the work. Th e following chapter will expand on this matter.
Th e way in which Chokes (ﬁ g. 57) functions when in action was associated in Chapter 
1 with states of instability. Th e state of instability is energetic and ﬂ uctuates across the 
installation. Stability with both lights permanently on or oﬀ  is always a possibility, but 
the point where this possibility might be realised is completely in ﬂ ux. A ﬂ icker of the 
one light might be the beginning of a stabilising sequence, although it is impossible to 
tell. Nevertheless, as in a ping-pong game, the action passes between the lights and is also 
interrupted by them as they not only follow each other’s command, but also their own 
pattern of ignition. Possible stability hovers between the lights, ‘waiting’, as it were, for 
its reality. Chokes is literally animated by electricity, light and a programmed code. Th e 
way in which it moves between its ﬁ xtures can also, on a more abstract level, be visually 
thought instead of being acted out materially. Th e ﬁ gure Chokes describes can also be an 
image.
Th e ﬁ gure is already present in the Potato Prints (ﬁ g. 7). It emerges as instability from 
within the shape of the blob, mainly because the grid is overpowered by the individual 
printed marks, which seem to come out of the ground towards the viewer as if pushed 
forwards. Th at sense is even more pronounced in Th e Premier Rose (ﬁ g. 11), where a few 
larger marks (in particular on the upper-left side, see detail ﬁ g. 161) show an enormous 
depth, as if the ﬁ gure had to move forwards due to lack of space. Th e instability of the grid 
is key to the dynamics of the ﬁ gure, which is continually moving beyond the grid. Th e 
relation between the printed marks, which are also blob-shaped and which are situated 
within the larger blob outline of the ﬁ gure, is repeated between the ﬁ gure-blob and the 
ground. Th e movement instigated by the ﬁ gure does not stay contained within the blob, 
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but aﬀ ects the ground on which the blob is printed. Th e ﬁ gure thus happens across the 
blob and the ground in an active relationship. When the ground, as in many other pieces 
(such as ﬁ gs 14, 22, 37, or 38), is not delimited by a frame, the force of the ﬁ gure can 
spread into the ‘empty’ space of the wall, in the sense that the wall can become ﬁ gure. 
Th is exchange is most prominently worked with in the photo murals (ﬁ g. 24), where the 
ﬁ gure is in the ripped-out negative of the foreground that is seamlessly connected to the 
ground around the murals. Th e relation of the shape to the ground is most important 
since the ﬁ gure needs a space in which to occur, within a shape and between the shape 
and the ground.
Th e relation between the ground and the shape dominates the Reconstructions (City Trees) 
series (ﬁ gs 33, 34, and 35), since the size of the drawn images had to be reduced, partly 
because of the delicacy of the relations within the shape, but also because the ground 
provided needed to be suﬃ  ciently large for the ﬁ guration to take place. In comparison to 
the Potato Prints (ﬁ gs 7 and 8), where movement is rather fuzzy, the Reconstructions are 
much more organised in terms of movement. Each drawing has strong developmental 
trajectories, across the ﬁ gure, but also within the ﬁ gure, which open and close space. Th e 
outlines are more compact than in the Potato Prints, where the printed marks have gaps 
between them, while the ground within the ﬁ gure seems to connect subterraneously with 
the ground around it. It is as if each line had some power over the ground beside it, but 
not enough to prevent the ground from coming through.
While the ground is in some way contained by the material paper or wall in the two-
dimensional works, in Treetops Remodelled (ﬁ gs 41 and 42) the ground is invisible space 
between and around the plastic structure. Th e ﬁ gure deforms the space as it follows some 
of the forces at work within the construction. Th e ﬁ gure converts space in a movement 
that happens simultaneously across the work. Th ese movements are, despite their ﬂ ux, 
the stable parts, while around them space and time become confused.
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Chapter 5: Reﬂ ection
5.1 Reﬂ ection
At least from the time of Plato, art’s contribution to knowledge was not considered to 
be an issue, because, if anything, art was thought to obscure human knowledge. In the 
Republic, it was considered downright dangerous. As Plato writes:
 ‘We are therefore quite right to refuse to admit him [the poet/painter] to a 
properly run state, because he wakens and encourages and strengthens the lower 
elements in the mind to the detriment of reason, which is like giving power and 
political control to the worst elements in a state and ruining the better elements. 
Th e dramatic poet produces a similarly bad state of aﬀ airs in the mind of the 
individual … by creating images far removed from the truth.’ (Plato, 2003: Book 
X, 605 b-c) 
Such a negative attitude to art’s cognitive implications deﬁ ned its status as an outsider 
in the realm of knowledge right up until modernism. It was only after Immanuel Kant’s 
diﬀ erentiation of aesthetic from logical judgements that art was given a genuine basis 
from which to operate. But, as Jean-Luc Nancy remarked, it cannot be said that it was 
one of Kant’s objectives to develop a theory that allowed for the emancipation of art. 
(Nancy, 2003: 220f ) On the contrary, Nancy believes that Kant, although building the 
right foundations, proposed a critical system designed to enclose art and lay it to rest. Th e 
result of Kant’s ‘third critique’ was thus the opposite of what he might have envisaged. By 
giving art its own domain, as based on aesthetic judgements, he in eﬀ ect unleashed the 
Romantic Movement, which, according to Isaiah Berlin, ‘is the largest recent movement 
to transform the lives and the thought of the Western world.’ (Berlin, 2000: 1)
If one does extend this Romantic tendency backwards into the works of Kant, one could 
argue that art as research became possible only with Kant, in the sense that his philosophy 
created the foundations for a distinct place for art through aesthetic judgement. Th at 
Kant focused on such judgements in the ﬁ rst place can be seen as a direct result of a 
crisis inherent in Christianity. As Friedrich Nietzsche described in Gay Science, God was 
put into doubt by Christianity itself, through its emphasis on the human conscience, 
which is, in eﬀ ect, the human capacity to judge whether or not an act was executed in 
accord with or against the will of God. (Nietzsche, 1988a: Fifth Book, § 357) Once this 
capacity, Nietzsche argued, had grown strong enough, Christianity not only put the acts 
of humans into question, but also the principle by which they were guided: God himself. 
Th e question of knowledge as created by judgement could only become central from the 
moment – to use Nietzsche’s words – when God was dead.
In his lecture On Science and Art in Relation to Academic Studies,1803, Friedrich Wilhelm 
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Joseph von Schelling claimed that art as ‘science’, i.e. as a producer of knowledge, made 
sense only if art produced ‘intellectual intuition’ (intellektuelle Anschauung). (Schelling, 
1985: 570) According to him, there are two kinds of art. Th e ﬁ rst aims at the production 
of a beautiful deception, in which case it is not seen to contribute intellectually. Th e 
second, which Schelling calls ‘holy art’, can reveal what remains hidden to the senses (a 
non-sensuous, intelligible quality). Th is latter understanding is, according to Schelling, 
directed against the common understanding of art because it recognises intellectual 
intuition as ‘necessarily immediate appearance resulting from the absolute’. (Schelling, 
1985: 570, my translation)
For Schelling, writing in the wake of Kant’s separation of imagination and understanding, 
this second type of art allows the absolute, the ideal, to be present in the real; that is, in 
the sensible artwork. Th e naming of the ideal, however, requires the use of philosophy, 
since it is beyond art’s capacity to make its own processes explicit. (Schelling, 1985: 573) 
Th e relationship between art and philosophy is such that art needs philosophy should it 
aspire to the domain of the ideal, which is, as it were, the domain of the free subject. 
Walter Benjamin’s dissertation Th e Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism, 1919, 
takes the notion of ‘reﬂ ection’ as developed by Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis as a possible 
deﬁ nition of that ‘intellectual activity’. Before I go into a discussion of this, I would like 
to make clear that I am aware that the picture Benjamin develops of early Romantic 
philosophy is biased. (Cf. Menninghaus, 2002) I am not, for the purpose of my argument, 
interested at this stage in a critical textual analysis that might question some of Benjamin’s 
readings. Rather, I view the interpretational liberties that he undoubtedly takes as another 
step along the trajectory that has brought us the reality of art-driven research.
Benjamin grounds early Romantic philosophy on Fichte’s work, up to his Concerning 
the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre, 1794 (Fichte, 1997), and the reception of his work 
by the key Romantic thinkers. According to Kant, aesthetic judgements are somewhat 
removed from logical judgements and, as such, open up a sphere that is non-conceptual 
and thus beyond philosophy. If that were the case, one would either have to give up 
the notion of unity across the diﬀ erent domains of judgement, or claim that what was 
introduced as ‘intellectual activity’ was at play even when concepts were lacking. 
Th e early Fichte, according to Benjamin, opted for this second possibility and tried to 
devise a system that could unify the diﬀ erent types of judgement, mounting ‘reﬂ ection’ as 
the centrepiece of such a system. Th ought is assumed to be at play in both aesthetic and 
logical judgements. Since the types of judgements, following Kant, are seen as essentially 
diﬀ erent, thought cannot easily form the uniting principle. How do we know that it is 
the same faculty of thought that is at play in both? According to Fichte, unity across the 
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faculties of judgement is achieved only when thought thinks itself and becomes reﬂ ective. 
If art occupies a diﬀ erent sphere from conceptual understanding, we can only claim that 
both domains share the same root when art, without the aid of philosophy, is seen to be 
reﬂ ective. Th us reﬂ ectivity is an integral component of art as much as it is of conceptual 
understanding.
Applying Fichte’s approach to Schelling’s concept of art, one can speculate that the ‘non-
sensuous, intelligible quality’ might lie in the concept of ‘reﬂ ection’. It both unites the 
human faculties and allows them to be distinct. Such unity is possible only if reﬂ ection 
functions regardless of what it reﬂ ects: reﬂ ection has to be a strictly formal process. 
However, what reﬂ ection reﬂ ects is not just this or that but acts of intelligence when this 
or that is thought. Reﬂ ection is in itself formal, making reﬂ ection the application of a 
form onto a form, or, to put it in Benjamin’s words ‘reﬂ ection [is] the re-forming – and 
nothing but the re-forming – reﬂ ection of a form’. (Benjamin, 2003a: 20)
Reﬂ ection is thus the relation of two layers of consciousness, through which immediate 
and certain cognition is given, since both layers are ultimately layers of the same capacity 
of reﬂ ective thinking. Th rough reﬂ ection, the knowledge we have of the world is re-
formed into (or identiﬁ ed as) our engagement in the world as an ‘act of freedom’, as 
Fichte calls it (quoted in: Benjamin, 2003a: 21), and is independent from the conditions 
through which it arises. Only as result of an independent reﬂ ection can knowledge be 
true, since it is not partial, nor aﬀ ected by circumstances, but has a general validity.
Th ere is, of course, no need to stop here: reﬂ ection can continue to reﬂ ect to ever higher 
degrees (a reﬂ ection of a reﬂ ection of a reﬂ ection and so on), which shows that an aspect 
of inﬁ nity is built into the concept of reﬂ ection along with the idea of immediacy. Fichte 
– and this is where he and Romanticism parted ways, according to Benjamin – believed 
that inﬁ nite reﬂ ection weakened the subject, because if its ground (the act of freedom) 
was not found in the ﬁ rst reﬂ ection it would not be found at all, or, worse, continuing 
to reﬂ ect would inﬁ nitely displace the ground. For Fichte, the immediacy of reﬂ ection as 
based on the absolute subject’s act of freedom was possible only if, although having the 
potential, it did not continue to reﬂ ect inﬁ nitely.
Th us for Fichte, it is the integrity of the subject of reﬂ ection that delimits reﬂ ection: the 
‘I’ that reﬂ ects is really at the heart of his philosophy. Romanticism, however, according 
to Benjamin, would not ‘trade’ the ‘I’ against reﬂ ection, but would rather take reﬂ ection 
as the central phenomenon and build everything around it regardless. But how could it 
make reﬂ ection inﬁ nite at the same time as preserving the self that Fichte saw as under 
threat from such inﬁ nity? Th e answer is that the Romantics had to ‘tweak’ the concept 
of inﬁ nity away from Fichte’s temporal deﬁ nition of an inﬁ nite regress that reduced the 
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self to nothing, and towards a spatial deﬁ nition of a totality, in which every member 
continuously reﬂ ected.
If one can call the ‘self ’ the subject of reﬂ ection and the ‘I’ the human form of that 
subject, for Fichte the ‘I’ was the only form that the self could take. For the Romantics, 
however, the concept of the ‘self ’ expanded onto everything; i.e., all things were now seen 
as reﬂ ective selves. Art in Romanticism is seen as realising exactly that: reﬂ ection beyond 
the limits of the ‘I’. (Benjamin, 2003a: 40)
5.2 Subject-Work
In early Romantic philosophy, an artwork takes the place of the subject. In Th e Literary 
Absolute, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy refer to this as the ‘subject-work’. 
(Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1988: 115) Its subjectivity lies essentially in its reﬂ ectivity, 
which cannot, however, be thought of as being removed from other subject-works, since 
the inﬁ nity of reﬂ ection connects everything with everything else. 
Th e artwork thus carries a relation to the absolute in so far as its reﬂ ection, objectively 
speaking, reﬂ ects everything, and subjectively speaking, has the power to reﬂ ect everything. 
Th e artwork is in eﬀ ect beyond its representation as either subject or object. When 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy refer to the artwork as ‘subject-work’, they do so in order 
to emphasise its qualities against the subject-artist and the object-work. Th e bringing 
together of subject and object is not, I should stress, done along the lines of perception, 
as Maurice Merleau-Ponty proposes in Th e Phenomenology of Perception. (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962)
Benjamin highlights the fact that if a thing is seen only in relation to itself as an object, it 
loses its relation to cognition, because as object-only it cannot reﬂ ect. (Benjamin, 2003a: 
58) Th e Romantic theory of understanding is engaged in a play of diﬀ erence. Th e result 
of a reﬂ ection is not identical to its source; their relation is the same but on diﬀ erent 
levels of reﬂ ection. Benjamin quotes Schlegel in saying that the move from one level to 
the other has to be thought of as a ‘jump’ (Sprung). (Benjamin, 2003a: 27) Only the 
identiﬁ cation of these levels of reﬂ ection denying the ‘jump’ produces the notion of the 
‘object’, in which reﬂ ection is lost.
Reﬂ ection is the process of diﬀ erence within thought. It can occur within the thinking 
human subject, but it can also extend to other things, subject-works as it were, since 
they are also seen to be reﬂ ective. I can reﬂ ectively relate to my own thoughts as much 
as I can relate to a thought inherent in a subject-work. Th e subject-work, however, can 
at the same time reﬂ ect the reﬂ ective being that is I. Knowledge of myself is therefore 
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always already dependent on a reﬂ ective other, for some of its knowledge of me forms 
part of what I see when reﬂ ecting the thought inherent in the subject work. Th is process 
of diﬀ erence is directed towards the absolute, which would be the immediate knowledge 
of everything through something else. Benjamin clearly states that this ultimate goal of 
reﬂ ection is nevertheless not the norm, not even in artworks, but cannot be excluded 
along the trajectory towards absolute reﬂ ection.
An artwork can thus be situated between two poles: that of absolute reﬂ ection and that 
of ﬁ rst reﬂ ection (or ‘Ur-Reﬂ ection’ as Benjamin calls it). As he says: 
‘In order to diﬀ erentiate between the two, one would have to assume that the 
absolute reﬂ ection captures the maximum, the ur-reﬂ ection the minimum, of 
reality, in the sense that although both carry the whole reality … this [reality] 
would be unfolded to its highest clarity in the ﬁ rst [absolute reﬂ ection], not 
unfolded and murky in the other [ur-reﬂ ection].’ (Benjamin, 2003a: 31) 
Th e quality of an artwork can be judged by ‘placing’ it on that scale. Th is ‘placement’ is, 
following Benjamin, the work of the critic.
Although art criticism forms the title of Benjamin’s dissertation, it is not exercised therein. 
In an early text from 1914/15, Two Poems of Friedrich Hölderlin – Dichtermut – Blödigkeit, 
Benjamin asserts that the judgement of an artwork must be derived from itself; not, 
however, from the way it solves a particular challenge, but from the ‘seriousness and scale 
of the task’ it poses. (Benjamin, 2003b: 105) By focusing on the ambition of the work, 
criticism looks in eﬀ ect at the work’s reﬂ ective potential rather than its objective qualities. 
Benjamin sees in art criticism a complementary reﬂ ection that follows the ambition of 
the work, which it seeks to complete in an act of cognition.
Th e ambition of the artwork is not an objective quality. Rather, we can only speak of an 
‘ambition’ once the artwork is accepted as reﬂ ective and exposed through reﬂ ection as 
subject-work. Critique brings out the best in the work, which – since it is the result of a 
reﬂ ection – must be genuine understanding.
5.3 Th e Figural
When we talk of a ‘ﬁ gure’ in the domain of art, we generally imply a human ﬁ gure, the body. 
As mentioned at various points in this text, within the ‘world of information’ (Arnheim), 
the body has become somewhat of a problem in relation to art because the body both 
as perceptor and creator has been seen to supply meaning to the otherwise meaningless 
processing of information. At the same time, however, once reality is understood in 
terms of information, the body as the site for meaning cannot exist, in the sense that the 
diﬀ erence that meaning makes to information cannot be fathomed by information itself. 
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Th us, if the body is considered to exist and play a role in relation to art, it must be, as was 
remarked by Bryson, ‘suppressed’. (Chapter 4) Alternatively, the body, whilst still being 
accepted as a site of meaning, can also be technologically overwhelmed by information; 
i.e. diluted and integrated into its fabric, like the ‘immersive environments’ in the domain 
of ‘new media’. (Hansen, 2004) In both cases, the body is given as the source for meaning 
that otherwise cannot occur. On a more historical level, Georges Didi-Huberman makes 
clear that the ‘body’ is a problematic notion because it is overburdened by a function that 
it received from Humanism as established in the Renaissance, where the bodily human 
was instrumental in the generation of meaning. (Didi-Huberman, 2005: 218ﬀ ) It is 
the human’s disappearance with which Foucault so clearly confronted us at the end of 
Th e Order of Th ings that may make possible a discussion of the body beyond its human 
limitation. (Foucault, 1989: 387) In the present study, the body is not of central concern, 
although its questioning is a necessary part of the wider implications derived from a 
theory of information that demands a more in-depth discussion than this short text can 
provide.
Th e artwork understood as subject-work may in respect to reﬂ ection be seen as related 
to the human subject. Th e human subject can provide the model through which the 
subject-work can be thought, but it cannot – naturally – provide a body. Th e ‘body’ of 
an artwork is its materiality, but that is as far as it goes. Th e material artwork is limited 
to certain types of activity when understood as subject-work. It may prove productive, 
as far as the question of meaning is concerned, to stick with such transformative and 
reﬂ ective activity as is essential without extending this concept straight into a literal 
‘body’. Th e ﬁ gure, or rather, following Jean-François Lyotard, ‘the ﬁ gural’, could provide 
for such reﬂ ective activity, which can be seen at work both in ‘the body’ and in artworks 
understood as subject-works. Th ese, however, do not necessarily require a human body 
for the generation of meaning.
It is easiest to understand the ﬁ gural through Lyotard’s discussion of Sigmund Freud’s 
notion of the ‘dream-work’, which transforms a ‘dream-thought’. (Lyotard, 1991) Such 
transformation is necessarily spatial and, as such, open for vision. Lyotard invokes a 
picture similar to Robert Smithson’s concept of ‘enantiomorphism’ when he writes that 
the transformation has to go through ‘a depth’ (a further dimension), since a ‘simple 
planar movement’ would not suﬃ  ce. (Lyotard, 1991: 23) Depth, however, is not to be 
found in discourse, but only in vision, since something has to be moved above or below 
something else, which can be imagined visually only. It appears, though, that the relation 
to Freud’s theories is not necessary for a conception of the ﬁ gural, as Lyotard’s own later 
writings reveal. In Que Peintre, he says, for example, that ‘the visible, or rather the visual, 
is not at all dependant on a montage of desire … it has nothing to do with the plots 
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stemming from sexual diﬀ erence’. (Quoted in Tomiche, 2002: 14) A second aspect, which 
Didi-Huberman introduces in a diﬀ erent context, is the importance of the meaning that 
Freud has for philosophy and not the particular psychoanalytic concepts he proposes. 
With Freud, a ‘split’ inherent in the subject becomes obvious (Didi-Huberman, 2005: 6), 
which relates Freud’s thinking to the idea of ‘reﬂ ection’ as the doubling of thought (as it 
has been introduced here), making it unnecessary to repeat Freud’s own theory. It is for 
these reasons that I will leave out a discussion of the ﬁ gural in terms of psychoanalysis and 
will focus on its general inner and thus visual workings. 
In Discours/Figure (Lyotard, 2002: 271),2 Lyotard conceptualises three diﬀ erent types of 
‘ﬁ gures’: (1) Th e ‘image-ﬁ gure’ as ﬁ gurative representation, such as when opposed to a 
ground, the most conventional use of the notion of the ‘ﬁ gure’ in art theory; (2) the ‘form-
ﬁ gure’ as the constitutive principle, such as the constellation or the gestalt of a image-
ﬁ gure; it ‘is present in the perceptible, it may even be visible, but is in general not seen’ 
(Lyotard, 1984: 57); (3) the ‘matrix-ﬁ gure’, which is invisible since it is the diﬀ erential 
principle of disruption of the binary relation of the visible and invisible and indeed any 
binary relation. Th e matrix-ﬁ gure’s ‘formal condition’, as Krauss says, is a ‘rhythm or 
pulse’. (Krauss, 1988: 65) Writing about the artists of the ‘optical unconscious’, such 
as Max Ernst or Marcel Duchamp, she states: ‘the pulse they employ is not understood 
to be structurally distinct from vision but to be at work from deep inside it’. (Krauss, 
1996: 217) It is this third and ﬁ nal aspect of the ﬁ gure as matrix that Lyotard derived 
from Freud and which is often taken as Lyotard’s deﬁ nition of ‘the ﬁ gural’. (For example 
in Slaughter, 2004: 234) Such deﬁ nition, however, risks separating the ﬁ gural from the 
ﬁ gure along the lines of visibility. David Carroll’s point seems to be more appropriate, 
according to which ‘each of [the three aspects of the ‘ﬁ gure’] is a complication of the visual 
nature of the ﬁ gure’. (Carroll, 1989: 39, my italics)
It makes sense to split the ‘ﬁ gure’ into these three diﬀ erent aspects in order to understand 
the particularities that come to the fore when focusing on each. However, the integrity 
of the notion has to be preserved because its strength lies in its ability to understand 
the ‘ﬁ gure’ in its complexity, in particular when the ﬁ gure obtains prominent status 
concerning the visual understanding of an image or artwork such as that proposed in the 
previous chapter.
Th e ‘progress’ of the artworks and the research so far that has been accompanied by this 
text could be seen to correspond with Lyotard’s diﬀ erentiation of the ﬁ gure if understood 
as developmental; i.e., if the matrix-ﬁ gure were seen as a ‘higher’ form than the image-
2 Unfortunately, much of this had to be taken from secondary literature since Lyotard’s Discours/Figure is 
still not translated.
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ﬁ gure. Such a correspondence could look like this: (1) Remember Me (ﬁ g. 1), the research 
question, is most ﬁ gurative because human portraits were used and represented. Th e 
ﬁ gurative elements, however, were described as ‘covering up’ visual concerns. (2) Th e 
research was, therefore, ﬁ rmly deﬁ ned as having to take place within the constructive 
elements of the ﬁ gure (such as the grid, for example), for which the outer and inner forms 
were crucial. (3) In this form, however, the ﬁ gure was experienced as ambiguous and 
unstable, moving beyond its constitutive process. 
Following such a progression, the research would have ‘discovered’ the matrix-ﬁ gure and 
with it the ﬁ gural within post-photographic practice. Reﬂ ection, as introduced above 
through Fichte, Schelling and the Romantic philosophers, would suit such a progress 
perfectly well, where a reﬂ ective practice moves towards totality and the absolute; i.e., 
true understanding.
It is undeniably possible to look at the research like this. Chapter 1, the most practice-
oriented part of this study, is perhaps also the one that most clearly describes the research 
as a progression towards a notion comparable to Lyotard’s ‘ﬁ gural’. Chapter 1 gives an 
account of studio work carried out for this research and is as such already a reﬂ ection, 
which is, as we have seen, a transformation of the work. Th e text is thus from the outset 
caught in its reﬂ ective devices, making it diﬃ  cult to talk of progress in the work in advance 
of a text. In fact, Lyotard’s work, at least of the early period, can be seen as an attempt to 
resist the dominance of the discourse over the visual. (Jay, 1994: 543ﬀ ) If the ﬁ gural were 
to be taken as the practice’s underlying text, much of his work would be undone, because 
it would re-inscribe the discourse back into the visual. Th is is not only a question of a 
written text but also of the studio: discourse, written or not, may have informed practice 
all along, since discourse is as ﬁ rmly established in art as it is in philosophy.
Reﬂ ection being, as described, a transformative process, cannot fully mirror itself. If it 
attempts to do so, it will create an image of itself, a speculation. Th at this speculation 
would zoom in on the diﬀ erential and thus reﬂ ective matrix-ﬁ gure if seen as a development 
from the image-ﬁ gure and the form-ﬁ gure would be no surprise, because the ultimate 
speculation of a reﬂ ective practice will be in its own image. At the same time, however, 
such practice would also be limiting itself within its reﬂ ective practice as reﬂ ection became 
the only point of interest, which will in time be nothing but reiterated. Diﬀ erence in 
practice is thus levelled at the same time as practice as diﬀ erence is ‘discovered’. 
A progressive understanding of ‘reﬂ ection’ may thus be counterproductive to the 
establishment of an artistically deﬁ ned notion of research. In eﬀ ect, when the ﬁ gural 
introduces the visual to reﬂ ection, it challenges us to understand reﬂ ection visually. Th e 
visual has to aﬀ ect the common notion of reﬂ ection as discourse-based. Aware of this, 
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Lyotard does not just introduce the ﬁ gural as an explanation of the visual. He sees that 
the discourse needs to be questioned in relation to its own dependency on visuality. 
Discourse, as it were, needs to quite literally make space for the visual in reﬂ ection. Once 
this is achieved, research such as that carried out for this PhD need not repeat discourse’s 
temporal, i.e. progressive, function, but can deliver artistic results in their own right. 
Th e three aspects of the ﬁ gural thus need to be seen as principally simultaneous; in other 
words, their diﬀ erence does not make the ﬁ gure within the practice go forwards, but 
rather, it causes it to go inwards into its inner workings. Principally, a ﬁ gurative work 
excludes neither form-ﬁ gure nor matrix-ﬁ gure. Artistic reﬂ ective practice can thus be 
seen not as progression but as transgression, working towards an understanding that was 
always already visible.
5.4 Deconstruction
Th e ‘ﬁ gural’ is the notion that Lyotard uses to describe visuality. It breaks down into the 
three aspects of image-ﬁ gure, form-ﬁ gure and matrix-ﬁ gure, the latter being the most 
essential because its movement, or pulse, approximates best the inner workings of vision. 
Lyotard arrives at the ﬁ gural by deconstructing the opposition between discourse and 
the ﬁ gure, between writing and art. To explain Lyotard’s method of deconstruction in 
Discours/Figure, Rodolphe Gasché goes back in his text Deconstruction as Criticism (Gasché, 
1979) to an account given by Jacques Derrida in Margins of Philosophy. ‘Deconstruction’, 
according to Derrida, ‘cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to a neutralization: 
it must, by means of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice an 
overturning of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system.’ (Derrida, 
1999: 329) In other words, deconstruction does not happen in a single step. If it did, 
deconstruction would only oﬀ er some sort of negative take to an original proposition, a 
critique that would stay within the system that created the proposition and its negation 
in the ﬁ rst place. According to Gasché, Lyotard ﬁ rst reverses the hitherto dominant order 
that places writing before art, by privileging the visual through the notion of the ‘ﬁ gure’. 
Discours/Figure already starts boldly as a ‘defense of the eye’. (Lyotard, 2002: 11) Th e 
second step is more diﬃ  cult to explain since the now privileged term of the ‘ﬁ gure’ has 
to be displaced or ‘reinscribed’ (Gasché, 1979: 184) into the ‘discourse’, making the 
‘discourse’ re-appear as a transformed term. Anne Tomiche reminds us that this may be 
seen as a double negation (the negation of a negation), which only logically reduces itself 
to zero, while on an ‘aﬀ ective level’ this reduction does not take place. (Tomiche, 2002: 
11)
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To explain this, Gasché goes back to Lyotard’s discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s Th e Visible 
and the Invisible. (Merleau-Ponty, 1968) In his last and unﬁ nished book, Merleau-Ponty 
discusses reﬂ ection as a physical and not logically idealised process. As he says: ‘Th e 
reﬂ ection recuperates everything except itself as an eﬀ ort of recuperation, it clariﬁ es 
everything except its own role.’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 33) Negation understood as 
critical reﬂ ection, which displaces as it reﬂ ects, thus cannot be undone, i.e. traced back. 
When in Discours/Figure ‘discourse’ reappears as the result of such double reﬂ ection, it is 
a positive term, but it is not the same term it was before undergoing the deconstructive 
procedure. It has, so to speak, ‘experienced’ its dependence on the ﬁ gure as its dependent 
other. ‘Discourse, in this way, appears surrounded and undercut by the ﬁ gural’ (Gasché, 
1979: 184), questioning the idea of ‘progress’ in discourse. Th e notion of the ‘ﬁ gure’, 
on the other hand, also had to be eﬀ ected in order to be able to occupy a place within 
the discourse, which Lyotard indicates by shifting the term ‘ﬁ gure’ to the notion of the 
‘ﬁ gural’. Th e ﬁ gural functions in a similar way to Derrida’s notion of ‘diﬀ érance’ (Derrida, 
1999) as ‘the principle of disruption that prevents any order from crystallizing into full 
coherence’ (Jay, 1994: 564), except that the ﬁ gural carries in its name a closer relation to 
the visual and ultimately to art.
Deconstruction may also serve to describe the practice of artistic research employed in 
this PhD. Put simply, the present research delivers a deconstruction of photography, 
deﬁ ning what has been called ‘post-photography’ not as the digital successor of analogue 
photography but rather as a realisation of photography’s dormant potential. Chapters 
2, 3 and 4 each indicate a particular step in the deconstructive operation. Chapter 2 
describes the dominant model of photography that privileges the picture over the process. 
Th e picture as photographic image is taken as essential to the deﬁ nition of photography 
today. Th e process, on the other hand, is deﬁ ned as the application of rules or algorithms 
in the widest sense, making the process in extremis almost non-photographic. (Indeed, the 
notion of the ‘technographic’ was used in support of a generalised ‘photographic’ process.) 
Chapter 3 facilitates the ‘overturning of the classical position’ (Derrida) by radically 
privileging the process over the picture within the notion of ‘information’. Information 
is thought of as procedural, while images only appear as random possibilities, having 
no essential qualities. Th e end of Chapter 3 indicates the ‘displacement’ of the image 
(or the artwork in general) that is carried out in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, the process is 
reinscribed into the picture (or the work) through the function of vision, which can see 
process in a picture. Even more radical, the visual picturing of the process was described 
as a property of the work rather than the perceptual performance of the spectator. Th is 
crucial step was argued for through Robert Smithson’s Enantiomorphic Chambers (ﬁ g. 
142) and the reversal of vision that they produce when themselves becoming ‘a pair of 
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alien eyes’ (Smithson). Th e notion of the ﬁ gure was used to describe pictures or works in 
general that have themselves become reﬂ ective agents.
Now that the work is reinstated, albeit ‘surrounded and undercut’ (Gasché), by the 
process, the deconstructive operation is complete. If one wanted to complete the circle, 
what before had been called the ‘picture’ would now be called the ‘ﬁ gure’, to indicate that 
the ﬁ gure is not only an element of the picture but has aﬀ ected the picture itself. In a 
textual context, such as in the present study, this process is indeed complete because the 
various images, pictures or artworks all appear as ﬁ gures indicated by the label ‘ﬁ g.’ in 
the text and underneath the work. One may think in this respect of Marcel Broodthaers’s 
Museum of Modern Art, Eagles Department (ﬁ gs 162 – 164) and other related works, where 
the label (and the ‘ﬁ g.’ that is often written on the label) indicate the transformation of 
the work into the ﬁ gure. Such a reading is opposed to Krauss’s understanding of the labels 
in Broodthaers’s works in her book A Voyage on the North Sea. As she says: 
‘Every material support … will now be levelled, reduced to a system of pure 
equivalency by the homogenizing principle of commodiﬁ cation, the operation of 
pure exchange value from which nothing can escape and for which everything is 
transparent to the underlying market value for which it is a sign. Th is reduction 
was given manic form by Broodthaers as he aﬃ  xed “ﬁ gure” labels to random sets 
of objects, eﬀ ecting their equivalence through the tags that assign them as either 
“Fig. 1,” “Fig. 2,” “Fig. 0,” or “Fig. 12.”’ (Krauss, 2000: 15) 
Her explanation stays, so to speak, within the ﬁ rst step of deconstruction, which is a mere 
reversal; i.e., indicating the loss of meaning in ‘random sets of objects’. Despite this, she 
quotes Broodthaers himself in the latter part of the book: ‘A theory of the ﬁ gures would 
serve only to give an image of a theory. But the Fig. as a theory of the image?’ (Quoted in: 
Krauss, 2000: 33) However, even with this knowledge, Krauss is not able think of image 
as ﬁ gure. In relation to Broodthaers’s work on Mallarmé, who was very important to both 
Lyotard and Derrida, Krauss states that the ‘ﬁ gs’ that Broodthaers uses ‘question rather 
than imitate the calligraphic status of Mallarmé’s pages’ (Krauss, 2000: 51), still refusing 
to think radically of the image as ﬁ gure.
Krauss’s diﬃ  culties in arriving at ‘the Fig. as a theory of the image’ whilst focusing on 
Broodthaers’s artwork may have a structural reason, because as artist Broodthaers cannot 
strictly speaking put forward a theory of the image, but only a speculation, i.e. a question. 
Artistic practice stays caught in artistic practice and is not able deliver the ‘ﬁ nal’ reﬂ ection; 
i.e., the ultimate transformation of the work into a theory. Artistic research, on the other 
hand, attempts to transform what can only be speculative in art into a theory proper. 
However, it can do this only if art is not discourse’s limited other. As both Lyotard’s and 
Derrida’s deconstruction of writing show, art can have a place in writing but only if both 
art and writing realise their diﬀ erential relationship.
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Concerning theory, this research could join forces with Didi-Huberman’s position 
recently expressed in Confronting Images (Didi-Huberman, 2005), where he sees a ﬁ gural 
understanding of images as central to their liberation from art, as established through 
a historical category in the Renaissance. Didi-Huberman, in particular in his book on 
Fra Angelico (Didi-Huberman, 1995), is mobilising Pre-Renaissance images in terms of 
ﬁ guration with results that often come close to my own research. I would in particular 
point out the visual function of the blobs, or ‘blotches’ as he calls them, which are 
‘operators of conversion’. (Didi-Huberman, 1995: 21) Th ese ‘multi-coloured zones … 
exist between the background and the foreground.’ (Didi-Huberman, 1995: 34) Th ey 
are ‘critical ﬁ gure[s], the introduction of a crisis into every semblance.’ (Didi-Huberman, 
1995: 56) And further: ‘[T]he primary virtue of dissemblance consists of imitating, not 
the aspect but the process.’ (Didi-Huberman, 1995: 96) However, the religious context 
plays its part, and it would have to be the concern of a diﬀ erent text to delimit religion 
in relation to the ﬁ gure. Fra Angelico’s paintings are, consequently, ‘helping a believer 
visually to move away from the visible’. (Didi-Huberman, 1995: 224) What remains to 
be addressed is not so much the Christian understanding of the image (or its Renaissance 
counter-model), but the contemporary function that an image as ‘ﬁ guring ﬁ gure’ (Didi-
Huberman, 2005: 141) can have, in particular when it comes to knowledge in relation to 
artistic research and not knowledge about art. (Didi-Huberman, 2005: 82)
5.5 Against Writing
Lyotard’s own philosophy after Discours/Figure is a good case in point regarding what 
happens when the question of artistic speculation is answered by theory. Using his example, 
I want to indicate that the theory extended by research from artistic speculation needs to 
stay within visual parameters (the ﬁ gure) in order not to subordinate art to writing.
As mentioned above, the three aspects of the ‘ﬁ gure’ can be seen as a progressive 
development towards the matrix-ﬁ gure or, alternatively, as simultaneously at play in any 
ﬁ gure. I have opted in my research for the second possibility, but I believe that Lyotard, in 
particular in his later writings, may have increasingly seen the matrix-ﬁ gure as dominant. 
Two reasons guide this impression.
Firstly, building on the way in which the matrix-ﬁ gure is situated at the limit of visibility, 
Lyotard appears to have become more convinced that the matrix-ﬁ gure is what enables 
vision, while both the image-ﬁ gure and the form-ﬁ gure are visible without enabling 
seeing. Th us the three aspects of the ‘ﬁ gure’ are not of the same order. Moreover, he 
favours that which makes vision possible over that which is visible when he writes: 
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‘Recognition from the regulatory institutions of painting – Academy, salons, 
criticism, taste – is of little importance compared to the judgement made by the 
painter-researcher and his peers on the success obtained by the work of art in 
relation to what is really at stake: to make seen what makes one see, and not what 
is visible.’ (Lyotard, 1992: 102)
Instead of questioning the opposition between seeing and enabling to see, Lyotard discerns 
in the matrix-ﬁ gure the origin for seeing in the temporal order of cause and eﬀ ect. He 
indicates that research in the person of the ‘painter-researcher’ must take care of what he 
considers vision’s foundation.
Secondly, he identiﬁ es what he believes to be vision’s basis in Barnett Newman’s 
speculations on the sublime in the artist’s 1948 text Th e Sublime is Now (Newman, 1992), 
and attempts to deﬁ ne postmodern art through the concept of the sublime. Th e sublime 
is the notion that Kant reserves for sentiments that cannot be contained in any sensuous 
form. (Lyotard, 2001: 78) In Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism? Lyotard 
distinguishes two approaches. Th e ﬁ rst, he calls ‘modern aesthetics’, which nostalgically 
presents totality as that which is unpresentable. Th e second, ‘postmodern aesthetics’, 
‘would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in presentation 
itself ’. (Lyotard, 2001: 81) Modernism, as it were, utilises negative, empty form-ﬁ gures, 
whilst postmodernism discusses the matrix-ﬁ gure that underlies any ﬁ gure.
Deﬁ ned as such, the question of modernism or postmodernism is secondary to the 
question of the sublime, in so far as both are ways to cope with the unpresentable that 
made Lyotard choose the category of the sublime in the ﬁ rst place. From where, however, 
has the question of the failure of presentation entered the scene? Th e achievement that 
comes with the ﬁ gural, so it seems, lies in the spatialisation of reﬂ ection, allowing the 
visual to claim reﬂ ective status. However, at the same time as he introduced the visual to 
reﬂ ection, Lyotard took care to establish the visual qua matrix-ﬁ gure as invisible. 
Despite the fact that Lyotard attempts to make the sublime in both cases, modern and 
postmodern, operational for an artistic practice, his preference for the matrix-ﬁ gure 
extends into a theory of the sublime form as a threat against visual practice, which ﬁ nds 
itself either limited by the unpresentable totality or by the similarly unpresentable ﬁ gural. 
If Lyotard’s assessment is correct, postmodernism only realises modernism’s hidden 
dystopia, and is of no diﬀ erent quality, since both carry within themselves essential limits. 
Jacques Rancière is thus right to say:
‘From this moment onward [Lyotard’s realisation of the postmodern as sublime], 
postmodernism came into harmony with the mourning and repenting of 
modernatist thought, and the scene of sublime distance came to epitomize all 
sorts of scenes of original distance or original sin.’ (Rancière, 2004: 29) 
And this is also where, according to Martin Jay, Lyotard dropped ‘the complicated 
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“defence of the eye”’ (Jay, 1994: 580) with which the ﬁ gure was supposed to uproot the 
discourse. Didi-Huberman, on the other hand, makes clear that the visual should not be 
equated with the invisible. As he says: ‘Th is is why … we are using the visual and not the 
invisible as the element of this constraint of negativity within which images are caught, 
catch us.’ (Didi-Huberman, 2005: 143)
It appears as if a serious critique of Lyotard’s essential Romanticism is necessary. It may be 
said, as he does, that the sublime rather than the beautiful has been underlying modern art. 
(Lyotard, 1992: 93) Th is could, however, be just another way to conﬁ rm the importance 
of the Romantic movement to which Berlin referred. By linking the working of the visual 
to the totality of things, as Romanticism does, the ﬁ gure’s visual reﬂ ective transformation 
is made subordinate to a concept of totality that is necessarily beyond the eye. From an 
artistic position, however, this totality is nothing but a speculation, whereas the visual 
operation of a work, the ﬁ gure, is a factual experience. Romanticism may have ‘opened’ 
the path to the ﬁ gure, but it also philosophically mined it, just as Lyotard does, ﬁ nally, 
when subordinating the ﬁ gure to a conceptual gain. Truth, according to such a Romantic 
position, can never really be operational in the work, and even if it were, it would only 
relate to a conceptual totality beyond the work’s reach, reducing art, dialectically or not, 
into philosophy. For this reason, Alain Badiou, for example, proposes to open up the 
category of the single artwork into multiple works, extending reﬂ ection beyond the 
unity of the single work. Th us, resisting the extreme expansion into philosophy that now 
appears only as a shortcut to truth, Badiou can see truth at work in art. ‘Philosophy’, as he 
says, ‘does not itself produce any eﬀ ective truth’. (Badiou, 2005: 14) Th is issue deserves 
an extensive discussion, which is unfortunately beyond the limits of this PhD.
According to the position adopted in the present study, the unity of the visible ﬁ gure in 
all three senses of the word has to be maintained against a philosophy – if necessary – that 
might challenge practice to declare what it is that it does. Answering this challenge seems 
to resolve in an objectiﬁ cation that ﬂ attens the reﬂ ective depth achieved in the subject-
work. Th is may, following Badiou, need to be seen as extending into a constellation of 
subject-works. Against Badiou’s negative understanding of philosophy in relation to art, I 
would maintain that philosophy should be required to respond reﬂ ectively; i.e., to accept 
the challenge of transformation posed by the work within its own domain: in other 
words, as philosophy. Writing has the extraordinary ability to take up art’s serious visual 
and reﬂ ective proposition for an additional transformation. Only writing, in approaching 
the work from the outside, can create the reﬂ ective coherence of the work, giving the work 
at the same time a discourse, which we have started to call ‘artistic research’. Without 
philosophy’s respect for art and the achievements of visuality, nothing is gained.
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Chapter 6: Artistic Research
6.1 Against Art 
For artistic research to claim its proper institutional place, art’s relation to knowledge 
needs to be made explicit. Many artists quite naturally claim that they ‘do research’ when 
developing new work. An artist may, for example, source new materials, look at the 
history of a particular practice, or experiment with new modes of production whilst 
calling all of this ‘research’. True, whatever we do, we learn something, but this does not 
mean that the practice is a ‘research’ practice. Looking at the historical account given 
in the last chapter, there seems to be a strong tendency towards an emancipation of 
art in relation to knowledge that spans from Plato’s dismissal to Kant’s acceptance and 
Schelling’s diﬀ erentiation between types of art, which opened up the possibility for artistic 
research. Even before anybody ever thought about that notion, artists and philosophers 
have looked at the inner workings of art, foregrounding reﬂ ection and more recently, 
ﬁ guration, as organised processes from which, now that the category has been invented, 
a step into research proper can be taken. 
Th e philosophical challenge that comes with this step, however, is extraordinary, since 
much of our occidental worldview is based on an exclusion of art, even if at times 
the opposite has been claimed. Nietzsche was probably the ﬁ rst philosopher radically 
to experience the shock of such a challenge, which made him question the whole of 
Western philosophy beginning with Plato, calling the point that was reached when truth 
as understood by Plato was ‘abolished’, ‘the end of the longest error’. (Nietzsche, 1988b: 
80f ) Th e problem, quite simply, was that Plato was unable to imagine a place for art 
within the category of ‘truth’ that his philosophy imposed, despite the fact that a will 
towards locating an appropriate register for art is more than apparent in his writings. In an 
astonishing section of the Republic, one can almost feel Socrates’s disappointment when 
he has to conclude that art should be ‘renounced’, even though he has just sung Homer’s 
praises. Socrates sets up a challenge, to which I think we are only now responding:
‘However, let us freely admit that if drama and poetry written for pleasure can 
prove to us that they have a place in a well-run society, we will gladly admit them, 
for we know their fascination only too well for ourselves; but it would be wicked 
to abandon what seems to be the truth [namely, that art should not be admitted]. 
I expect you feel the fascination of poetry yourself, don’t you,’ I asked, ‘especially 
when it’s Homer exercising it?’
‘I do indeed.’
‘It is only fair, then, that poetry should return if she can make her defence in lyric 
and other metre.’
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‘Yes.’
‘And we should give her defenders, men who aren’t poets themselves but who love 
poetry, a chance of defending her in prose and providing that she doesn’t only 
give pleasure but brings lasting beneﬁ t to human life and human society. And we 
will listen favourably, as we shall gain much if we ﬁ nd her a source of proﬁ t as 
well as pleasure.’
‘Yes, we shall gain a lot.’
‘But if they fail to make their case, then we shall have to follow the example of the 
lover who renounces a passion that is doing him no good, however hard it may be 
to do so.’ (Plato, 2003: 607 c-e)
As far as Socrates is concerned, art must make a case for itself, but strangely, it cannot do 
so, since he requires ‘defenders, men who aren’t poets themselves’ to speak on art’s behalf. 
In other words, art is so far removed from the truth that a process of translation must be 
set in place through which Socrates can understand what he already knows: namely, that 
art works and may have a relation to truth. We artistic researchers are, to a certain degree, 
still in the process of convincing the world to accept art when it cannot think what the 
truth is that it can deliver.
Th e history of art has, of course, been strongly aﬀ ected by the place into which it has 
been relegated. It would be naïve to think that art, not only as imagined by Plato, but 
also as practised today, could simply make a case for its own relevance and get on with 
living happily ever after. Before this can happen – assuming that it ever can – art must 
strip itself of the assumptions that have been aﬀ ecting it. In other words, a fundamental 
critique of art is necessary, and this must come initially from the experience of the work, 
its ﬁ guration, which will then need to make its impact on the discourses of art and 
philosophy. Socrates can only be convinced about art’s validity if art has the reﬂ ective 
ability to aﬀ ect his own discourse so that he is ﬁ nally able to see. If art, however, remains 
in philosophy’s shadow, Socrates will continue to see nothing but good reasons to reject 
it.
Th e last chapter ended with a demand for writing to be used but not imposed on art 
so that art may retain its own reﬂ ective stance. Th is ﬁ nal chapter starts with a demand 
for art to wake up to the question of its own place. Art has, unfortunately, become a 
generalisation applied to all sorts of practices that are not considered to be fully logical. 
Robert Musil, for example, has wondered what sort of times we are living in, when a 
race horse can be said to have ‘genius’. (Musil, 1955: 46) Typing in the words ‘the art of ’ 
into any internet search engine will deliver plenty of examples of what the same current 
thinking considers ‘art’ may extend to, ranging from ‘shaving’ to ‘losing’; even within the 
more elitist world of the ‘ﬁ ne arts’ there is such an undiﬀ erentiated range of reﬂ ective or 
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unreﬂ ective practices that the category of ‘art’ must be given up in order to deﬁ ne ‘artistic 
research’, since otherwise an endless task of art criticism would ﬁ rst have to be exercised 
before any sensible characterisation could be made.
6.2 Supplementation
Given both the historical problem and the institutional reality, it comes as no surprise 
to learn that when practice-led research was established in the United Kingdom, the 
traditional order between art and knowledge was preserved: art was there to create, discourse 
was there to reﬂ ect, and no challenge was made to this assumption. In the institutional 
context, two deﬁ nitions of ‘research’ are central. Th e Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC) states that ‘creative output’ on its own cannot be seen as research. 
Rather, it ‘expect[s] this practice to be accompanied by some form of documentation of 
the research process, as well as some form of textual analysis or explanation to support its 
position and to demonstrate critical reﬂ ection.’ (AHRC, 2004) Th e Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE), moreover, states that research should be an ‘original investigation 
undertaken in order to gain knowledge and understanding’. (RAE, 2001) Th e AHRC’s 
deﬁ nition is somewhat ambivalent, since on the one hand it does not accept artworks 
as research, while on the other it downplays the function of writing, suggesting that it is 
there only to ‘document’, ‘support’ and ‘demonstrate’. As much as the deﬁ nition seems 
to accept a secondary emphasis on text, it is still clear that ‘research’ is looked at only in 
relation to the text, since this is where critical reﬂ ection is to be found.
Th us, despite the fact that artistic practice on its own cannot be seen as research, it is 
nevertheless its source, while the written elements need to supplement this practice for it 
to become research. Th e necessary supplementation of art by writing when it comes to 
research, however, denies reﬂ ective artistic practice the status of research; art can create 
new forms, but it is not considered an adequate discourse to give meaning to those forms. 
Textual reﬂ ection, on the other hand, not being the site of ‘creativity’, must maintain a 
discourse that is hardly compatible with, let alone reﬂ ective on, an artistic account, since 
the chief models of discourse applied to art are taken from philosophy or art history.
At the same time, the RAE deﬁ nition, according to which research has to be ‘original’, 
makes explicit the idea that ‘knowledge and understanding’ are ‘gained’ progressively, 
putting even greater pressure on art to create novelties to be absorbed by discourse. Th us 
the choice between progressive and transgressive research that was discussed in Chapter 5 
is institutionally biased by discursive demands that are not necessarily artistically relevant. 
Th is particular study has oﬀ ered a reﬂ ective model for both options, progressive as well as 
transgressive, placing itself at the limits of what is deemed to be acceptable by preferring 
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the latter. However, it is the progressive model, which emphasises art’s creative over its 
reﬂ ective signiﬁ cance, that is institutionally assumed and reaﬃ  rmed. Th is has, as Didi-
Huberman makes clear, been inherited from a particular emphasis on the human during 
the Renaissance, which is today, to say the least, questionable. (Chapter 5)
Such progressive humanism is not just being questioned in the debate on research 
methodology. Th e question, in fact, goes all the way through to the practical artistic 
concerns that triggered the present research in the ﬁ rst place: the status of the picture, 
the process and the site of meaning. Much of the supplementation that makes art the 
mute source of meaning has been criticised within artistic practice. Art & Language, 
for example, have launched a series of outspoken reﬂ ections on the state of art that have 
attempted to provoke a diﬀ erent way of thinking. As they wrote in their account of their 
own practice, Provisional History, in 1982:
‘[W]hat perhaps united the founder members of Art & Language more than 
anything else was an intuition that, under the speciﬁ c circumstances of art at the 
time, the production of a ﬁ rst-order art was a virtual impossibility, unless assent 
was given to those fraudulent conceptualizations by means of which normal art 
was supported and entrenched. Defensible work must ﬁ rst and foremost entail 
a critique of those conceptualisations – the development of a ‘second order’ 
discourse in terms of which the normal discourse and production might be 
described and explained.’ (Harrison and Orton, 1982: 21)
One way in which they responded to their own concerns was to integrate their critical 
writing into art installations, such as in the famous Index 01 (ﬁ g. 165), shown at 
Documenta 5, Kassel, in 1972, for which the artists used previously published material 
along with new manuscripts, organising their texts in eight ﬁ ling cabinets.
However, although this sounds like the beginning of artistic research triggered by the 
concerns surrounding Conceptual practice, in eﬀ ect this is not the case; there is no 
straight history connecting Conceptual art with artistic research. According to Art & 
Language’s position, as cited above, art can only maintain its primacy if it engages with 
the discourse that has been unwittingly produced by traditional practice. If, however, that 
discourse is supplemental or ‘second order’, placing art ﬁ rst as the originator of meaning, 
then it would be repeating rather than questioning that discourse, due to the very fact 
that the concept of art as primary has remained in place. Exhibiting the discourse as Art 
& Language did in Index 01 does not undo the discourse’s supplemental function. If 
anything, it complicates it.
As the example of Art & Language testiﬁ es, the supplementation of art is not only a 
problem in regard to discourse but also in regard to practice. It is only when art shapes 
discourse, i.e. within post-conceptual practice, that the supplementation of art can be 
undone, making it necessary to formulate artistic discursive forms. In the present study, 
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artistic research is understood as such an artistic discursive form that aims to challenge 
some of the preconceptions inherent in the institutional deﬁ nitions of practice-led 
research.
6.3 Artistic Research
Th e general debate around ‘practice-led research’, apparently the notion of ‘research’ 
currently preferred by the AHRC (Biggs, 2006: 185), may be seen to repeat the order in 
which discourse supplements practice. On the one hand, there are those who believe that 
art, being a reﬂ ective practice, is already a form of research. Graeme Sullivan’s book Art 
as Research, for example, sets out to prove that the main requirements for any research, 
namely ‘rigor and systematic inquiry’ (Sullivan, 2005: xi), are already part of artistic 
practice. Once these are made explicit, he believes, ‘studio-based inquiry in the visual arts 
will have greater institutional credibility’. (Sullivan, 2005: xiii) Th ere are also those, on 
the other hand, who believe that practice needs to be made accountable for the research 
it delivers in order to discriminate between a general artistic practice and a more speciﬁ c 
artistic research practice. (Cf. Biggs, 2006: 193) Th is is of particular importance when it 
comes to the assessment of a PhD. Such a position, it appears, does not contest the fact 
that artistic practice in general may loosely be seen as research; it only takes issue with 
the lack of criteria with which to evaluate whether research has taken place in a particular 
practice or not. As Victor Burgin states: 
‘Th e question of whether visual art production constitutes research is not a 
signiﬁ cant issue. Th e substantive issue for visual arts departments now is the 
widespread inability or disinclination to clearly distinguish between an art work 
and a written thesis, a tendency to obfuscate or ignore the diﬀ ering speciﬁ cities 
of two distinct forms of practice.’ (Burgin, n.d.: 6)
It is certainly true that, as Henk Slager says, ‘In the topical practice of visual art, artists 
increasingly consider their activities a form of research.’ (Slager, 2004: 12) It is dangerous, 
however, to equate this tendency with an institutional deﬁ nition of research, since once 
these doors are opened, criteria that were developed for the assessment of research may 
slip into the judgement of art. In fact, Simon Sheik warns that on a European level, 
the introduction of artistic research, together with what he calls the ‘Bologna process’, 
which is the standardisation of education within the European Community, will ‘merely 
substitute a system of discipline with a system of control’ (Sheik, 2006), where institutional 
regulations may exercise an impersonal stranglehold on artistic practice in art schools. In 
relation to European policy, Hermann Pitz adds that ‘if we go on with PhD programs as 
a norm to give quality to artworks, then we have a problem’. (Pitz, 2006: 26) Christopher 
Frayling is also sceptical and wonders why, apart from ‘Research [having] become a status 
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issue’, artists  want to call their practice ‘research with a big “r” at all.’ (Frayling, 1993: 
5)
Art and research should be kept distinct for two reasons. Firstly, at a time when the notion 
of ‘artistic research’ is being shaped, an indiscriminate notion of practice as research would 
reduce the intellectual demand that the notion of ‘research’ puts on artistic-research 
practice. Secondly, if art and research are kept distinct, there will be no need to speculate 
on what art is and thus to qualify art that is allowed not to respond to the question of 
research; research does not and, indeed, should not, be used to regulate art.
When stepping into the paradigm of ‘research’, an artist must thus look at his or her work 
not as art but as research, and develop its place in this context. It is here that the question 
of supplementation really matters. Th e fact that research is seen as distinct from art, a step 
that privileges discourse, does not mean that it is clear what that discourse is or how it 
functions. Burgin, who seems to link research with a particular practice of writing, goes 
as far as to recommend that the written component of a PhD, even that with a ‘practical 
emphasis’, should be looked at ‘on its independent merits’. (Burgin, n.d.: 9) He does 
not clearly state which model of writing he proposes, but indicates in reference to a BA 
(Hons.) course he designed at the Polytechnic of Central London in 1973 that history, 
sociology, semiotics and psychoanalysis may guide the writing. (Burgin, n.d.: 3) Michael 
A.R. Biggs, who does not keep practice and writing as distinct as Burgin, develops a 
model whereby the ‘experiential content’ of a work needs to be represented in research. As 
a consequence, he adds, ‘it should be the purpose of art and design research to disembody 
the content from the experience and thereby render transferable what was formally 
subjective and non-transferable’. (Biggs, 2006: 200) Idealistic notions of subjectivity, 
such as those employed in this thesis, are not deemed acceptable since they would impact 
on the objectivity of the work, which he needs to see as empirically accessible for its 
‘defence’. (Biggs, 2006: 183) Writing is not in any of these cases aﬀ ected by the artistic 
status of the research. Th e more an artistic practice plays a part in the research outcome, 
as positions such as Biggs’s seem to demand, the more it needs to be told what is deemed 
acceptable, while a position such as Burgin’s, by separating artistic practice from writing, 
allows practice a freedom, albeit one without consequence.
It may be important to note at this point that the oﬃ  cially preferred notion of ‘practice-
led research’ by deﬁ nition suggests that practice leads research, and also that research 
is distinct from, and not aﬀ ected by, the practice. In preferring the notion of ‘artistic 
research’, I am trying to convey an idea of research not articulated by the above-mentioned 
positions, so that the research as a whole can be charged with artistic, and in my case, 
visual concerns.
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Stephen A.R. Scrivener similarly argues for research to be artistically deﬁ ned. If it were 
not, ‘a shift to research in the arts could be extremely damaging as it has implications for 
academic competence, through its graduates in the non-academic world, and through 
them for the general health of the arts’. (Scrivener, 2002) According to his argument, 
art, in contrast to other disciplines, has not developed a professional class in charge of 
the transformation of the discipline; every artist contributes to the transformation of art 
without necessarily being aware of it or being deﬁ ned through it. (Scrivener, 2006: 160) 
Academic artistic research is, according to him, an experiment that is being carried out 
at present, in which the transformation within the discipline of art is institutionalised 
through the creation of research degrees. (Scrivener, 2006: 165) Such a professional 
research class would ‘put into question what it means to be a professional artist’. (Scrivener, 
2006: 178) Scrivener’s position thus confronts the discipline of art with what appears to 
be artistic research as an academically institutionalised avant-garde that would have a 
transformational function in relation to general artistic practice.
Some elements of his argument are comparable to mine, in so far as he believes that 
reﬂ ective artistic practice is transformational. He also makes clear that he wants to use this 
element for a deﬁ nition of artistic research. Th e idea, however, that the purpose of research 
would be to transform a discipline or to ‘return the discipline to its own principles’, as 
Katy MacLeod and Lin Holdridge suggest (MacLeod and Holdridge, 2006: 8), is at odds 
with my position, because that which research is reﬂ ectively transforming is principally 
itself. Scrivener appears to understand transformation as historical progression that gives 
purpose to such a ‘new’ research class. Th is may be a limiting position. He is also not very 
explicit when it comes to the impact that artistic transformation as research practice may 
have on writing.
Norman Bryson focuses on the question of writing in his introduction to Always Both 
Faces when he writes: ‘While enormous attention is paid, rightly, to the axioms of the 
ﬁ eld and to renovating the critical foundations for thinking about visual art, relatively 
little attention goes into investigating what might be the axioms of writing at the doctoral 
level.’ (Bryson, 2000: 9) In his opinion, ‘the dead hand of the institution lays itself over 
the hand that writes’. (Ibid.) He, much like Burgin, understands writing as a diﬀ erent 
practice, except that for Bryson, writing should interact with studio-practice, in the end 
making it diﬃ  cult to tell ‘which is “ﬁ rst” and which is “second”’. (Bryson, 2000: 10)
MacLeod’s and Holdridge’s book Th inking Th rough Art (MacLeod and Holdridge, 
2006) demonstrates that much has changed since Bryson expressed his concerns, since 
many of the examples they have assembled over the last few years show how writing has 
become a concern within artistic research. Th eir notion of ‘research as art’, developed 
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from Frayling’s ‘research for art’ (Frayling, 1993: 5), deserves particular mention in this 
context. Basing their argument on Stephen Melville’s notion of ‘the work’, they indicate 
that the articulation of the work as work is an important aspect of what it means to be ‘a 
work’. As Melville says: ‘[W]riting would belong to such work as a part of its unfolding, 
a continuation of the conditions of its appearing.’ (Melville, 2001: 19) Such writing 
needs to be aﬀ ected by the work. In fact, the work as it appears in the writing is the work 
transformed, since only as transformative writing can the work appear as work.
It is of crucial importance to keep this position distinct from any form of ‘triangulation’, 
such as expressed in Art and theoria (Davey, 2006), Nicholas Davey’s contribution to 
MacLeod’s and Holdridge’s reader. His position is similar to Biggs’s as cited above, since 
both believe a ‘subject matter’ to exist that is communicated in studio practice and which 
can be ‘triangulated’ by writing. Such positions assume an invisible, addressable centre, 
much like a Platonic idea, which diﬀ erent modes can reﬂ ect. Reﬂ ection in such a case 
may be imperfect, it seems, but it needs to have an element of transparency, without 
which nothing prior, such as the work, could be indicated. ‘Triangulation’ is impossible, 
however, when – as pointed out in Chapters 4 and 5 – reﬂ ection transforms the work, 
since it does not leave any ‘subject matter’ behind that could be referred to in the context 
of writing.
It is thus the question of how something works that has concerned me in this PhD, and 
this reappears in relation to writing in this ﬁ nal chapter. Th is thesis has transformed or 
reconﬁ gured my work, and by doing so has made the work accessible as the work it now 
is. Most important for me is that the research would ﬁ nally be successful only if all of its 
concerns could ultimately be seen at work without recourse to any metaphysics whatsoever. 
If such reﬂ ection is possible, it should include the reader, whose understanding needs to 
be aﬀ ected should understanding happen at all.
Th e most important diﬀ erence that I have found between my own methodological 
position and that of those whose work I have read in this respect is the distinction I make 
between art and research. I would challenge the assumption that in deﬁ ning my research 
practice I should at the same time make general comments about what art is, as if art 
necessarily had to do with the ‘development of knowledge and understanding’. If artistic 
research is seen as at play in art in general, those forms of art that have diﬀ erent emphases 
may be misunderstood. I would much prefer to leave it open for artists to speculate 
about art in the context of art, while I hope I have forwarded a theory of artistic research 
appropriate to the knowledge and understanding called for by my initial question: ‘What 
does it mean to see like this?’ when confronted with particular post-photographic images. 
(Chapter 1) Th us my own deﬁ nition of ‘artistic research’ is that research is the conscious 
creation of an artistic practice mobilising what it can for that practice to come alive.
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6.4 Seeing like Th is
A blurred patch of colour is, at the end of this PhD thesis, still a blurred patch of 
colour. However, the interrelation of patches of colour in diﬀ erent works, as well as their 
contextualisation in technology, art history and philosophy, have proposed a transformed 
understanding of what that patch means visually. In the text, this change was indicated 
through the notion of ‘the ﬁ gural’, which replaced terms such as ‘patch’, ‘blob’ or ‘blotch’. 
In the practice, the shift must be seen as having occurred when the ﬁ gure was outlined 
and thus separated from the source material at the same time as constructive, procedural 
elements emerged in the space of the ﬁ gure itself. 
Th e Potato Prints (ﬁ g. 7), Th e Premier Rose (ﬁ g. 11) or Sudeley Castle (ﬁ g. 25) are 
examples of diﬀ erent modes of ﬁ guration that all nevertheless describe what ﬁ guration is 
and how it works visually. Th is PhD shows that it makes sense to speak of or to see a ﬁ gure 
within the most basic and even automated artistic gestures. Th e meaning of seeing ﬁ gures 
on this level is ﬁ rst and foremost directed against a reduced and narrow understanding of 
ﬁ gure as body, a position that makes it necessary to see the human body in such ﬁ gures 
or to not see ﬁ gures at all. On a more positive note, however, it is also directed towards 
the visibility of transformative reﬂ ection within shapes that become ﬁ gures. Th us the 
meaning of ‘seeing like this’ when confronted with Remember Me (ﬁ gs 1 and 2) is that 
meaning had already occurred before the question was asked. Th is meaning is inherent 
to the visual event, but only if we understand the seeing of a ﬁ gure as reﬂ ectively related 
to its ﬁ guration.
Moreover, ﬁ guration that is not the result of a perception can be seen at work beyond 
blobs or patches of colour in pieces such as Chokes (ﬁ g. 57). Here, ﬁ gures are produced 
through the programmed interrelation of ﬂ ickering ﬂ uorescent tubes. In time rather than 
space, these ﬂ ickering ﬁ gures are ‘outlined’ by comparatively long periods of stable light 
conditions when both lights are on or oﬀ . More than a pattern of ﬂ icker, Chokes performs 
a responsive relation between the two lights, allowing for an unpredictable experience of 
a programme caught in a randomised system.
In Chokes as much as in the Potato Prints, ﬁ guration is a visual principle. Figuration need 
not be visible to be at play, although it does need a visual register within which it can be 
understood. During the course of this PhD, seeing has been expanded through practice 
into visual thinking, with the result that a research interest has established itself as research 
practice, making it easier to see and to respond to ﬁ gures, but also making it easier to see 
how even the most ﬁ gurative work is a reﬂ ection of ﬁ guration. As a consequence, a whole 
history of art opens itself up, which, from today’s point of view, has been obstructed by 
restrictive notions of art that prefer human form within practice. Th us a visual thinking 
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that ambitiously places itself beyond such limits needs to be developed. I hope that from 
this point onwards my research can shed some of the conceptual restrictions that were 
necessary for the ambition to expand, but which now appear as arbitrary restrictions.
6.5 Conclusion
I was almost tempted to call this conclusion an ‘introduction’, for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, the research project has completely transformed my practice, which only now, at 
the end of the thesis, appears to be being introduced. Secondly, as far as this piece of 
writing is concerned, it is as if everything is turned on its head: to conclude with a section 
on method implies that the beginning, which in more conventional, i.e. scientiﬁ c, PhDs, 
seems to be so ﬁ rm, is in many ways only arrived at in the end. In fact, the conscious 
making of a beginning is probably the best deﬁ nition I myself can give of ‘research’. Th is, 
however, is a conclusion.
Th e organisation of the present text into the six chapters ‘Studio’, ‘Post-Photography’, 
‘Post-Conceptual Art’, ‘Figure’, ‘Reﬂ ection’ and ‘Artistic Research’ should have made 
apparent two simultaneous, albeit contradictory, movements. Th e ﬁ rst is an expansion 
of a concern that starts with a very speciﬁ c blob or patch of colour on an image and its 
reworking in the studio, moving through photography and Conceptual art into general 
questions of philosophy and the notion of ‘knowledge’. Th e second is a contraction, 
which makes the concern even more speciﬁ c in an expanded context, ending with a very 
particular stance on research practice. Th is is achieved due to the fact that each chapter 
initially declares its context before tracing the concern at hand into the context’s own 
depth. Each chapter thus ends with a result that is always displaced by the next chapter, 
in whose foreign context the concern reappears. 
Th e concern, as it turns out, that originated from a particular visible pattern has been 
transformed in the course of the research into a practice. From this point of view, it is 
not a written theory that is used to supplement a practice, but rather a practice that 
has come into being by taking hold within a discourse. Th e ﬁ rst steps were necessarily 
deconstructive. Th ey had to break the representational primacy of the pictorial image in 
order for the image as ﬁ gure to appear. Th e emerging philosophical speculation, however, 
needed to be constrained at this point, since the deconstructive process was not there 
to discover a philosophical truth. Lyotard, whom Gasché credited in Deconstruction as 
Criticism as having understood that deconstruction cannot become a desire fulﬁ lled 
(Gasché, 1979: 205), must be seen as failing on this account in the period following 
Gasché’s text, when Lyotard moved on to a theory of the ‘sublime’. My own insistence on 
the visible, aided by Didi-Huberman’s art-historical research, is in essence an insistence 
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on ﬁ gural practice. It is from this point that the speciﬁ city of my artistic research practice 
is developed against artistic or philosophical speculations. Th e slippage that seems to 
have occurred in Lyotard’s work from a how-question of discourse into a what-question 
of ﬁ guration could thus, I believe, be prevented by embracing the how as artistic-research 
practice.
Such research practice sits uneasily within the institutional regulations as shown in the 
current chapter. It is only during recent years that enough work has been done to give 
credibility to artistic practice in the domain of research. It is clear, however, that people’s 
opinion about the function of art plays a huge part in what they expect artistic research 
to be. Th is may be the reason why art appears to be so closely linked to research, despite 
the fact that the question concerning the category of art creates more problems than 
solutions. It is, however, necessary to contextualise the artistic-research practice that has 
been developed within methodological discourses; without such a step, research would 
always also appear as art. At the same time, it is deemed important to make an institutional 
point about the validity of the present approach, hopefully transforming not what people 
believe art is, but how they deﬁ ne artistic research.
We are now witnessing the ﬁ rst instances whereby organisers of scholarly conferences are 
accepting practical submissions. Th e European Conference of the Society for Literature, 
Science and the Arts (SLSA), Figurations of Knowledge, to be held in 2008 in Berlin, oﬀ ers 
a strand for practical projects. In its ‘call for papers’ the organisers state:
‘Over the past few years, there have been increasing calls for art to be granted 
a claim to understanding and research. Th e arts, it is said, can generate and 
formulate knowledge in their diﬀ erent disciplines – music, theatre, literature 
and dance etc. – which is equivalent to the production of scientiﬁ c ﬁ ndings, 
or which accompanies and supplements these. Most of those advocating this 
approach insist on the diﬀ erent nature of this knowledge and on the fact that 
artistic research cannot be transposed to the traditional forms of representation 
in science. We share this view and, at this year’s SLSA conference, therefore wish 
to introduce a new format or stream. Th e results of artistic research are no longer 
to be presented in talks and slide shows, i.e. secondary formats, but in the form 
of original contributions: an exhibition, a concert or a theatre performance, as an 
alternative to a scientiﬁ c talk.’ (SLSA, 2007)
Such initiatives are a sign of a changing culture where artistic research practice is allowed 
to ﬁ gure. At the same time, the organisers appear to repeat art’s position as primary 
in assuming that writing, i.e. ‘scientiﬁ c talk’, cannot sensibly relate to the knowledge 
‘produced’ in practice. Returning, however, to an original practice not aﬀ ected by writing 
now appears to be impossible, as this thesis suggests. Th us, oddly, the exercise to be 
carried out in response to such a call needs to prove that practice has become a form of 
writing. It may, however, be able to do this only by including a deconstructional text, 
since otherwise it would include traditional writing in absence.
97
Th e ﬁ nal point to make is thus that artistic research cannot do without writing as long as 
writing is the norm. Diﬀ erential and reﬂ ectively transformative artworks need to aﬀ ect the 
writing at the same time as they need to be aﬀ ected by the writing for the work to become 
research. Th e AHRC is in the end right to demand writing, but only if writing is allowed 
to happen in practice. In this way, what may look like the simplistic supplementation of 
art by writing has all the potential to generate true artistic research practice.
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